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ABSTRACT

Jeanne, Coulibaly Yekeleya. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2011. Diversification
or Cotton Recovery in the Malian Cotton Zone: Effects on Households and Women.

This dissertation investigates income diversification alternatives from the cotton
economy and compares those initiatives with present policy measures to restore the
cotton sector in Mali. It also derives the welfare implications for women of these various
policy measures.
During the decade preceding 2011, farmers’ incomes in the cotton zone of Mali
have been significantly affected by the downturn of the cotton economy explained by
many factors including the low farm gate cotton price, the declining cotton yields and soil
fertility concerns. In 2011, the Malian government substantially increased the farm gate
cotton price as a result of the world cotton price hikes and to stimulate a revival of the
domestic cotton industry. Also for the main crops, farmers had access to a 24 percent
fertilizer subsidy relatively to the market price as the government wants to intensify
agricultural production by improving soil fertility levels and raising crop yields.
With a farm household model that allows producers to make decisions at several
points in time, we evaluated farmers’ response to the government cotton pricing policy
and compared the income effect resulting from this latter policy with the adoption of
improved agricultural sorghum technologies plus marketing strategies. Then, we further
simulated the effects of the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy and the predicted
reduction in cotton farm gate price by 8 percent because the economic conditions of 2011
are expected to be temporary. The welfare implications on women of these various
policies were lastly derived.

xiii
Results showed that the substantial increase in cotton prices and access to
fertilizer subsidy are very effective policies that will substantially boost the expansion of
cotton area and farmers’ incomes. Maize will also benefit significantly from the increase
in cotton farm gate price. With the availability of the improved sorghum technologies and
marketing strategies, farmers’ incomes are further enhanced by 21 percent leading to
more income diversification. The expected 8 percent decline in the cotton price will
essentially be detrimental to cotton production as farmers will divert cotton land and
fertilizer use to sorghum. Moreover, the removal of the fertilizer subsidy will seriously
constrain intensive crop production and result in a sizable reduction in household wealth
by 21 percent but diversification into sorghum will become an important part of the crop
mix.
Overall, the most profitable economic opportunity for the household is not the
most beneficial for women. Women are made better off with the adoption of less labor
intensive technologies on the communal plot. So, there is need to focus more on women’s
specific welfare enhancing policies including access to better lands and inputs, reduction
of their labor requirements in agriculture and household activities.

xiv

LIST OF ACRONYMS

BNDA= Banque Nationale de Developpement Agricole
DAP= Diammonium Phosphate (18-46-0)
FCFA= Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine
CMDT= Compagnie Malienne de Développement du Textile
CIMMYT=International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
FAO= Food and Agriculture Organization
IER= Institut d’Economie Rurale
IMF= International Monetary Fund
INTSORMIL= International Sorghum and Millet Collaborative Research Support
Program
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem Statement
Agricultural technology introduction and marketing strategies are the main
policies to stimulate agricultural growth in sub-Saharan countries. In these countries,
agricultural development is constrained by low soil fertility, but water management
techniques and improved cultivars are also critical (Sanders et al. 1996). Hence, it is not
surprising that research programs have emphasized the diffusion of technologies based on
inorganic fertilizers, high yielding varieties, and water retention techniques.
In Southern Mali, diffusion of new varieties of sorghum cultivars combined with
increasing use of fertilizer and water retention techniques have been growing during the
past decades to respond to soil fertility constraints (Ayele and Wield 2005). This
diffusion process for new technologies of cereals (maize and sorghum) has also
accelerated recently with farmers’ disillusion from declining world cotton prices before
2010 (Baquedano et al. 2010). The downward trend in the world cotton price was due to
the cost reduction and output expansion effects due to the introduction of transgenic
cotton, Bt cotton in the major cotton producers, combined with the reduction of the
system of guaranteed cotton price by the Malian parastatal company (Droy 2008) as well
as the competition from synthetics.
The declining cotton price has encouraged Malian farmers to move away from
cotton to cereal technologies including sorghum. Farmers are diversifying away from
cotton through an increase in area and improved inputs allocated to the production of
cereals. In the cotton zone, cotton production and area cultivated over the past decade has
dramatically decreased by 80 percent (see figure 2.1) while maize and sorghum areas
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have increased by 143 and 18 percent1 (Malian Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). Some of
the fertilizer allocated as credit for cotton is presently being diverted to cereals especially
maize but including sorghum.
However, limited access to financial resources and cereal price collapses at
harvest, have an impact on farmers’ willingness to adopt new cereal technologies.
Farmers operate in an environment characterized by variability in rainfall and grain
market price collapses (Vitale and Sanders 2005). There are three types of price collapses
faced by staples in developing countries.2 These three price collapses reduce the expected
prices, hence the expected incomes. Hence, marketing strategies to moderate or eliminate
the price collapses are expected to increase the incentive to introduce new technologies.
In 2010, the world cotton market experienced a historic price spike characterized
by an 80 percent increase compared to the world price in 2009 (ICAC 2010). This price
surge is explained by the adverse impact of flood on cotton production in China, one of
the largest cotton producers and consumers. Thus, the Malian government decided to
raise the farm gate cotton price by 36 percent3 in nominal terms for the 2011 crop season.
This price increase had no precedent in the history of cotton in Mali over the past 15
years. Through this price policy the government expects to stimulate a large supply
response from producers and revamp the domestic cotton industry.
Also, with the potential increased income following adoption of new technologies
and marketing innovations in cereals, there is a need to investigate how decisions are
made within the household and the impact of the increased income on women’s welfare.
A large body of literature argues that women may not benefit from adoption of
1

Millet area has even doubled during the last decade, which is a symptom here of soil fertility depletion.

2

Prices collapse annually at harvest because famers need cash then and generally have limited storage
availability. Prices collapse in good and sometimes even normal rainfall years because there are few
alternative markets for food staples and an inelastic demand for them. In poor rainfall years when prices
start increasing rapidly, governments frequently intervene and drive down prices. Then the question is:
Without a marketing strategy to overcome some of these price collapses, when can farmers make money?
3

In 2011, the price has been raised to 255 F CFA/kg from the 185 F CFA/kg in 2010. The exchange rate
presently (May 2011) is 452 F CFA/kg.
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agricultural technologies on the communal family land because of the additional labor
requirements thereby reducing their labor available for their main source of income
“women’s private plots” (Kumar 1987, Gladwin and McMillan 1989, Lilja and Sanders
1998). In fact, the positive effects from technological change on the communal land on
women’s income may be reduced or eliminated by the decrease in labor availability for
their private plots.4
Thus, there are two main problems addressed in this dissertation. First, what are
the household income effects of further diversification of the cotton economy and how do
these compare with the present and potential policy measures being implemented to
revamp the cotton economy? Secondly, how would these various changes in technology,
marketing and policy affect the welfare of women (and by implication children)?

1.2 Objectives
The specific objectives of this thesis are:
1.

Estimate the income effect of the government cotton pricing policy and fertilizer

subsidy program. These are the innovations of Malian cotton policy in 2011.
2.

What happens to the cotton sector and to diversification when the cotton price

comes back down to its recent levels and the fertilizer subsidy on cotton is eliminated?
3.

Evaluate the impact of new sorghum technology and better marketing practices on

household income. Besides the yield effect following the adoption of improved
agricultural technology, farmers have been recommended various new marketing
strategies. What is the impact of these technology and marketing changes individually
and collectively?
4.

Estimate the impact of fertilizer subsidies on the adoption of sorghum technology-

marketing policy and on household incomes. In 2011, the fertilizer subsidy program was
extended to sorghum and millet as opposed to the previous years where it only targeted

4

However, a complete welfare analysis would need also to consider the welfare benefits to women from
the increased household expenditures made possible by the technological change.
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maize, cotton and rice. We consider the impact of the technology-marketing changes with
the addition of this fertilizer subsidy and what happens when it is removed.
5.

Estimate the welfare implications for women from the adoption of improved

sorghum technology-marketing innovations and the changes in the cotton policy.

1.3 Organization of the Research
This dissertation is organized as follows:
After the introduction, a descriptive analysis of farm production systems and
socio-economic characteristics of farm households in the geographical setting is
presented in the second chapter. Next, the third chapter lays out the improved sorghum
technologies and marketing strategies diffused by the IER-INTSORMIL program in
Mali. These technologies and marketing strategies will be the center of our analysis in
this research work. The fourth chapter develops the modeling framework and data used to
analyze the income effects of agricultural policies and marketing strategies. We discuss
the stochastic environment in which farmers make their decisions by analyzing variability
in yields and prices with secondary aggregate data. A stochastic sequential programming
model is used as the modeling framework and the model results are discussed in three
consecutive chapters. From these results, the welfare implications regarding the impact of
the cotton policy and sorghum technology-marketing innovation on women are analyzed
in the eighth chapter. Lastly, the conclusion and policy implications of the research work
are presented in a final chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY AREA

2.1. Introduction
This chapter analyzes the farm production system and socio-economic
characteristics of the farm households in the study area. The farming and economic
characteristics of the households in the study area will be used to construct the modeling
framework and to validate the model’s results in subsequent chapters. The analysis is
based on farm household data collected during a field survey for the crop year 2008/2009
and data consistency was checked during additional field visits in 2010 and 2011. The
primary data collection was complemented by aggregate data in the study area. The
chapter begins by presenting the geographical location, land use and soils types of the
study area. Then, it documents the traditional cropping systems of the average farm
household and the cotton farm gate price fixation mechanism. In a third section, the
chapter discusses the traditional crop yields in the study area and issues of fertilizer
supply. The chapter ends by analyzing the demographic and economic characteristics of
the sample surveyed.

2.2. Geographical Location, Land Use and Soil Types
The Koutiala cercle (equivalent French name in Mali for district) is located in the
Sikasso region of southern Mali near the neighboring countries of Ivory Coast and
Burkina Faso. This cercle is an old cotton zone. The rapid population growth has resulted
in an extension of area cultivated and an increase in the livestock herd size in order to
meet the increasing demand for food. The long time practice of cotton culture and
unsustainable land management has led to soil depletion and a reduction in the traditional
fallow systems (Kaya and Nair 2001). Land in the Koutiala cercle is a scarce resource.
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So, the resulting land scarcity combined with the poor quality of soils in the district make
imperative the introduction and diffusion of intensive technologies.
This is why since 2006, the IER-INTSORMIL project has disseminated in many
villages of the cercle, an improved technological package of sorghum composed of highyielding sorghum cultivars, moderate use of fertilizer and intensive agricultural practices.
The village of study selected for this research is Garasso. This village is the most
successful site for the adoption and diffusion of the sorghum technologies in Koutiala.
In Garasso sorghum is produced on all three topographic levels: plateau, slope
and lowlands. The soils range from clay, loam sandy and sandy soils. Sandy soils have
very low organic matter and infiltration capacity. Due to their poor level of fertility and
poor water retention capacity, sandy soils are mainly cropped to millet which tolerates
better low soil fertility and water scarcity than the other crops and is concentrated on the
plateau and slopes. Clay and loam sandy soils are of higher quality and sorghum responds
better in these soils. They are used to cultivate cotton, maize and sorghum often grown in
rotation.

2.3 Traditional Cropping Systems and Cotton Farm Gate Price
The crop season in the study area starts usually with the first rains which occur
generally in the end of May. The agricultural campaign takes place during the rainy
season. It starts in June with the planting activities and ends in December by the harvest.
The traditional crops grown by farmers are sorghum, millet, maize, cotton, peanut
and cowpea. Cotton is the first crop to be planted in June followed by maize and the other
grains and beans. Maize harvest occurs in August and September prior to the other crops’
harvest which is realized from October to December. Maize is considered to be a
“soudure” (hungry season) crop because it can be consumed during the period before
harvest when the food supply is most scarce.
The results in table 2.1 show that currently, the average farm size is estimated at
15 hectares per household. Under the traditional technologies, farmers on average
allocate 4 hectares of land to cotton, 5 ha of sorghum, 3 hectares to maize and millet. Half
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a hectare is devoted to peanut. Cowpea is not often grown by farmers. Those who do
plant it allocate very small areas of land and use the harvest to feed animals. The new
sorghum cultivar is grown on a pilot land of one hectare on average. So, the main crops
cultivated in the farming system are cotton, maize, sorghum and millet and they will be
the core crops that will be analyzed in the farm model.

Table 2.1: Areas and Yields of the Main Crops Cultivated in the Crop Year 2008/2009
Area cultivated in hectare
Crops
Cotton
Maize
Traditional Sorghum
Improved sorghum
Millet
Peanut
Cowpea
Total
Source: Primary Survey Data
Sample: 57 farmers interviewed

4.2
2.8
3.4
1.3
2.8
0.5
0
15.1

Yields
(kg/ha)
1,278
1,789
1,376
1,658
1,276
544

Garasso, like the other villages in the cercle of Koutiala, has been traditionally a
cotton growing area. During the flourishing years of cotton, from 1970 to the end of the
1990s, cotton was by far the main cash crop in the farming system. Since the end of the
1990s, the cotton economy has become less competitive with the declining world cotton
prices and the reduction of agricultural subsidy in the Malian cotton industry. Cotton area
and production have dropped by 80 percent in the decade from 1998 to 2008 (see figure
2.1) whereas the area planted for sorghum and millet have respectively increased by 18
percent and more than 100 percent (Malian Ministry of Agriculture 2009). The increase
in areas for the cereals as represented in figure 2.2 reflects an increasing productivity for
these crops. Moreover, presently with the collapse of the cotton economy, producers are
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diversifying away from cotton and are becoming increasingly interested in growing
intensively maize, sorghum5 and millet for consumption and marketing.

Figure 2.1: Cotton Area and Production in Koutiala (Mali), from 1998 to 2008.
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Mali

5

Traditionally sorghum has been considered a subsistence crop a type of insurance policy for poor yields of
millet. Increasingly there are new markets for sorghum as a food and feed.
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Figure 2.2: Area Planted to Sorghum, Millet and Maize from 1998 to 2008 in Koutiala
(Mali)
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Mali

The farm gate cotton price in Mali plays a key role in farmers’ land allocation and
has been generally dependent on the variations in the world cotton market. The farm gate
cotton price is fixed at the beginning of the cropping season by the CMDT, (Compagnie
Malienne de Développement du Textile). The CMDT is a parastatal cotton company in
charge of research, extension and marketing of cotton since 1974. This company is
primarily focused on the cotton industry and supplies production inputs on credit to
cotton producers and purchases the cotton production after harvest. The CMDT purchases
4 to 5 months after harvest the cotton seed at a pan-territorial guaranteed price announced
at the beginning of the planting season. Cotton seed is then ginned by the CMDT ginning
companies and sold in international markets.
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The price fixing process for cotton evolved over time. From 1974 to 1989 prices
were fixed by the government solely. Then, from 1989 to 2004, farmers ’organizations
became engaged in the negotiation process and a minimum guaranteed cotton seed
purchase price was established. The minimum guaranteed cotton price was fixed at 200 F
CFA/kg ($US/kg 0.44) and at 210 F CFA/kg ($US/kg 0.46) for the top quality cotton
seed. In 2005, with donors’ pressure on the Malian government, the CMDT and
farmers’organisations defined a new policy directly linking the farm gate cotton prices in
Mali to the international cotton price. However, the full variation in the international
cotton price was not transmitted directly to Malian farmers (Baquedano et al. 2010).
Some agreements between the CMDT and the representatives of farmers’organizations
specified the share of the international cotton price that will be paid to farmers and that
kept by the CMDT for any investment and management expenditures. The farm gate
price paid to farmers depends on their negotiation power and the government legislation
on the cotton seed price floor and price ceiling (Nubukpo and Keita 2005). With this new
policy, the cotton price ranged between 160 F CFA/kg ($US/kg 0.35) and 200 F CFA/kg
up to the crop year 2010-2011 when the cotton price was raised to 231 F CFA/kg
($US/kg 0.51) following a spike in the world cotton market. This unprecedented increase
in the world market resulted from poor harvest and demand expansion in China. Figure
2.3 below traces variation in the real price6 of the farm gate cotton seed from 1980 to
2011. We can easily identify the downward trend in prices from the 1990s up to the
recent year of 2011 characterized by the upswing of the cotton seed price. It is needless to
say that cotton farmers’ incomes have been also significantly reduced over the period of
declining cotton prices.
A central concern of this thesis is the impact of cereal technology introduction
from the various prices for cotton. In the long run we expect Mali to continuously lose
market share if it does not adopt Bt cotton as is already being done in more than 40
percent of world cotton production.
6

The real cotton seed price has been obtained by deflating the nominal prices using the GDP deflator with
2008 as the base year. Deflating the nominal cotton seed prices with the fertilizer prices would have been
ideal. But we didn’t have fertilizer prices for a very long time series (1980 to 2009).
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Figure 2.3: Real Cotton Prices in Mali from 1980 to 2011 (Base Year=2008)
Source: CMDT

2.4. Traditional Crop Yields and Fertilizer Supply
Crop yields depend on soil fertility as well as on the annual amount and
distribution of rainfall. Under the traditional technologies, maize and cotton principally
benefit from the application of inorganic fertilizer on a regular basis. Traditionally, 150
kg/ha of NPK, 50 kg/ha of Urea, 3l/ha of herbicide and 2 l/ha of insecticide are applied
on cotton field. Maize receives 100 kg/ha of NPK and Urea as well as 2l/ha of herbicide.
Since cotton and maize are the only crops that benefit from chemical fertilizer in the
traditional farming system, it is expected that competition will take place between these
two crops in the demand for fertilizer.
The fertilizer inputs for maize and production inputs for cotton (seeds, fertilizer,
herbicide and pesticides) are supplied by the CMDT. In addition to the cotton sector, the
CMDT has for two decades extended the supply of fertilizer loans to cereals, principally
maize which is very demanding of plant nutrients and weed control. Farmers are required
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to reimburse the input credit for both cotton and cereals in cotton value after harvest. The
loan reimbursement constraint will be a key component of the model formulation since it
will have an impact on farmers land allocation.
The CMDT purchases fertilizer from private suppliers and delivers the inputs to
farmers at the farm gate. Transportation costs are paid by the CMDT. Farmers have the
opportunity to purchase fertilizer directly from private suppliers. However, the input
loans from the CMDT do not require the farmers to pay transportation or transaction
costs. Also, the access to input loans releases the liquidity constraint that farmers often
face for the input purchase at the beginning of the cropping season.
The cost of fertilizer supplied by the CMDT is generally dependent on market
prices and government fertilizer policy. Over the past decade, the nominal price of NPK
has increased at an annual average rate of 8 percent, the Urea price has risen by 7 percent
per year, insecticides prices were almost constant whereas the herbicides prices increased
by 6 percent per year (Diakite et al. 2009). But in 2008, fertilizer (NPK and Urea) costs
spiked in Mali as in the rest of the world. Fertilizer costs in 2008 were 40 percent higher
than the cost in 2006. This surge in the price of fertilizer was due to a boom in the world
demand for cereals and oil. The sharp increase of the world fertilizer prices halted in
2009 and 2010 but during those years the Malian government subsidized the cost of
fertilizer for cotton and maize while fertilizer for sorghum and millet remained at their
market prices.
In 2011, the fertilizer subsidy program was extended to sorghum and millet. The
market prices for fertilizer during that latter year rose steadily to resume with their climb,
similarly to the world market. Table 2.2 reports the cost of fertilizer for cotton and cereals
supplied by the CMDT over the five past years. The fertilizer subsidy program will
undoubtedly increase yields and stimulate area expansion but in the international context
of fewer government interventions, this policy might not be very sustainable in the long
run. It will therefore be interesting to investigate with the model the effects with and
without the fertilizer subsidy program on farmers’ decision making and income.
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Table 2.2: Cotton Prices in Real Terms and Fertilizer Costs supplied by CMDT from
2007 to 2011
Years

Cotton Prices
(F CFA/kg)

2007
($/kg)
2008
($/kg)
2009
($/kg)
2010
($/kg)
2011
($/kg)

174
( 0.38)
200
( 0.44)
164
( 0.36)
172
( 0.38)
231
( 0.51)

Fertilizer Costs for Cotton
NPKBS
Urea
(F CFA/kg) (F CFA/kg)
283
242
( 0.63)
( 0.53)
369
380
( 0.82)
( 0.84)
259
259
( 0.57)
( 0.57)
250
250
( 0.55)
( 0.55)
243
243
( 0.54)
( 0.54)

Fertilizer Costs for Cereals
NPK
Urea
(F CFA/kg)
(F CFA/kg)
259
242
( 0.57)
( 0.53)
351
380
( 0.78)
( 0.84)
259
259
( 0.57)
( 0.57)
250
250
( 0.55)
( 0.55)
243
243
( 0.54)
( 0.54)

Source: CMDT, 2011.

Traditional yields for the year 2009 of the main crops grown by the sample of
farmers are summarized in table 2.3 and compared with aggregate yield data assembled at
the district level by the Malian Ministry of Agriculture.

Table 2.3: Farm Level and Aggregate Yield Data in the Study Area

Farmers' Yield 2008
Aggregate data in 2008
Average Aggregate data*

Maize
(kg/ha)
1789
2500
1832

Sorghum
(kg/ha)
1376
1500
1047

Millet
(kg/ha)
1276
1250
987

Cotton
(kg/ha)
1278
1134
981

Note: *The average aggregate data is a 10 year average data from 1998 to 2008.

From the sample of producers surveyed, traditional maize yields are by far the
highest among all crops. This is also confirmed with the aggregate data. Yield increase
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for maize has been impressive over the past 10 years (figure 2.4) compared to cotton,
sorghum and millet. The growth in maize productivity is the result of successful research
efforts invested in this crop during the past decades from CIMMYT in collaboration with
the national agricultural research program, IER. Surprisingly, despite the extension
services provided by the CMDT, cotton yields have been stagnant and even falling in
spite of the continuing use of high inputs. With declining cotton yields and increasing
maize productivity farmers have been diverting cotton fertilizer from the cotton fields
onto the cereals. Cotton still remains the main source of cash income for farmers. One of
the reasons of farmers’ constant interest in cotton is the benefits that they can get from
growing cotton in the form of access to credit and fertilizer. Moreover, fertilization has a
residual effect on the cereals in the crop rotation system. Also as contrasted with the grain
prices volatility and harvest price collapse, cotton offers stable returns with the minimum
guarantee cotton prices. Hence, greater access to fertilizer credit for the cereals and
adoption of grain marketing strategies to increase return on marketing are expected to
reinforce farmers’ interest for cereals at the expense of cotton.
Sorghum and Millet yields are not impressive because these crops are
traditionally grown without inorganic fertilizers except for the residual effects following
cotton in the rotation. Thereby, the use of improved inputs on those two cereals appears
to be essential for an increase in the traditional yields.
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Figure 2.4: Aggregate Cotton Yields and Cereals from 1998 to 2008 in Koutiala, Mali
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Mali

Rainfall in the area is not a severe constraint to agricultural productivity. The
cercle of Koutiala is known as a high rainfall area. The average amount of rainfall from
1980 to 2009 is estimated at 800 mm (Direction Nationale de la Meteorologie 2009). In
terms of annual quantity of rainfall, only 10 percent of the number of years since 1980
can be identified as poor rainfall years, while 90 percent are identified as normal and
good years of production. This region encounters flooding as in the years 1994 and 2010.
This is an especially serious problem for maize and sorghum as they are concentrated on
the lowlands. So, excess rainfall is a factor that needs to be taken into consideration in
explaining yield variability.
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2.5 Socio-economic Characteristics of the Representative Farmers
Based on the results of the field survey of 54 farm households, the socioeconomic characteristics of the representative farmer in the study area were defined. The
sampling was done randomly from a population of 100 farmers who participated in the
IER-INTSORMIL project for the diffusion of the improved sorghum technology.

2.5.1 Household Social Characteristics
In the sample of household heads surveyed, the average age of household heads is
57 years old (table 2.4). Households are extended families with on average 27 people
living together among which 14 people are above 15 years old. Field labor is basically
family based. On average, 10 household members work full time on the fields. In
Garasso, it is very common for adult males to migrate seasonally out of the farm. In each
family, an average of 2 people worked off farm seasonally in larger cities of Mali or in
neighboring coastal countries (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea). These migrants come
back to the farm to perform the farming activities required in the agricultural season.
Household heads interviewed have little formal education. Most of them do not have any
level of school education either in French or Arabic (table 2.4).
The main cereals consumed are by order of importance sorghum, millet and
maize. But these grains are perfectly substitutable in consumption. During the interviews,
farmers revealed their preference for millet and maize but the amount of maize consumed
is limited by the cost of the purchased inputs for maize production. This preference for
maize is consumption is expected to influence the crop allocation in response to a
fertilizer subsidy. Household daily grain consumption is estimated on average at 25 kg
per household or 0.93 kg per person per day.
One of the most important farming goals stated by producers is the need to meet
the subsistence consumption level every year. Thereby in the model construction, this
objective will be specified as a priority for farmers before maximizing their profits.
Households own a large number of cattle with an average of 20 animals per
family. In fact, cattle represent a main asset for farmers. Farmers invest their cash
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earnings in cattle which are considered as savings. Cattle play also a key role in the
farming systems. They provide the manure used as organic fertilizer on the crops and the
power in animal traction farm operations. They are important sources of cash for
financing the agricultural inputs for sorghum and millet and for some emergency family
expenses especially at the beginning of the cropping season where farmers often are
facing a liquidity constraint.

Table 2.4: Household Characteristics
Household Characteristics
Age of the household head
Number of people in the household below 15 years
Number of people in the household between 15 years and 35 years old
Number of people between 35 years and 65 years old
Number of people above 65 years
Total number of people in the household
Number of people working full time on the field
Number of migrants
Education level of household members
Household grain consumption (kg)
Number of Cattle
Source: Primary Survey Data
Sample: 54 farmers interviewed

Mean
57
13
9
5
1
27
10
2
0
25
20

2.5.2 Agricultural Inputs Financing
Farmers use several sources of liquidity to finance agricultural inputs such as
fertilizer, seeds, agricultural equipment and hired labor used during the rainy season.
These financial resources originate from livestock sales, crop sales, non-farm work,
remittances, and input loans for both cotton and the improved sorghum variety (table
2.3). Eighty four percent of the input expenses come from the cotton and maize credit
borrowed from the CMDT. Seven percent originate from the improved sorghum credit
contracted with the producer’s cooperative working under the IER-INTSORMIL
program. The remaining input expenses come by order of importance from the sales of
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crops (cotton, fruit trees, and grain), livestock and non-farm work. During the rainy
season, few non-farm activities are performed because farmers are busy working on the
fields. Producers are only able to devote time to non-farm work during the low labor
demand periods of the agricultural season and during the dry season. Examples of these
non-farm work are mechanic (bicycle and motorcycle repair), small food or clothing
retailing activities, and blacksmith. The revenue from non-farm activities are small but
represent a source of income diversification to help households to smooth consumption
over time and to meet some of their expenses.

Table 2.5: Sources of Liquidity for the 2008/2009 Agricultural Campaign
Items
Amount in F CFA
Percentage
Cotton credit
499,505 ($ 1,104)
84%
Sorghum credit
41,500
($ 92)
7%
Crops
34,654 ($ 77)
6%
Livestock
12,130 ($ 27)
2%
Remittances
4,717
($ 10)
1%
Non-farm income
3,111 ($ 7)
1%
Other
377
($ 1)
0%
Total
595,993 ($ 1,317)
100%
Source: Primary Survey Data
Sample: 54 farmers interviewed
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com

2.5.3 Household Income and Expenditures
There are three main periods during which income is generated and the primary
expenditures occur. These are harvest (October – December), dry season (January to
May) and the hungry period (June-August).
At harvest, the main source of cash comes from crop sales. Cotton sales used to
be the most important cash earnings at harvest. Cotton farmers were selling back their
harvest at the fixed price to the parastatal company for the repayment of the input cotton
credit. After reimbursement the net revenue of farmers from cotton was returned right
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after harvest. However, since 2005 the cash payments to farmers have taken place much
later in the year. For example in 2009, the payments were received in the month of June
that is six months after harvest. This long waiting time inconveniences farmers because
they usually count on these earnings to make some of their biggest expenditure
requirements such as taxes, school fees, loan repayments, hired agricultural labor wages,
social ceremonies expenses such as naming ceremonies, marriage, funerals, gifts to
household members (table 2.6). All these customarily expenses take place around harvest
time when farmers are expected to have more income. So, farmers are sometimes forced
to sell grains at harvest to meet their necessary harvest expenses. The most traded grains
are millet and maize because of the higher selling prices. The harvest income goal is
another important objective for farmers that will be taken into consideration in the model
construction.

Table 2.6: Household Expenditure Items in 2008/2009
Expenditures Items
Amount in F CFA
Percentage
Food consumption
85,869 ($ 190)
16%
Animal health and feed
85,357 ($ 189)
16%
Social ceremonies
82,704 ($ 183)
15%
Health
56,189 ($ 124)
10%
Gifts to all household members
49,367 ($ 109)
9%
School fees
48,812 ($ 108)
9%
Taxes
45,549 ($ 101)
8%
Motorcycle and bicycle repair
40,546 ($ 90)
7%
Hired Labor
22,146 ($ 49)
4%
Loans
19,056 ($ 42)
3%
Others
9,385 ($ 21)
2%
Total
544,978 ($ 1,204)
100%
Source: Primary Survey Data
Sample: 54 farmers interviewed
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com
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During the dry season, the reduction in the demand for labor for the agricultural
activities allows farmers to be involved in non-agricultural activities to have some cash
earnings. In this period of time, household expenditures include any emergency health
issue, social ceremonies, livestock expenditures (feed complements and vaccinations) and
the recurrent expenditures of school fees and food items. Also, at the end of the dry
season, farmers start preparing the next agricultural campaign by purchasing agricultural
inputs.
The hungry season or lean season is usually identified as two months right before
the harvest but in this research we assume that it is lined up with the crop season for
modeling purposes. During the lean season, farmers are running out of food in their
storage units. This is why farmers like early maize. All family workers have to allocate
their labor principally on the communal plot which is used to generate the cash income
and the home food consumption. After the communal work, family members can
participate in their private activities such as private plots, petty trade and agricultural
gender work teams. The crop season is the time for migrant family workers to return to
the farm or to send remittances to assist their families in agricultural and household
expenses.
Household expenditures are spread throughout the year although the availability
of cash crops at harvest gives more incentive to households to honor their debts, reward
family members for their agricultural work and pay for any pressing household
expenditures. The main expenses are related to food consumption, animal care and feed,
and social ceremonies. The expenses for food consumption include principally
expenditures for complementary items for food consumption such as meat, fish, and
sauce ingredients. Purchase of grains is limited. When it occurs, it is generally during a
bad crop year when quantities of grain produced are not sufficient to cover the home
consumption needs for a year. On average, during a bad year the stock of grain will last
only 7 months. In this case, grain purchases will be necessary during the crop season. In
normal years, the stock of grain lasts almost a year, in good years it can go up to 15
months. With the adoption of high-yielding cultivars of sorghum, the level of selfsufficiency in grain consumption is expected to increase.
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Household expenses vary across years. During a very good crop year, households
increase their expenditures on social ceremonies specifically wedding and dowries for
their children of age to get married, housing improvement, agricultural equipment, assets
such as cattle and gifts to household members. The extent of gifts (grains, cash or
clothing) offered to household members particularly to women depends on the state of
nature of the crops as well as on the purchasing price of cotton set by the parastatal
company (CMDT).
In the past, when the cotton economy was very successful, all adult household
members including women were often granted clothing items and cash payments. But,
nowadays with the reduced income from cotton, compensations in cash or clothing have
decreased or have been completely cancelled. With the declining cotton economy,
women are predominantly compensated in nature by some amounts of grains at harvest.
Quantities of grains received vary according to the state of nature of the crop year.
Therefore, the adoption of sorghum technologies and the government interventions in the
cotton sector are expected to influence differently women’s compensation after harvest.
The three critical periods of income earnings and cash expenditures discussed
above will be fundamental in the development of the model as they will represent the
main points where household decisions are made.

2.6. Summary
The study area is located in southern Mali in the district of Koutiala which is a
higher rainfall area with average rainfall estimated at 800 mm. This area is an old cotton
zone with depleted soils due to the long time practice of cotton and population growth.
Sorghum, maize and millet are the main cereal crops cultivated in the area. In the
traditional farming system, cotton and maize are cultivated intensively with the use of
inorganic fertilizer whereas millet and sorghum are grown without inorganic fertilizer but
benefit from the residual fertilizer effect of cotton and maize. Cotton, maize and sorghum
are typically part of a crop rotation system on low-lands and better lands. Millet is
generally cultivated on the poorer soils especially on the plateau and on sandy lands. The
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average household in the study area is composed of 27 persons, consumed 25 kg of grains
per day and cultivated 15 ha of lands including 4.2 ha of cotton, 2.8 ha of millet and
maize and 5 ha of sorghum.
Cotton area and productivity have been declining over time mainly driven by the
falling trend of the cotton price paid to farmers and the delays in the payment by CMDT
to the farmers. But with the surge in 2011 of the cotton price, farmers are expected to
increase the area of cotton. Hence, the models’ results will predict farmers’ acreage
allocation in response to the cotton price policy.
Inputs for the intensively grown crops cotton and maize are financed with the
input loans from the CMDT while inputs for sorghum and millet are financed by cashing
farmers ’assets of small livestock or trading crop commodities. Over the past two years,
cotton and maize have benefited from the government subsidy program in which
sorghum and millet were included in 2011. Fertilizer is a catalyst for yield but with
increasing public expenditures, this program might not be pursued in the long run. So, the
effect of the government fertilizer subsidy allocated to the different crops will be an area
of investigation with the model. The income effects of the adoption of the traditional
technologies will be assessed without and with the fertilizer subsidy.
The main farm household expenditures are undertaken during points in time with
significant cash needs that are the end of harvest season, the dry season and the next crop
season. Thus, three main periods of decision making will be defined in the model
construction.
Overall, the socio-economic characteristics of the representative farmer in the
study area will be used to build the modeling framework of farmers’ decision making and
the traditional technologies will be used to calibrate and validate the results of the model
estimation. Farmers’ decision making will be estimated with government intervention
regarding cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy program.
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CHAPTER 3: NEW SORGHUM TECHNOLOGIES AND MARKETING
STRATEGIES

This chapter documents the new sorghum technologies and marketing strategies
diffused in the study area to improve farmers’ income. This combination of technologies
has been introduced as an alternative source of income for farmers in the cotton zone
given the declining cotton economy and the resulting reduction in farmers’ revenues.
Moreover, with the declining soil fertility and low yields of local sorghum varieties, the
adoption of high-yielding cultivars and the use of moderate levels of inorganic fertilizer
on sorghum are crucial to increase sorghum productivity. The chapter gives details on the
higher yielding sorghum cultivar that is very responsive to the use of fertilizer and the
adoption of better agronomic practices in any rainfall year.
The second innovation is represented by the improved marketing practices that
allow farmers to take advantage of the price seasonality and therefore receive a higher
return on marketing. The ultimate effect is expected to be an increase in the profitability
of the new sorghum technology, particularly in the poor rainfall years where the seasonal
price variation can double the harvest price.

3.1. Improved Production Technologies for Sorghum
The heavy soil types and sufficient rainfall in the Koutiala region are excellent for
sorghum. This explains the large area allocated to sorghum in the traditional farming
systems. So, emphasis has been put by the IER-INTSORMIL program since 2005 on the
diffusion of new technologies of sorghum in this region. The technological package for
sorghum is a combination of higher yielding varieties, soil management technologies,
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improved agronomic practices such as thinning and the use of moderate amounts of
inorganic fertilizers. The technologies are expected to alleviate the constraints of soil
fertility and relatively poor traditional crop yields. So, farmers will adopt the new
technologies if the innovations generate substantially higher yield gains over the
traditional varieties. To do this the first prerequisite is to increase soil fertility.

3.1.1 Ridging and Tied Ridging
A large percentage of lands in the study area are degraded lands with low water
retention capacity. Thus, ridging is perceived as a soil management technology important
to increase soil moisture which leads to higher returns from the fertilization. It is used as
a land preparation technique performed before planting after the first rainfall or during
the weeding activities. Conventional ridge cropping has become a main component of the
traditional farming systems on the most degraded lands. The decreasing land quality
pushes farmers to perform this practice despite the fact that the returns are low when
performed on degraded lands. The economic return is much higher when the technology
is applied before soil degradation (Sanders et al. 1996).
Tied ridging is a technology improvement over the traditional ridges. It consists
of ridging the soil and cross tying the ridges to reduce the run-off of water from the soil.
Hence, tied ridging has the advantage to decrease the loss of water and mineral elements
from the soil and to conserve water in the soil longer. It therefore controls for erosion and
increases the soil moisture necessary for good crop germination. This practice leads to
substantial crop yield gains over the traditional simple ridges and does not require
significantly higher labor contribution. Sanders et al. (1996) reported that the adoption of
tied ridging increases yields by approximately 50 percent and farm income by 12 percent.

3.1.2. Inorganic Fertilizer
Soil deficiencies in Nitrogen (N) and Phosphorus (P) are identified as major
constraints for the production of sorghum. Inorganic fertilizer is thus an essential input
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for crop production because it enhances crop productivity through intensification rather
than area extension. Application of fertilizer has been conducted over thirty years in the
study area but application was on cotton and maize.
Extensive availability of inorganic fertilizer for all crops is constrained by
marketing infrastructures, credit and governmental support. Many farmers lack cash to be
able to purchase significant amounts of inorganic fertilizer. Thus, to facilitate adoption of
fertilizer and improve sorghum yields, the IER-INTSORMIL project has procured
moderate amounts of inorganic fertilizers for farmers providing input credit. Farmers
involved in the program reimburse fertilizer in grains to the farmers’ association thereby
creating a revolving fund to continue fertilizer purchase over time.
The recommended fertilizer levels are 100 kg/ha of NPK and 50 kg/ha of Urea.
The nutrient content of the NPK is 15-15-15. More recently, farmers have switched to a
lower cost package of inorganic fertilizer represented by the di-Ammonium Phosphate
(DAP). The inorganic formula is 18-26-0 and the principal focus of fertilization is on
Nitrogen and Phosphorus because Potassium (K) is generally sufficient.

3.1.3. High Yielding Cultivars
The gains in production due to adoption of soil management practices and
inorganic fertilizer need to be supplemented with high-yielding seed varieties responsive
to fertilizer. Several sorghum cultivars have been introduced over time to improve the
response to the local agronomic conditions and produce higher yields. Currently, the new
variety diffused is a Caudatum which is an intermediate cycle variety as opposed to the
local varieties that are long cycle varieties. The local name of the improved variety is
Grinkan.
The improved Grinkan variety is high yielding, very responsive to the use of
inorganic fertilizer and more tolerant to Striga infestation and some plant diseases
compared to the traditional cultivars. In addition, according to some farmers, the
improved sorghum cultivar is more resistant to flooding damage compared to the local
varieties. Average crop yield in normal years is about 1.4 tons to 1.9 tons with the best
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farmers reaching 2.5 tons to 3 tons per hectare with the combination of soil management
technologies, use of inorganic fertilizer and rigorous implementation of agronomic
practices at specific periods of the plant cycle (Coulibaly 2010). The yield gains over the
traditional varieties are considerable and are 40 percent higher for the average farmer
during a normal rainfall year.
Nevertheless the net returns on production of the improved sorghum for the
average farmer are almost similar to the one of the traditional varieties for the crop year
2008/2009 when the grains are sold at the harvest price of 80 F C FA/kg (table 3.1).
A first implication of this latter result is that for very high input costs such as
those of the year 2008/2009, the average farmer might be indifferent between adopting
and not adopting the improved sorghum while the most efficient farmer will have a
stronger incentive to adopt. To enhance return on adoption, it is necessary to increase
yield through a rigorous implementation of the agronomic practices or to lower the
production costs. Hence, we observe that in 2011, there is a very high return on
technology adoption with the subsidized cost of fertilizer (table 3.1). This outcome
suggests that at affordable fertilizer costs, the average farmer will have a higher
willingness to adopt the improved sorghum and to substitute more for the local varieties.
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Table 3.1: Returns for the Traditional Sorghum and the Improved Sorghum Cultivar.
Crop Year 2008 and Estimations for 2011

Inputs Items
Seed (F CFA/ha)
NPK (F CFA/ha)
Urea (F CFA/ha)
Total Inputs Cost7
(F CFA/ha)
Yield (kg/ha)

Traditional Cultivar
Crop Year 2008

Improved Cultivar
Crop Year 2008

Improved Cultivar
Crop Year 2011

4,000
0

1,200
36,000

1,200
25,000

0

19,000

12,500

4,000

56,200

38,700

1,154

1,642

1,642

Harv.Price* (F CFA/kg)
80
80
80
Total Revenue1 (F CFA)
92,320
131,360
131,360
Net Return1 (F CFA)
88,320
75,160
92,660
Rec. Price **(FCFA/kg)
115
115
Total Revenue2 (F CFA)
188,830
188,830
Net Return2 (F CFA)
132,630
150,130
Note: Harv.Price*= This is the expected harvest price collected in the regional market of Koutiala
(Mali) in 2008
Total revenue1 and Netreturn1 are those obtained with the harvest price of 80 F CFA/kg ($/kg
0.18)
Rec.Price**= This is the expected price during the price recovery period collected in the regional
market of Koutiala (Mali) in 2008
Total Revenue2 and Net Return2 are those obtained with the recovery price of 115 F CFA/kg
($/kg 0.25)
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com

A second implication of the results reported in table 3.1, is that selling the grains
at harvest, does not lead to significant return on adoption of the improved sorghum
technology because of the harvest price collapse. But, when farmers are able to sell the
improved sorghum in the price recovery period, return on technology are substantially
higher (see table 3.1). So, in addition to increasing yields or reducing costs of fertilizer,
farmers must be able to sell sorghum at higher market prices to increase profitability of

7

We didn’t include labor costs in the total input costs as most the labor used is family labor. There would
be some additional costs including increased labor from higher plant and weed density resulting from more
fertilization. Also more labor woluld be required by the new operations especially thinning which farmers
do not normally do and the split application of fertilizers.
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the new technology and the return on adoption. With increased sorghum production
following the adoption of the higher yielding cultivar, farmers in the farmers’ association
have the opportunity to store the excess grains above consumption and sell when prices
are higher in the market.

3.2 Grain Marketing Strategy
The development of marketing strategies contributes to increase the profitability
of the improved technologies. Higher yields reduce costs of output. Farmers are more
willing to adopt agricultural technologies when those innovations are able to increase
profitability. Unfortunately, technology introduction of staples is constrained by three
types of price collapses.
Prices collapse during years of good or even normal rainfall because of the price
inelasticity of demand. Once households with sufficient income to buy cereals have
enough, there are few alternative markets to keep prices from collapsing. In the regional
market of Koutiala, prices of sorghum as well as other grains collapsed during the good
rainfall years of 1999, 2003 and 2006 as opposed to the years 2001 and 2002 which were
poor rainfall years (table 3.2). The between year price collapse in sorghum as well as in
other grains introduce more riskiness in grain prices as revealed by the larger value of the
coefficient of the standard deviation compared to cotton (table 3.2) for which a minimum
guaranteed price is fixed yearly at the beginning of the cropping season by the
government. The lower price variability of cotton is an attraction but the previous other
advantage of obtaining cash near the harvest time has been reduced in recent years by the
tardiness of CMDT in paying farmers. Moreover, real cotton prices have been falling for
most of the 21st Century until 2011.
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Table 3.2: Real Producer and Consumer Prices, and Coefficients of Variation from 1998
to 2008

Years

1998/1999
1999/2000
2000/2001
2001/2002
2002/2003
2003/2004
2004/2005
2005/2006
2006/2007
2007/2008
2008/2009
Mean
($/kg)
Standard dev
Coef of var

Millet
Prices
(F CFA/kg)
PP*
PC*
135
181
75
112
121
166
174
221
168
217
77
113
153
189
124
151
87
102
107
123
126
145
122
156
(0.27)
(0.34)
34
42
0.28
0.27

Sorghum
Prices
(F CFA/kg)
PP
PC
129
168
72
111
107
144
170
212
149
190
63
98
144
173
103
124
79
95
97
114
110
127
111
141
(0.25)
(0.31)
34
39
0.30
0.28

Maize
Prices
(F CFA/kg)
PP
PC
106
147
61
100
101
162
144
187
119
166
57
85
127
159
89
110
72
86
104
120
110
128
99
132
(0.22)
(0.29)
27
35
0.28
0.26

Cotton
Prices
(FCFA/kg)
PP
262
214
224
252
235
255
255
188
184
174
200
222
(0.49)
32
0.14

Note: PP*=Producer Prices, PC*= Consumer Prices. Prices have been deflated by using the year
2008 as the base year. Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at
www.oanda.com.
Standard dev. stands for standard deviation; Coef. of var .stands for coefficient of variation
Source: Author own Calculation from Aggregate Data and Index of Inflation from 1998 to 2008.

In addition to the between year price variation and collapse, there is a within year
price variability with prices falling at harvest because most farmers sell their crops to
finance the necessary harvest time expenditures. These expenditures are a series of
traditional requirements including school fees, local taxes, paying workers for
agricultural activities during the last crop season, financing younger males to migrate to
cities for seasonal employment, and traditional ceremonies such as marriages and naming
ceremonies. The price collapse results from most farmers feeling the necessity to have
funds at harvest.
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Then prices start increasing after this collapse. From January (harvest season) to
May (recovery price season) prices increase on average by 27 percent (table 3.3). From
May to September (lean season) there is an average smaller price increase in the market.
This results because the public sector often intervenes in this second season to keep
prices from increasing further. Moreover, merchants with larger stocks start unloading
with larger quantities in this second period. Thus the greatest increase in the returns to
storage has historically been selling in the recovery period. However, if the government
does not intervene, there is substantial potential to sell later in the lean period especially
in poor rainfall years.

Table 3.3: Sorghum Production (Kg/ha) and Producer Prices (F CFA/kg) across
Marketing Periods

Year

Production Period
(kg/ha)
Prices

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

971
1090
978
1056
798
1059
994
989
991
1095
1500

Average

1047

1 Period 2
Prices

Harvest
Season
119
80
65
114
157
56
90
96
69
82
80
92
($/kg0.20)

Recovery
Period
135
73
117
185
157
65
158
108
73
90
109
115
($/kg0.25)

Period 3
Prices
Hungry
Season
124
65
153
202
115
72
196
103
93
120
138
126
($/kg 0.28)

Percentage
Change

Percentage
Change

Period
1 to 2

Period
2 to 3

14%
-9%
79%
62%
0%
15%
76%
13%
7%
9%
37%

-9%
-11%
31%
9%
-27%
11%
24%
-5%
27%
34%
26%

27%

10%

Note: Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com.
Prices have been deflated by using the year 2008 as the base year.
Source: Author own Calculation from Aggregate Data and Index of Inflation from 1998 to 2008.
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The third type of price collapse occurs during adverse years for crop production
when the government often intervenes to drive down prices paid by consumers usually
after they have increased substantially. For example during the poor crop year of 2002
the Malian government imported grains from Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso and released
grains from its warehouses. Though there is a public stock policy, government release of
stocks is not very common due to their financial limitation to generate and hold
substantial stocks of grains. Import of grains from neighboring countries is a more
common policy. In figure 3.1, we notice that during the crop year 2002, grain prices
started falling by June (the lean season). In the last decade donors have been increasingly
reluctant to help governments drive down the prices and thereby reduce incentives in
agriculture.

Figure 3.1: Normalized Producer Prices for Sorghum from 1998 to 2002
Source: National Marketing Watch (OMA/Mali)
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Figure 3.2: Normalized Producer Prices for Sorghum from 2003 to 2008
Source: National Marketing Watch (OMA/Mali)

Given the seasonality in prices developed above and depicted in figures 3.1 and
3.2, new marketing strategies need to be implemented to assist farmers in dealing with at
least the first two types of price collapses. Specifically, the model is concerned with the
storage and the higher prices from selling later in the year. But other strategies including
increasing farmers’ negotiation power through learning by doing process are also
important since they have potential to increase return on marketing.8

3.2.1 Grain Storage and Late Sales
Grain storage at harvest and late sales within the year enable farmers to avoid the
harvest price collapse and thereby take advantage of the price increase later in the year.
8

To respond to the price inelasticity problem new market development for the cereals is the on-going
strategy of the Production-Marketing project of INTSORMIL. As the intensive poultry sector continues to
rapidly expand, sorghum should be able to compete with maize but this was not included in the modeling.
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farmers’ cooperatives buy grains from their members at harvest and store these cereals in
storage facilities until prices recover from their harvest collapse. But very poor farmers
with a lack of alternative financial resources for the harvest expenditures are often unable
to forgo their harvest income by participating in this collective grain storage store their
grains. Nevertheless, by obtaining access to the banks for the input purchases or
inventory holdings, famers have the opportunity to get credit for consumption while
storing their grains up to the period of price recovery.

3.2.2 Increasing Producer Bargaining Power
The increase in farmers’ bargaining power is an important strategy to capture
higher marketing margins. Farmers are encouraged to market their sorghum grains
through the producers’ associations in order to increase their bargaining power and take
advantage of the economies of scale. By being involved in associations, producers have
the opportunity to buy inputs and sell sorghum in larger quantities to wholesalers instead
of dealing with individual intermediaries who can take advantage of their lack of
knowledge of market prices and thus capture large benefit in the supply chain. Hence,
farmers’ collective action enables them to benefit from storage and from a higher price by
selling in bulk quantity. The producers association can also invest more in market
information than the individual farmer.

3.3. Summary
The new sorghum technologies diffused in the study area consist of an improved
sorghum cultivar, use of moderate levels of fertilizer and the implementation of better
agronomic practices. These new technologies lead to higher yields and expected profits
than with the traditional sorghum. Thus, farmers should develop more interest in growing
the new sorghum cultivar if they have access to the new technology package. Higher
profitability of the new sorghum technology is also expected to be achieved by the
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adoption of marketing strategies based on storage and late sales, especially in the price
recovery period.
The higher yielding cultivar associated to the use of moderate levels of fertilizer
for the improved cultivar and the adoption of efficient marketing strategies will be
introduced in the model to assess the impact on farmers’ decision making and income.
The results will be compared to the base case scenarios where no improved agricultural
technologies for sorghum are used. Under the adoption of improved sorghum technology,
the income effect of the cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy will be estimated and
compared with the base case scenario characterized by the traditional technologies.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND DATA

In this chapter, we will develop a model to represent farmers’ decision making
process in the study area. The representative farm household in the study region is
assumed to maximize the expected ending wealth subject to some resource constraints
such as labor, land and other agricultural inputs. Based on field research and interviews
conducted in the study region and on empirical research performed in several other subSaharan countries, farmers take their decisions in order to cope with risk. The previous
chapters showed that farmers face many sources of risk in agriculture and grain
marketing including variability in rainfall, crop yields and commodity prices. These risk
factors influence farmers’ production, consumption and marketing decisions. Farmers’
decisions are made sequentially across marketing periods based on the outcomes of yields
and prices randomness. The planning period in which farmers make their decisions starts
at the beginning of the planting season in June up to the end of the lean season in
September.
After providing a justification for the choice of the sequential stochastic farm
modeling approach, this chapter discusses in a following section the stochastic
environment in which farmers make their decisions. Next the decisions variables included
in the model are described. Then, the empirical model is presented and in a last section
the data used for the model estimation are provided.

4.1. Justification of the Model
Several methods have been described in the literature to measure the income
effects of agricultural technologies and to evaluate farmers’ decision making in an
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uncertain environment. Uncertainties are related to some stochastic events including
rainfall distribution, input and output prices which affect famers’ production decisions
and marketing strategies.
The most common theory used to analyze farmers’ decisions under risk is the
expected utility theory. This theory assumes that the decision maker chooses between
risky or uncertain plans by comparing their expected utility and selecting the one that
yields to the highest utility (Hazell and Norton 1986). Depending on the decision maker’s
preference or utility function, diverse types of models can be used to assess farmers’
decision making with the expected utility theory. Mean-Variance models (EV) are used
when the utility function reflects normally distributed returns. These models involve
mathematical programming and can be applied to identify the set of efficient portfolios
with the smallest variance from the mean. An alternative to the Mean-Variance model is
the MOTAD model (Hazell and Norton 1986). This model solves for an efficient
portfolio set by minimizing the absolute deviation of a portfolio from the mean portfolio.
Implementation of the MOTAD is based on linear programming. Adesina, Abbott and
Sanders (1988) used a MOTAD model to estimate the impact of agricultural technologies
in Niger. Their results show that adoption of fertilizer depends on farmers’ level of risk
aversion. Highly risk averse farmers adopt fertilizer on limited crop area as opposed to
less risk averse producers.
Other programming techniques incorporating risk include safety-first models and
lexicographic utility functions. Safety first models are appropriate in highly risky
environment. It ensures that the farmer maximizes his income after securing his
subsistence needs. This model has been used to explain producers’ behavior related to the
levels of fertilizer adoption (Bell 1972), land allocation to food and cash crops (Carter
and Wiebe 1990) or area of land allocated to improved and traditional technologies
(Smale, Just, and Leathers 1994). Lexicographic utility functions assume that farmers
cope with risk by making their decisions to satisfy ordered goals. While in safety first
models farmers have one main subsistence goal to achieve before maximizing their
income, lexicographic utility functions allow for more than one goal to be secured.
Hence, empirical application studies on agricultural technology adoption in developing
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countries, by Abdoulaye and Sanders (2006), Baquedano et al. (2010) identified a
subsistence objective and a harvest income requirement as principal goals farmers need to
satisfy prior to maximizing their profit.
The models described above were extensively used to capture stochastic events in
agricultural production and to estimate the impact of agricultural technologies on
producers’ income. However, these models are static and assume that all decisions are
made at one point in time. This assumption places some restrictions on the use of these
modeling techniques because they do not permit farmers to make adaptive production and
marketing decisions based on new information received over time. Yet, farmer interviews
in Mali revealed that producers make decisions at several points in time in order to cope
with production and marketing uncertainties. It is therefore necessary to use a modeling
framework that takes into account farmers’ ability to adjust their decisions over time.
Also, there is a growing recognition of the importance of sequential decision making as
farmers ’strategies in coping with uncertainty (Fafchamps 1993, Dorward 1996).
Discrete Stochastic Programming (DSP) model appears to be very appropriate to
analyze sequential farmers’ decision making under uncertainty. This model has the
advantage to handle conditional strategies which allows future decisions to be influenced
by past decisions (Preckel 2008). Moreover, in addition to handle randomness in the
objective function, this model accommodates also randomness in the constraint
parameters or the right hand side of the constraints.
Application of DSP has been limited in empirical research. Empirical agricultural
studies with discrete stochastic programming models have started with the work of Cocks
(1968). He developed a multistage farming problem in which labor requirement and gross
margin are stochastic decision variables with discrete probability distribution. Rae (1971)
further discussed the capability of DSP in solving problems with sequential decisions
under uncertainty by applying this model to a farm management problem. Although
much attention has been devoted to the application of this model in developed countries,
some authors have used this model to analyze agricultural issues in developing nations.
Adesina and Sanders (1991) and Shapiro et al. (1993) used this model to show that
peasant farmers in Niger have the ability to adapt cropping and resource management
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strategies to the rainfall pattern. Lopeiz-Pereira et al. (1994) determined the income effect
of soil conservation strategies and seed-fertilizer technologies in Ecuador by using a
discrete stochastic model. More recently, Maatman et al. (2002) applied a sequential
programming approach to describe farmers’ decision making in Burkina Faso regarding
grain consumption, sales, storage, and purchases throughout the growing and post-harvest
seasons.
A common feature across the studies mentioned above is that rainfall and/or
yields were the only random variables influencing farmers ’decisions. Their
methodologies did not allow for randomness in prices. Yet, variability of harvest and
post-harvest prices are equally important sources of uncertainty that may influence
farmers ’decision making. To fill the gap, this study takes into account price uncertainties
as well as yield variability in analyzing farmers’ production, inventory and marketing
decisions over time. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, this research is the first empirical
study in sub-Saharan Africa that evaluates the impact of new agricultural technologies
and marketing strategies within a context of stochastic crop yields and prices.
The implementation of a discrete stochastic programming model requires several
steps as follows: the specification of the random variables and construction of the
probability distribution, the identification of the decision variables and constraints within
each stage and the definition of the objective function for the planning horizon.

4.2. Stochastic Environment
The stochastic environment discusses variation of yield and prices as well as
defines the probability distribution of the random variables.

4.2.1 Random Variables
The specification of the DSP stochastic events requires first the definition of the
random variables included in the model. The random variables of interest are crop yields
and prices. Yields for the traditional crops concern cotton, sorghum, maize and millet.
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The improved crop yield includes only the new sorghum cultivar. Crop yields are chosen
as random variables instead of rainfall because rainfall does not explain all variability in
yields. Yields are determined by rainfall since agriculture in Mali is mainly rain fed. But
other factors such as temperature, soil fertility and agronomic practices influence the
yield outcome for a given crop year. So, by choosing yields as random variables, we take
into consideration all possible factors that have an impact on yields. Since the study area
is known as a high rainfall area, flooding is sometimes encountered and can be as
detrimental to the crop yield as drought is. Figures A.1 to A.3 in appendix A show the
quadratic relationship between yields and rainfall. Yields increase with rainfall but are
negatively affected by excess rainfall. Yield of cotton in addition to rainfall is also
predetermined by the announced cotton price at the beginning of the planting season (see
table A.1 in appendix A). So, cotton prices are exogenous non- random variables fixed by
the CMDT parastatal company
Grain prices are considered as the second set of random variables and influence
the marketing decisions. Marketing decisions are taken at points in time with substantial
cash needs. These are the beginning of the cropping season, the harvest season and the
lean season. At the beginning of the planting season, farmers need money to purchase
agricultural inputs. At harvest, they need cash to compensate hired labor employed during
the cropping season or for some pressing household expenditures. During the lean season,
they need some financial resources to purchase grains when their stocks are depleted.
Harvest prices are influenced by yield outcomes. We used Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
regressions and aggregate data from the crop year 1998/1999 to 2007/2008 to show the
dependence between yearly harvest prices and yields for the grains sorghum, maize and
millet (equation 4.1). The results are reported in table 4.1.

Pit1   0  1 yit1   it1

Pit1  Harvest prices for grain crop i in year t
yit1  Harvest yield for grain crop i in year t

 0 ; 1  Constant term and coefficient for the yield variable
 it1  Error term for the equation of grain crop i in year t

(4.1)
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Results of these regressions reported in table 4.1 indicate a significant relationship
between grain yields and harvest prices, especially for sorghum and maize. The small
data set might explain the low values of the R2. Other explanations may first be lying in
the argument of the higher rainfall area characterizing the south of the country, which is
our study area. Large amount of rainfall in this part of the country might certainly reduce
much of the yield variability over the years which could lead to a low significance level
of the regression model. This might not be the case in the northern low rainfall areas of
Mali where we should expect to see more variability in yields. Secondly, the relatively
weak correlation between prices and aggregate production is an indication that other
factors such as grain trade flows in the Malian economy and to a lesser extent
government carry-over stock exert a significant influence in explaining the variations in
aggregate producer prices.

Table 4.1: Relationship between Harvest Crop Prices and Own Crop Yields and from
1998 to 2007
Harvest Prices

Sorghum
Millet
Maize

Intercept

Yield Coefficient

Adjusted
R2

F

336.94***
(58.88)
305.62**
(132.57)
178.20***
(52.04)

-0.24**
(0.09)
-0.20
(0.14)
-0.05*
(0.03)

0.40

7.24**

Standard
deviation of
residuals
21.93

0.12

2.18

27.84

0.22

3.47*

19.33

Note: N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence
and *=significance at 10% level of confidence

To have a good understanding of the relationship between prices in the different
marketing periods several OLS regressions were performed. The goal of these regressions
is to analyze price seasonality. There is interdependence between prices at different
marketing periods and we want to know how well prices in a given marketing period are
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impacted by prices in earlier marketing stages. These analyses are essential for farmers’
decision making because farmers’ marketing strategy is determined by their information
about current prices but also by past random events.
For this aim, three sets of OLS regressions have been performed (equation 4.2). In
the first set of regressions, prices for sorghum, millet and maize in the recovery season
have been regressed against own harvest prices. A weighted average is used for harvest
prices to reflect adequately the timing of the marketing decisions. Based on empirical
observations, the largest part of the grains sold at harvest occurs in the month of
December. So, upon field reports and technicians advice, we attributed a weight of 20
percent to the grain prices for the month of October and November and a weight of 60
percent for the month of December. Prices in the recovery period are represented by the
average price of April and May. Farmers’ objective is to sell their stock of grains during
those months as prices experience sizable increase. In the second set of regressions,
prices in the lean season are estimated as a function of harvest prices and prices in the
recovery period for each of the commodities mentioned previously. Here, prices in the
lean season are characterized by the average price of August and September which are
the months with the highest prices for the hungry season.
Overall, we performed OLS regressions on grain prices to reflect their conditional
nature with time series price observations across 10 years.

Pitp   0  1 Pitp1   itp

(4.2)

Pitp  Prices for grain crop i in year t and marketing period p
Pitp 1  lag price for grain crop i in year t

 0 ; 1  Constant term and coefficient for the lag price variable
 itp  Error term for the equation of grain crop i in year t and marketing period p assumed
to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance.

The results of the set of regression equations between harvest prices and prices in
the recovery period show high values of R2 meaning that harvest prices predict very well
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variation in the post-harvest prices of April and May (table 4.2). Knowing harvest market
prices help farmers to predict prices in the post-harvest season.

Table 4.2: Estimation of the Relationship between Crop Harvest Prices and Own Prices in
the Price Recovery Period
April-May
Prices
Sorghum
Millet
Maize

Intercept

24.38
(32.85)
28.53
(40.40)
21.34
(31.42)

Harvest Prices

0.99**
(0.34)
0.88**
(0.35)
1.03**
(0.37)

R2

F

0.46

8.54**

Standard
deviation
of residuals
28.96

0.36

6.14**

31.42

0.43

7.69**

24.23

Note: N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence
and *=significance at 10 % level of confidence

Results of the set of regressions between prices in the lean season and prices in
the two preceding periods (table 4.3) show a very strong and significant dependence
among prices. Prices in the lean season are well predicted by prices in the recovery and
harvest periods
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Table 4.3: Estimation of the Relationship between Crop Prices in the Hungry Season and
Own Prices in the Recovery and Harvest Periods.
Aug-Sept
Prices

Intercept

April-May
Prices

OctoberDecember
Prices

R2

F

Sorghum

Standard
deviation
of
residuals
10.45

48.50***
1.52***
-1.08***
0.94
66.93***
(13.11)
(0.14)
(0.19)
Millet
42.24**
1.43***
-0.77***
0.96
77.36***
10.06
(14.26)
(0.12)
(0.16)
Maize
50.78*
1.29***
-0.99**
0.81
15.10***
15.47
(22.04)
(0.24)
(0.35)
Note: N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses.
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence and
*=significance at 10 % level of confidence

4.2.2. Probability Distribution of the Random Variables
Using the Gaussian Quadrature approach (see appendix B), 17 states of nature for
yields were defined with the sum of the probability of occurrence of the 17 events equal
to 1. Among those 17 states of nature, one event happens at harvest. Then, from the
realized yield outcome, harvest prices are determined. At the end of the recovery season
the states of nature of second period prices are realized conditional on harvest prices and
yields. Next, prices fluctuate during the lean season and at the end of this period we have
realization of the lean season price state of nature conditional on the outcomes of prices
and yields in the preceding periods.
The values of the error terms in the grain price regression equation for each
marketing period (see equation 4.2) were used to construct the probability distribution of
prices in each marketing period. Observations for prices are only available for 10 years so
an empirical distribution was used to define the states of nature and their associated
probabilities. Thus, 10 states of nature were defined for prices in each marketing period
with a probability of occurrence of one event equals to 1/10.
At the end of the year, the total number of states of nature is the product of the
events that were obtained in each decision period. This product is equal to 17,000 that is
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17x10x10x10. The probability of the end period states of nature is also obtained by
multiplying the probabilities of the outcomes that unfold in each time period. As we can
notice, the size of the DSP increases exponentially with the number of stages and states
of nature but the modeling of number of states of nature achieved is feasible with current
computer capacity.

4.3 Decision Variables
The decision variables are best described using the decision tree that summarized
the sequential and stochastic process (figure 4.1). Circles in the decision tree represent
realization of the random events while squares depict points in time where the decisions
are made conditional on the occurrence of the states of nature. It is assumed that
decisions are made at the beginning of each stage. Three stages are identified in the
decision tree.
The first stage in the decision tree describes the agricultural season. This initial
stage extends from the beginning of the agricultural season of year 1 (June) up to the
harvest of year 1 (December). At the start of the pre-harvest period, decisions regarding
land allocation across crops (millet, sorghum, maize and cotton), inputs used such as
fertilizer application, amount of grains to trade in the market and the transfer of stock of
grains to the next stage are taken. All these decisions are made with subjective
probabilistic knowledge of the states of nature of yields. These decisions are constrained
by resources availability including land, non-labor inputs, labor, cash or credit
availability. Under the traditional technologies, farmers finance their inputs for grain
crops with cash originating from grain sales, cotton revenue from the previous harvest as
well as livestock sales. Cotton inputs and fertilizer for maize are purchased with the
credit received from the parastatal cotton company. At the beginning of the growing
season, the yearly price of cotton at which the parastatal company will buy cotton from
framers is announced. This price is expected to influence farmers’ land allocation
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decisions and the use of purchased inputs. At the end of the agricultural season, the
outcomes of the randomness of crop yields and grain prices are known and represented
respectively by Yh1 and Ph1 on the decision tree. The probabilities of occurrence of these
two events are respectively a1 and b1.
Stage 2 is the price recovery period. It starts at the end of the first harvest
(January) and goes up to the beginning of the next growing season (June). At the
beginning of stage 2, farmers have full knowledge of the realization of the random yields
and the prevailing crop prices associated with crop yields but they have only subjective
probability estimates of the post-harvest prices which will occur later in the year. The
outcome of yields and prices in stage 1 influenced the decisions made in stage 2. Thus,
conditional upon the yield and price outcomes and their conditional knowledge regarding
the future distributions, farmers decide on the amount of crop to sell immediately at
harvest, buy, store for consumption or sell later in the year. Hence, at harvest, farmers
face several marketing decisions. They sell grains at harvest to satisfy some necessary
harvest expenditures. Those expenditures at harvest include payment of hired labor,
school fees, any eventual health expenses or social ceremonies. Also, during a good state
of nature, farmers are able to store grains above domestic consumption and sell later in
the year. Sorghum grain, especially the improved variety is usually stored collectively in
the cooperative storage house and sold at the end of the price recovery period. At the end
of stage 2, one outcome of the price states of nature in the recovery period occurs that is
Pr1 conditional on the preceding harvest price Ph1. This realization occurs with a
probability c1.
Stage 3 portrays the lean season. This stage starts at the beginning of the second
growing season (June) and ends at the second harvest (December). At the beginning of
stage 3, farmers have full knowledge of the post-harvest grain prices that prevailed in the
recovery period. Recovery prices have been determined conditionally on harvest prices.
Thus, the set of activities selected at the start of the hungry season takes into account
realization of prices during the recovery period and harvest season. The decisions made
by farmers include grain sales, grain purchases and home consumption. At the end of
stage 3, the outcome of price uncertainty in the hungry season is known and identified in
the decision tree as Phu1 with probability d1.
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Phu1
E1

p=d1

Pr1
p=c1

Ph1

E10

p=b1

Yh1
p=a1

Realization of
harvest prices

Realization of prices
from the recovery
period

Realization of prices
from the hungry season

Realization of crop
yields

Agricultural Season

Decisions at planting time:
crop mix, sales, purchases,
grain and cash transfer to
Figure
the next period

Decisions at the end of harvest:
Output sales, consumption, grain
purchases for the recovery season, grain
and cash transfer to the next period

Price
Recovery
Season

Lean Season

Decisions at the end of recovery
period:
Output Sales, consumption,
purchases, inventories for the
hungry season

Figure 4.1: Decision Tree for the Discrete Stochastic Model
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4.4 Empirical Model
The empirical formulation of the model requires specification of material and
cash balances in each time period. Then, the expected wealth at the end of the planning
horizon is maximized.

4.4.1. Material Balances
Material Balance at First Planting up to First Harvest

C1k  S1k  I1k  Q1k  B1k

(4.3)

In equation (4.3), the starting inventory of output k ( Q1k ) is used for consumption
( C1k ), sales ( S1k ) and the remainder ( I1k ) is kept in the form of inventory stock. This
constraint allows cereals to be purchased ( B1k ) in the event that the starting stock is not
enough to meet the household grain consumption needs. Minimum subsistence
requirements for the grains are defined in this period as well as in the subsequent periods
as households need to guarantee a food security level before satisfying any other
objective.

Material Balance from First Harvest to the Hungry Season
C2 ks  S 2 ks  I 2 ks  I1k   bkjs y j  B2 ks

(4.4)

j

Equation (4.4) specifies that consumption ( C2 ks ), sales ( S 2 ks ) and inventory of
output k for a given state of nature s in the second period ( I 2 ks ) cannot be greater than
the inventory of output k ( I1k ) carried over from the first period plus output k produced
in state of nature s using different combinations of crop technologies ( bkjs y j ) plus the
amount of grain k purchased ( B2 ks ) in the corresponding state of nature s during the
second period.
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Production of output k harvested in the second period is subject to the resource
constraints as follows:

y

j

K

(4.5)

j

Equation (4.5) defines the land constraint. The sum of areas allocated to the
different crop technologies ( y j ) must be less or equal to the total land availability (K).

a

ij

y j  xi

(4.6)

j

Equation (4.6) is the constraint on total purchased input availability. Input i used
( aij ) for the different crop production systems j is ( y j ) set to not exceed the amount of
input i available ( xi ).
xl  l o  Lh  H

(4.7)

In equation (4.7) labor allocated to crop production system j and ( xl ) to off-farm
employment ( l o ) must be less or equal to the total family labor available ( Lh ) and the
amount of hired labor (H).

Material Balance from the Hungry Season to the Next Harvest

C3kst  S3kst  I 3kst  I 2ks  B3kst

(4.8)

In this equation (4.8) another state of nature t is added to reflect the price dynamic
that occurred during the second period. Indeed, from the first harvest to the price
recovery period (hungry season) prices of the main grain commodities that are millet,
sorghum, maize increase across time and covary positively. The state of nature t is
conditional on the state of nature s that occurred in the first period. We assume that at the
beginning of the third time period, producers have full knowledge of the state of nature of
yields and prices realized in the past periods. Hence, in the third period, the sum of
consumption ( C3kst ), sales ( S 3kst ) and inventory of output k in state of natures s and

t ( I 3kst ) are restricted to not be more than the amount of cereal k purchased in period 3 in
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state of nature s and t ( B3kst ) and the transfer of inventory of output k received from the
second period in state of nature s ( I 2 ks ). The cash balances corresponding to each set of
material balance are defined below.

4.4.2. Cash Balances
The cash balances guarantee an equilibrium state between the financial resources
and the uses in each marketing period. We defined three cash balance equations:

Cash Balance in the First Period

E1   ci xi   p1bk B1k  R1  F   p1sk S1k
iK

k

(4.9)

k

Equation (4.9) represents the cash constraint for the first period. The cash and any
liquid asset (F) plus the value of output sold in the first period ( p1sk S1k ) is used to satisfy
household expenditures ( E1 ), input purchases ( xi ) except labor and land, expenses on
grain for home consumption ( p1bk B1k ). Remaining cash ( R1 ) is carried over the next
period. Cash and liquidity assets include any sales of livestock that occur to finance some
emergency expenditure such as health expenses and/or food purchases mainly during a
bad state of nature.

Cash Balance in the Second Period

E2   p2bks B2 ks  R2 s  H   p2s ks S 2 ks  R1
k

(4.10)

k

Equation (4.10) states that the cash generated from the second period output sales
( p2s ks S 2 ks ) in a given state of nature s and the retained cash from the first period is
allocated to the necessary household expenditures ( E 2 ) (school fees, debt and taxes
repayment, wages for migrant labor, heath expenses, social ceremonies), to hire labor
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(H), and for the grain purchases ( p2bk B2 ks ). Again, retained cash ( R2 s ) from the second
period in state of nature s is transferred to the subsequent time period.

Cash Balance in the Third Period

E3   p3bkst B3kst  R3st   p3skst S3kst  R2 s
k

(4.11)

k

In equation (4.11), the cash revenue from the sales of output in state of nature s in
the third period ( p3skst S3kst ) and the retained cash from the second period in the identical
state of nature s must at least covered household expenditures ( E3 ), grain purchases
needed in the third period ( p3bkst B3kst ). Any excess of liquidity will be in the form of
retained cash ( R3st ).
The risk aversion behavior of households has been reflected in the constraints to
secure enough grain for their subsistence in each period (equation 4.12) and to fulfill a
harvest income goal (equation 4.13) which corresponds to income requirements at harvest
to pay for school fees, taxes, debt, naming ceremonies, etc. We defined a minimum level
of total grain consumption for each period based on household surveys ’results. The
harvest income requirement is defined obviously at harvest. Those constraints are
satisfied before the expected profit is maximized.

C

Tk

 C Tk

(4.12)

k

p

s
2k

S 2 k  HI

k

(4.13)

4.4.3. Objective Function
After specifying the constraints on cash and grain inventory in each period, the
objective function can be written as follows:
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  (s). (t s)  (r t s) 

(4.14)

str
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s
str   ( p1sk S1k  p1bk B1k )  ( p2s ks S 2 ks  p2bks B2 ks )  ( p3skst S 3kst  p3bkst B3kst )  w s l o  pkstr
I 3kst



k



  ci x i  w s H  E1  E2  E3 
i #K


(4.15)

The objective function to be maximized is the expected end period wealth
(equation 4.14). It is a function of the profit across the different periods in the planning
horizon and the joint probabilities of states of nature s, t and r. r is the probability of the
price state of nature for the end of the hungry season. Yield and prices are both random
variables with yield and prices at harvest having a probability distribution of  (s) , postharvest recovery price carrying a probability distribution of  (t ) and post-harvest price in
the hungry season having a probability of  (r ) . The sum of the probabilities of states of
nature s, t and r is equal to 1. Equation (4.15) details the profit maximized in equation
(4.14) as the difference between the sum of the net revenue earned in each period from
the net grain sales less costs from the cropping activities, plus wages from non-farm
work. Estimation of this farm household model using only the present traditional
technologies gives the optimal crop mix, quantities of grain purchased, inventories of
stock over the planning horizon and household’s profit prior to the introduction of new
cereal agricultural practices. This first model is the base case scenario.
We will use it to measure the impact of the use of intensive level of inputs
(fertilizer, urea, and improved sorghum seeds) and government policies on the decision
variables and the farm income.
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Variable Definitions

Item
j
i
yj

Notation

aij

use of input i by production system j

bkjs

yield per unit of area for output k

T =1, 2, 3

planting period, harvest and up to the next harvest
state of nature of yield and prices at harvest
state of nature of price between harvest and second planting

s
t
CTk
STk
I Tk
Q1k
BTk

combination of crop and technology
inputs used (fertilizer, urea, pesticides, herbicides, insecticides, seed)
area devoted to production system j

Consumption during period T for output k
Sales during period T for output k
Output k inventory for period T
Starting inventory for output k
Quantity of output k purchased in period T

ET
pTks

Expenditures in period T

b
pTk

Buying price of output k in period T

RT
K
xi

retained cash in period T

xl

Labor allocated for crop activities

ci

Cost of input i per unit of hectare

lj

labor allocated to the production system j

lo
Lh
H

labor allocated to off-farm activities
Total amount of family labor available
Total amount of hired labor
Probability of state of nature s

s
t
r

Selling price of output k in period T

Total area of land available
Total quantity of input i available

Probability of state of nature t
Probability of state of nature r

C Tk

Minimum consumption level for grain k in period T

HI

Harvest income goal
Profit maximized in state of nature s, t, and r

str
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4.5. Data
Data used in the model came from a combination of primary and secondary
observations. Primary data have been collected from a field survey conducted in 2008
and supplemented by additional field research in the months of June and July 2010 in the
village of Garasso which is part of the district of Koutiala. The surveys were designed to
analyze the income effects of improved sorghum technologies and traditional farming
practices on the population of 100 farmers participating in the IER-INTSORMIL
program in Garasso. So, a stratified random sample has been defined along the
homogenous group of farmers participating in the program and 54 percent of the total
number of farmer members of the IER-INTORMIL program has been interviewed.
The primary data collected included household expenditures, consumption,
inventories, output sales, grain purchases, farm labor, agricultural input quantities and
costs, land allocation. Secondary data were aggregate information in Koutiala from 1998
to 2008, gathered from the Ministry of Agriculture in Mali and the “Compagnie Malienne
pour le Développement du Textile” (CMDT). Prices data for the main crops of the model
are monthly observations covering the time frame 1998 to 2008 and were obtained from
the National Market Watch in Mali. Those prices have been deflated using a GDP index
for the same time period obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Rainfall
observations in Koutiala for the time span 1980 to 2009 have been collected with the
State Department of Meteorology. The labor coefficients used in the model were
developed from the household survey and confirmed by field observations from
Coulibaly et al. (1998).

4.6. Summary
The Discrete Stochastic Model has been chosen as modeling framework because
it captures the sequential production cycle and marketing decisions in a stochastic
environment. The stochastic process is related to randomness of yields and grain prices.
Grain yields are influenced by rainfall while cotton yields are dependent besides rainfall
on the annual prices announced by the CMDT. Seasonal price variation and conditional
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price distributions were captured through OLS regressions using retail market price data
from the years 1998 to 2007/2008. Farmers’ decisions regarding land allocation, input
uses, grain consumption, marketing and cash flow are assumed to be made at the
beginning of every marketing period based on realization of the current random variables
and farmers’ expectations about the future. The development of the empirical model
maximizes expected wealth at the end of the planning horizon subject to resource
constraints. The model also considers satisfaction of subsistence constraints and harvest
income goals as farmers’ means of revealing their risk aversion. The data needed to
estimate the model were collected from primary household survey data and supplemented
by secondary observations.
In the next chapters, the model will be used to evaluate the household income
effect of the adoption of improved sorghum technologies and marketing strategies as well
as various policy measures to restore the cotton sector.
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CHAPTER 5: TRADITIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND MODEL PERFORMANCE

This chapter discusses the model results for the traditional technologies of cotton,
maize, sorghum and millet. The results of the model are validated with empirical
observations and observed farmers’ decision making. First, the model findings will be
compared with farm survey data and results of other recent studies. Then, the ability of
the model to predict farmers’ behavior in response to changes in cotton prices and
fertilizer costs will be evaluated.
For the first step of the model validation, we run the model with the cotton price
and fertilizer prices for the crop season 2008/2009 as the farm household data were
collected during that crop season. We will compare the model results with field
observations and other research studies in the same agro-ecological zone. Then, in the
second step, we use the 2011 cotton price and fertilizer costs to predict farmers’ acreage
response and the income effect of those policies with the traditional technologies.

5.1. Calibration and Validation of the Model
Running the model for the cotton price of 2008, the model allocates 3.7 ha to
cotton, 2 ha to maize, 6.3 ha to sorghum and 3 ha to millet (see table 5.1). The large share
of sorghum in the crop mix results from sorghum’s role as the major staple grain in the
household. Outside of the primary cotton zone with higher rainfall, sorghum has a
comparative advantage over maize because sorghum is more flood, drought, and low soil
fertility tolerant than maize.
The model results match fairly well our empirical field observations where the
average farmer allocates 4.2 ha to cotton, 2.8 ha to maize, 5.2 ha to sorghum and 2.8 ha to
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millet. This is not surprising as the data in the model construction have been used to
calibrate the empirical field observations.
The model results for the traditional technologies are compared with other
empirical studies in the Sudano-Guinean region of Mali. Baquedano et al. (2010)
analyzed the impact of the removal of US cotton subsidies on farm household income in
Mali. Under traditional technologies, Baquedano et al. (2010) found that Malian farmers
allocate 3.6 ha to cotton, 5.8 ha and 1.0 ha to sorghum and maize, respectively. Coulibaly
et al. (1998) studied the impact of devaluation on new technology adoption in this cotton
zone. They estimated that on average farmers grow 3.0 ha of cotton, 6 ha on sorghum and
0.5 ha on maize and 2 ha on millet. These latter results are for moderate risk averse
farmers. We also handle risk aversion by including constraints to satisfy subsistence
consumption and the harvest income goal. Both constraints are expressed as priorities by
farmers in their decision making.
As in our study, sorghum is the principal cereal activity and the land allocations to
the different crops are very similar to our findings.

Table 5.1: Validation of the Model with Average Farm Data and Model Results
Traditional Crop
Average
Technologies
Farm Surveyed
Cotton (ha)
4.2
Maize (ha)
2.8
Sorghum (ha)
5.2
Millet (ha)
2.8
Total Area (ha)
15
Total minimum household grain consumption (kg)
Period 1a
5103
b
Period 2
3645
c
Period 3
2916
Note: aPeriod 1 corresponds to the agricultural season
b
Period 2 corresponds to the price recovering period
c
Period 3 is the lean season.
Source: Model Results

Model’s results
Cotton Price=200 F CFA/kg
3.8
1.9
6.3
3.0
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The crop mix identified in this previous section is mainly driven by the
announced cotton price at the beginning of the agricultural campaign, the fertilizer costs
and the need to satisfy a minimum grain consumption requirement. Now, we will analyze
how the cotton seed price and fertilizer costs have changed recently and how the
traditional system has responded to these changes. Indeed, in 2011, two major changes
took place in the Malian agricultural economy, the extension of the fertilizer subsidy to
sorghum and millet and the substantial increase in the cotton farm gate price of 31
percent relatively to the real price of cotton in 2008.

5.2. New Economic Environment of Fertilizer Subsidy and Substantial Increase in Cotton
Price in Mali
With the debt crisis of the 1980s in developing countries the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) began putting substantial pressures on developing
countries to eliminate subsidies and privatize the fertilizer market that was under the
control of state-owned companies most commonly cotton parastatal. Fertilizer was
widely distributed to farmers with government agricultural credit which resulted in high
fiscal costs and inefficiency in the distribution process marked by many delays in the
supply of fertilizer to farmers. As in most African countries, under the structural
adjustment programs Mali had to reform their fertilizer market by allowing more
competition from the private sector. Moreover, fertilizer and other subsidies in
agriculture including on credit were eliminated in Mali during the 1990s.
In 2005, the Malawi government designed a targeted fertilizer voucher program
entitled Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Program (AISP) to enhance maize production and
farmers’ income. In the AISP, targeted farm households9 received 2 subsidized coupons
of 50 kg of fertilizer (NPK and Urea). With the subsidized coupons, farmers were only
paying 28 percent of the market price of fertilizer, the remaining 72 percent were paid by
the government (Dorward et al. 2008). Along with the fertilizer subsidy, maize hybrid
9

According to the program objectives, households receiving the coupons were poor farmers with severe
liquidity constraints, but in practice this was not always respected (Dorward et al.2008).
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cultivars were also available at discount prices. With the combination of factors including
good weather conditions and the use of improved maize cultivars, the AISP led to a
significant increase in maize productivity, food availability and economic growth. Maize
production more than doubled and the value of the agricultural sector in the GDP was
raised from US$ 3.2 million before 2005 to US$ 11.1 million in 2006 and 2007 (Dorward
et al. 2008).
After Malawi’s success in raising maize yields with fertilizer subsidies, the World
Bank position on the fertilizer subsidy changed. The World Bank position now is that
developing countries have the right to follow their own policy initiatives and implement
fertilizer subsidy programs. If there is another crisis similar to the one that led to the
structural adjustment movement, we can expect the World Bank and the IMF to again
apply pressure against subsidies. For the moment there is an understanding that
developing countries need to increase their own food production and that fertilizer use is
a critical element to do that. The argument for a fertilizer subsidy is a learning by doing
or infant industry argument. As farmers learn to better use fertilizers and combine them
with new cultivars and better agronomy, there will be a higher return over time and
subsidies will not be necessary.
Hence, the Malawi success story has encouraged many developing countries to
follow this program of subsidizing fertilizer. Moreover, in the Abuja meeting in 2006
African policy makers decided to improve fertilizer access through targeted subsidies
with special attention to poor farmers. 10 The fertilizer subsidy program was also
encouraged by the sharp increase in commodity prices in 2007 and 2008 as the result of
the international food crisis during those years and the consequent pressure on developing
countries to raise crop yields in the agricultural sector.
In response to the regional call for stimulating agricultural production in Africa,
the Malian government began providing subsidies for rice production in 2008. Then these
subsidies were expanded in 2009 to include cotton, maize and wheat. Finally in 2011,
after complaints from producers’ organizations and NGOs, sorghum and millet were also
10

In 2006, African Union leaders signed a declaration during the Africa Fertilizer Summit in Abuja to
stimulate an African Green Revolution through incentives to use fertilizer in Africa.

59
eligible for the fertilizer subsidy program. The subsidy was provided through vouchers to
farmers who redeem the voucher with a private supplier. The fertilizer dealer submits the
voucher to the government for repayment of the price differential between the market
price and the subsidized price.
Figure 5.1 below depicts the market prices for cotton fertilizer prices (NPKBS11
and Urea) in Mali from 2003 to 2011 and the costs at which the CMDT supplied fertilizer
to farmers during the same period of time. Fertilizer for cotton and maize are provided by
the CMDT and private dealers supply fertilizer for the other crops. As we can observe in
this figure, the market and CMDT fertilizer prices were at record levels in 2008 but prices
retreated in 2009 and 2010 to their normal trend before the 2008 hikes. Then in 2011,
fertilizer prices are resuming their 2008 hikes.
Before 2008, the CMDT fertilizer prices were aligned with market prices. After
2008, the CMDT fertilizer prices became much lower than the market prices because the
government subsidized fertilizer for maize and cotton and then in 2011 millet and
sorghum. The government subsidy in 2011 is 28 percent for NPK and 20 percent for Urea
as compared to the average market price of 2011. Note that the subsidized price of
fertilizer offered by the CMDT and generally received by sorghum and millet in 2011
returned to the pre-2008 market price levels. Also note that Urea costs have dipped as
natural gas has become cheaper. The high other fertilizer prices are influenced by the
commodity price spike of recent years. As that comes down so will fertilizer prices.

11

The cotton fertilizer compound NPKBS is different from the cereal compound in the fact that it contains
boron and sulfur in addition to nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. Boron and sulfur are two essential
nutrients for the growth of cotton. Prices for the NPKBS for cotton are slightly higher than the NPK for the
cereals but variation of prices over time for these two types of commodities are similar.
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Figure 5.1: Market and CMDT Prices for Cotton Fertilizer (NPKBS and Urea) from 2002
to 2011
Source: CMDT, 2011

Regarding the cotton seed prices, since 2005, the farm gate cotton price is fixed
by the government based on world cotton price of the previous year. 12 Normally, the
cotton price is set in negotiation between the CMDT and farmers’ union representatives
before the start of the crop season. The CMDT plays a very influential role in defining
the domestic cotton price as farmers are poorly informed about the world cotton price and
trends (OECD 2006). As we can observe from figure 5.2 below, fluctuations in the world
12

The world cotton prices are the season average Cotlook Index A. An index is published every year by the
International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC). The prices were originally in $US/lb but they have been
converted to $US/kg in this study for comparison purpose. The Malian cotton prices are the farm gate
cotton prices reported by the CMDT. The prices were converted to lint equivalent $US/kg using a seed/lint
ratio coefficient of 0.42 (Alston et al. 2008) and an average annual exchange rate published by the USDA
Economic Research Service (www.ers.usda.gov/Data/ExchangeRates).
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price have been transmitted to the domestic farm gate price but with a lag strongly
favoring the CMDT. After a decade of slowly increasing world prices (nominal), in 2010
the world price more than doubled (ICAC, 2010). However even with the lagged catch up
in 2011, the farm gate price increased by only 48 percent above the 2009 Malian price
level. The Malian cotton price increased from $ US/kg 0.35 to $US/kg 0.51 from 2010 to
2011.

Figure 5.2: World and Malian Nominal Cotton Prices in Lint Equivalent from 2004 to
2011
Source: ICAC 2011 and CMDT 2011

5.3. Model Prediction of Farmers’ Response to the Increase in Cotton Price and Fertilizer
Subsidy without and with Grain Marketing Strategy
Farmers generally sell at harvest to satisfy pressing household expenditures and
make very little sales of grains during the post-harvest season. Those small sales are
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usually called consumption because the purpose of those sales is to buy some items to
complement domestic grain consumption. In the first runs all cereals are sold at harvest.
Without the opportunity for farmers to sell cereals during the post-harvest period
the combined effect of substantial increase in the cotton price and the access to fertilizer
subsidy translate into a large expansion of the cotton and maize planting areas. Cotton
and maize planting areas increase by 43 percent and 154 percent, respectively (table 5.2).
The acreage expansion for cotton leads to a decrease in total area planted for cereals.
Traditional sorghum area is the principal cereal crop affected by these price changes of
2011 for cotton and fertilizer. The area of sorghum is drastically reduced13 by 72 percent.
As a result, farmers are reallocating land and family labor resources to the most profitable
crops which are in this case cotton and maize.
Maize area is very responsive to the increase in the availability of fertilizer
subsidy. With the increased price for cotton the maize producers also have an incentive
because this makes more credit available for maize (an allowed option with the cotton
input financing), and it is easier to repay with the higher cotton price. The maize input
credit has to be repaid in cotton.
Maize substitutes for sorghum in home consumption (see figure 5.3). The growth
in cotton production and sales at a high price leads to a high household wealth estimated
at 1,206,482 F CFA ($ 2,666), a 49 percent increase in household wealth.
The availability of more maize and cotton for sales ease the liquidity constraints
at the end of the planning horizon (table 5.2). With less sorghum production, the marginal
value of the sorghum balance constraint increases by an additional 56 F CFA/kg ($0.13
$/kg) relatively to the 2008 economy.
Farmers’ response to the new economic environment is then analyzed allowing
the marketing strategy for sorghum and then for all grains. The marketing strategy
selected consists of storing the grains and selling after the price recovery and before the
next planting season. By selling during the price recovery period farmers can take

13

Since millet is concentrated on the poorer soils and there is less technology available than for either
sorghum or maize we consider its supply to be inelastic.
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advantage of the normal seasonal price increase especially during a bad year of
production (figures 3.1 and 3.2 in chapter 3).
With the higher price for sorghum from selling sorghum later, the area for
traditional sorghum is extended at the expense of the maize area. Income increases
further but only by 2 percent over the gains obtained from the cotton and maize
improvements without marketing practices of sorghum. But sorghum has shown its
potential to compete in the crop system even with the favorable conditions for cotton and
before the new sorghum technologies are introduced. When maize and millet are also
sold later in the season, farmers have a greater incentive to expand the maize area to
substitute for sorghum. The overall wealth effect is an additional increase of 3 percent
compared to the previous case identified by the marketing strategy for sorghum.
In the 2011 economy or when the marketing strategies are adopted for all grains,
there is less variability in the distribution of income as revealed by the lower standard
deviation (table 5.2). So, higher cotton price and the late sales of grains enable farmers to
secure consistently enough income throughout the year.
With more grain marketing opportunities there is a further easing of the cash
constraint during a bad crop year. Farmers’ ability to sell their grains later in the season
increases the return on storage as depicted by the higher marginal value of the grain
balance constraint at the end of the harvest period (table 5.2).
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Table 5.2: Farmers’ Response to the 2011 Economy with their Traditional Technologies
and the Opportunity to Implement Marketing Strategy
Traditional Crop
Technologies

Cotton Price
Cotton Area (ha)
Percentage change
Maize Area (ha)
Percentage change
Sorghum Area (ha)
Percentage change
Millet Area (ha)
Total Area (ha)
End Wealth (F CFA)
Percentage change

Base Case
TT

Scenario 1
TT

Scenario 2
TT

No MS
2008
Economy
200
3.8

No MS
2011
Economy
231
5.42
43%
4.82
154%
1.77
-72%
3
15
1,206,627

MS for Sorghum

1.9
6.3
3
808,386

49%

2011 Economy
231
5.02
32%
3.83
102%
3.15
-50%
3
15
1,222,705
51%

Expected Marginal Value
Grain Balance at Harvest
(CFA/kg)
23,624
20,006
20,925
Maize
27,174
26,673
26,671
Millet
24,995
25,051
26,134
Sorghum
1,329
199,076
163,569
Minimum Wealth (CFA)
2,525,354
2,505,395
2,874,063
Maximum Wealth (CFA)
Standard Deviation of
535,692
479,592
521,546
Wealth (CFA)
Max Marginal Value of
1.79
1.41
1.31
Cash in Period 2
Max Marginal Value of
7.94
4.71
2.07
Cash in Period 3
Source: Model Results
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com
Note: TT= Traditional Technology, MS= Marketing Strategy

Scenario 3
TT
MS for all
Grains
2011 Economy
231
5.29
39%
5.99
216%
0.71
-89%
3
1,247,780
54%

21,120
27,001
26,197
148,806
2,909,505
514,279
1.34
1.36
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Figure 5.3: Substitution in Consumption of Cereals across Policy Scenarios
Source: Model Results

5.4. Summary
The 2011 Malian government pricing policy on cotton and the fertilizer subsidy
led to large improvements in the household wealth. But, farmers still have a long way to
catch up for their share of the large increase in the world cotton price. The substantial
increase in cotton price is expected to trigger growth in cotton areas. The maize sector
will also benefit substantially from the fertilizer subsidy and the increased access to
fertilizer. Sorghum areas retreat significantly as cotton and maize are expanding.
Similarly, if all grains can be stored and sold later, farmers pick maize for these sales and
traditional sorghum decreases substantially.
Allowing only sorghum to be stored and sold later has a very small effect on
incomes (as does storage of all grains) compared to the other changes in economic policy
going on, specifically the increased cotton price and the fertilizer subsisdy. In the next
chapter we will add to the 2011 economy the new sorghum technologies.
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CHAPTER 6: IMPROVED SORGHUM TECHNOLOGIES AND MARKETING
STRATEGIES

We saw in the previous chapter that the 2011 cotton pricing policy and fertilizer
subsidy led to substantial household wealth and cotton acreage response. Farmers were
diverting from local sorghum into maize and cotton. However, the opportunity to sell
their sorghum later in the year and to receive higher prices particularly during adverse
years of production increased the incentive to crop traditional sorghum and slightly
increased incomes.
In this chapter, we describe first the improved sorghum technology now available
in the region. Next, the sorghum technology is introduced in the model without and then
with marketing strategies and we estimate the resulting income effect and acreage
response from technology alone and technology with marketing.14 The new sorghum
technology-marketing scenarios will be analyzed with the 2011 economic conditions. We
also compare the model results with some field observations of farmers collected in 2011
during a following–up visit. Finally, we make some concluding observations.

6.1 Improved Sorghum Technologies
The improved sorghum technology consists of a higher yielding cultivar of
sorghum, use of moderate levels of fertilizer in the following quantities, 50 kg of DiAmmonium Phosphate (DAP), 50 kg of Urea and 10 kg of seed of the improved sorghum
cultivar. In addition to inorganic fertilizer, the Production-Marketing project of

14

Note that we already considered marketing alone in the previous chapter.
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INTSORMIL included a package of agronomic recommendations including organic
manure, ridging, side-dressing, the split application of fertilizer and thinning. The
principal components of the technology were the improved caudatum15 sorghum,
Grinkan, and the moderate fertilizer levels. The improved sorghum variety responds well
to inorganic fertilizer and expected yields for average farmers are 50 to 100 percent
higher than the traditional variety. For the best farmers, yield gains go up to three times
those of the traditional cultivars. These yield gains were derived from field investigations
and from researchers’ estimations (Coulibaly 2010). Compared to cotton, average yield
of the improved sorghum is one and half times above traditional cotton yields. But the
average traditional maize yield is 7 percent higher than the mean yield for the improved
sorghum (see table 1.2).
Due to liquidity constraints farmers need access to bank loans for the purchase of
fertilizer for the improved sorghum cultivar as they do for cotton and maize. Producers
have to operate in farmers’ associations to obtain the lower price of credit of 12 percent16
from the BNDA (National Bank for Agricultural Development) and there is a credit
ceiling of 150,000 F CFA/ha ($/ha 332 at the exchange rate of 452 F CFA/ $US).
Farmers can pay back their bank loans by selling their grains after prices recover from the
harvest collapse since the bank loans are for ten months. Based on historical experience,
expected prices increase 26 percent from the harvest price to the second price period,
approximately four months later. So, by selling their grains after harvest, farmers can
obtain a substantial return on storage and later sale.

6.2 New Sorghum Technology in the Model with no Marketing Strategy
With the introduction of the improved sorghum technology in the model without
the marketing strategy, the traditional sorghum is entirely replaced by the new sorghum
technology. By adopting the new sorghum technology even without better marketing, the
household wealth is enhanced by 16 percent over the base case at the 2011 prices (table
6.1).

15

Actually a cross between Guinea and Caudatum with 25 percent Guinea and 75 percent Caudatum.
The normal bank interest rate is 24 percent. The lower interest rate is given to the producers’ associations
because of the reduced risk premium when lending through a famers’ association. There may also be some
subsidy from this public institution to support farmers’ associations.
16
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Table 6.1: Results of the Adoption of Improved Sorghum Technologies without and with
Marketing Strategy under the 2011 Agricultural Economy
Traditional Crop
Technologies

Cotton Price (CFA/kg)
Cotton Area (ha)
Percentage change
Maize Area (ha)
Percentage change
Sorghum Area (ha)
Percentage change
Millet Area (ha)
New Sorghum
Total Area (ha)
Expected Wealth (x1000 CFA)
Percentage change
Marginal Value of the IST
Credit Constraint
Expected Marginal Value Grain
Balance at Harvest (CFA/kg)
Maize
Millet
Sorghum
Minimum Wealth (x1000 CFA)
Maximum Wealth (x1000 CFA)
Standard deviation of
wealth(x1000 CFA)
Max Marginal Value of Cash
Period 2
Max Marginal Value of Cash
Period 3

Base Case
TT

Scenario 2
IST
No MS
2011
Economy

Scenario 3
IST
MS for
Sorghum
2011
Economy

Scenario 4
IST
MS for all
Grains
2011
Economy

No MS
2011
Economy

231

231

231

231

5.42

4.6
-16%
3.4
-28%
0

4.4
-20%
3.6
-24%
0

3.5
-36%
4.5
-6%
0

15

3
4.0
15
1,394
16%
0.75

3
4.0
15
1,444
20%
1.32

3
4
15
1,457
21%
1.28

20,006
26,672
25,051
199
2,505

22,499
26,754
24,947
227
3,458

21,492
26,690
26,147
105
3,964

21,727
27,096
26,117
72
4,272

480

702

749

816

1.41

1.69

1.41

1.69

4.71

6.39

3.32

1.36

4.82
1.77
3

1,206
-

Source: Model Results
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com
Note: TT= Traditional Technology, MS= Marketing Strategy
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The new sorghum gives higher yield response under intensive input levels
compared to the traditional varieties. The traditional tall sorghum cultivars lodge with
higher fertilizer use.
Thus farmers new crop portfolio is composed of all intensive crops that require
fertilizer use with the exception of millet.17 On the best lands, the improved sorghum is
competing with cotton and maize in land allocation. The fact that farmers do not have to
reimburse their input loans for sorghum at harvest when prices are at their lowest levels
leads to higher returns of the improved sorghum. Here they do not have the option to
market later but can keep the sorghum for consumption over the crop year. With the new
technology farmers are diverting land and family labor from maize and cotton to grow 4
ha of the improved sorghum.
The area cultivated for the improved sorghum could have even been higher if
farmers were not limited in the amount of credit they could borrow. Indeed, the marginal
value of the credit constraint shows an opportunity cost of 0.75. This means that if
farmers had an additional 1 F CFA available they would have purchased more fertilizer to
grow sorghum and increase their wealth by 0.75 F CFA. So, the shadow value of the
credit constraint indicates a return of 75 percent on the marginal increase of credit. This
return is higher than the interest rate on the bank loans for the purchase of fertilizer for
sorghum and reveals consequently the high profitability of the improved sorghum as well
as the limiting nature to farmers of the credit constraint when the new sorghum
technology is available.
Sales of sorghum at harvest become very important especially with the low cotton
yields. As discussed previously farmers have important cash requirements at harvest.
With the introduction of the new sorghum, there is more flexibility in the pattern of grain
consumption, sales and purchases. More sorghum is sold during years of higher harvest
price of sorghum relatively to maize. Consumption of sorghum substitutes for maize
particularly when the harvest price of sorghum is less attractive than the maize price.
17

Millet area stays constant in the crop mix because millet is traditionally grown on poor lands and is the
only produce in the crop mix that can respond reasonably well on these poorer soils. However, many
Malians prefer millet as a food so the harvest prices of millet are higher than those of sorghum and maize.
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With the new technology farmers need to purchase less maize and sorghum for their
home consumption (figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1: Expected Quantity of Grain Sold at Harvest across Policy Scenarios
Source: Model Results

With the introduction of the new sorghum technology, the marginal value of cash
increases substantially (table 6.1) during poor states of nature of the new sorghum variety
as farmers need money to satisfy their financial needs. So, farmers will have a higher
incentive to store enough millet and maize for their consumption and household
expenses. This is reflected in the larger marginal value of millet and maize grain balance
constraints.
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6.3 New Sorghum Technology in the Model plus the Marketing Strategy
The opportunity for farmers to sell sorghum in the price recovery period yields an
additional 4 percent increase in the ending wealth relative to the previous case when
farmers were only able to sell at harvest (table 6.1). The higher post-harvest prices for
sorghum gave an increased incentive to farmers to postpone their sales of sorghum until
the price recovery period (up to the next planting season) and increase their revenues.
Hence, in figure 6.1, we see that no sales of sorghum occur at harvest when farmers can
implement the marketing strategy. The stock of sorghum above consumption is carried
into the price recovery period. The returns for the improved sorghum cultivar are
increasing as revealed by the larger marginal value of the sorghum credit constraint.
The credit constraint for the improved sorghum is still binding and the marginal
value of 1.31 indicates a 131 percent return on investment in expanding the sorghum
area. If there were no input credit constraint, farmers would have increased the area
allocated to the new sorghum above the 4 ha. We might ask whether given the credit
constraint on increasing the land planted for the new sorghum cultivar, why farmers are
still not cultivating the traditional sorghum to supplement the improved sorghum
production and respond to the higher return on marketing sorghum. With the availability
of the fertilizer subsidy and the high cotton price, farmers prefer to grow additional area
of maize and sell at harvest prices thereby satisfying consumption objectives and
enabling sorghum to be sold later. Thus, we notice that although the maize area is still
lower than that of the base case scenario, there is a small positive area response of maize
which increases by 4 percent compared to the case where post-harvest sales for sorghum
did not occur.
The small increase in maize area comes at the expense of cotton area which is
reduced for the maize area. Maize is competing with cotton for additional fertilizer
resources and maize displays larger net returns during the very bad years of cotton
production characterized by cotton yields below 800 kg/ha and a high harvest price for
maize. Nevertheless, cotton still represents the largest area in the improved farming
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system. Note the constraint on the further increase of the sorghum area.18 Also, with
farmers’ opportunity to adopt the improved marketing practices for all their grains, there
is a slight increase in the household wealth and more competition between sorghum and
maize in land allocation at the expense of cotton (table 6.1). Note that with the
opportunity to store and sell all cereals more maize is produced and sold but there is no
reduction of the sorghum area. Cotton area reduction now makes the increased cereals
marketing more profitable. So the crux of the diversification decision is the increasing
importance of both cereals.
The adoption of the improved sorghum and grain marketing strategies lead to
higher income but there is more variability in the distribution of wealth around the
expected value as revealed by the standard deviation of wealth (table 6.1). The decreasing
marginal value of cash at the end of the marketing periods is an indication that farmers
become less cash constrained when they are able to sell sorghum and the other grains
later in the season at higher prices. Also, with the sorghum and the other grain marketing
opportunities producers value more their stock of grains available at the end of harvest
(table 6.1).
The model results with the adoption of improved sorghum and marketing strategy
were compared with farmers’ predictions regarding their land allocation during a field
survey at the beginning of the 2011 agricultural campaign with a sample of 34 farmers in
the study area. For the 2011 crop year, the interviewed farmers intend to allocate 4.8 ha
of land to cotton, 3 ha both to maize and traditional sorghum, 2.9 ha to millet and 1.3 ha
of land to the new sorghum. The model result overestimated the land allocated to the new
sorghum and underestimated area in the traditional sorghum but they indicated a shift to
the new sorghum technology. They also indicate how models adjust faster than farmers to
new economic opportunities requiring some agronomic and marketing adjustments by
farmers.

18

With a large scale introduction of the sorghum technologies we expect the sorghum price to fall. One
result will be the increasing substitution of sorghum for maize in the rations for poultry and other animals.
This scaling up of the sorghum technology and expanded use in poultry feed is expected to occur over the
next five years.
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6.4 Summary
Under the 2011 policy interventions, the opportunity for farmers to adopt the
improved sorghum agricultural technologies leads to a substantial rise in household
wealth. This increase is largely driven by the switch from the traditional sorghum
technologies to the improved one and the resulting higher yield effect. The introduction
of the improved sorghum in the farming system increases the opportunity costs of
financial capital and suggests a need for a greater access to credit.
The prospect for farmers to take advantage of the price seasonality especially
during adverse years by selling sorghum or maize later in the years has a positive but
smaller impact on the household wealth as compared to the introduction of the improved
sorghum cultivar and associated technologies. Combining both agricultural technologies
for sorghum and marketing strategies produces the highest income effect due to the
cumulative impact of the good fertilizer response of the new sorghum variety and the
higher market prices.
Note that with both new technology and the marketing strategy farmers’ returns
are higher with sorghum than with cotton. In the region where this technology was
introduced farmers in surrounding regions call Grinkan (the new sorghum cultivar) the
“cotton of Garasso.”
In the next chapter we consider what happens when the golden age of 2011 ends.
Then cotton prices are expected to come back down and fertilizer subsidies eliminated.
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CHAPTER 7: BACK TO NORMAL: REMOVING THE FERTILIZER SUBSIDY AND
RESPONDING TO THE EXPECTED DECLINE OF THE COTTON PRICE

The previous chapter analyzed farmers’ response to the introduction of the
improved sorghum with the economic conditions of 2011, including a substantial increase
in the cotton price and the access to fertilizer subsidies for sorghum. In this chapter, we
consider the return to the trend of world cotton prices and the elimination of the fertilizer
subsidies. First, we review the economic forces driving the expected changes in the
Malian cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy program. Second, we simulate first the
effect of the reduction of the high cotton prices and then we add in the increase in
fertilizer costs. The cotton price comes down by 8 percent. Fertilizer prices increase by
24 percent with the elimination of the subsidies. Both scenarios are compared with the
2011 economic environment including the new sorghum technology and marketing
changes.

7.1 Predicted Policy Change in the Cotton Price and Fertilizer Subsidy
The historic 2010 increase in the world cotton price has substantially increased
cotton production in the big producer countries. World production is expected to rise by 8
percent in 2011 in most of the world producing countries except in the US (ICAC 2011).
Even though cotton areas have grown significantly in the US, bad weather conditions in
Texas, especially the drought have resulted in a substantial yield decline. So, US
production is projected to decrease by 12 percent relative to 2010 (ICAC 2011). Cotton
production in India, China and Australia, is expected to reach record levels. Thus, with
the surge in world cotton supply of cotton, stocks will be replenished, import demand in

75
large importing countries will be reduced and the overall effect will be a lower world
cotton price than in 2010.
Furthermore, the decline in the world cotton price will also be driven by the
output expansion with the increasing use of transgenic BT cotton and the continuing
competition from synthetic fibers. The ICAC secretariat could not publish a price forecast
for the year 2011 based on the price model because this model performs well only when
the cotton price is in its historical range (ICAC 2011). However, based on the ending
stock consumption ratio in China and the rest of the world, a price decline of 15 percent
with respect to the 2010 price is expected (Commodities 2011).
We used a price elasticity method (Alston et al. 2007) to compute the elasticity of
price transmission between the world cotton price and the farm gate lint equivalent cotton
price from 2004 to 2011. We found a transmission elasticity of 0.54. During the time
period 2004 to 2011, farmers receive 54 percent of the changes in the world cotton price.
This elasticity coefficient is also very close to the 58 percent estimate of Baquedano et al.
(2009). Then, we determined a base price at the Malian gin gate by translating the 2011
farm gate seed price into lint equivalent price. Based on the assumption of a 15 percent
world price decrease in 2011, and the price transmission elasticity of 0.54, we found that
the farm gate cotton lint price will decrease by 45 F CFA/kg ($/kg 0.1) or by 8 percent.
When we translate the farm gate cotton lint price into cotton seed price we found that
farmers will be paid 212 F CFA/kg ($/kg 0.47) in real price for the next agricultural
season. So, this price will be used in the model to predict farmers’ response to a change
in the farm gate price.
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Table 7.1: Impact of a Decrease in the World Cotton Price on the Cotton Fiber Price in
Mali
World Price

Malian Fiber Price
Base Price = 550 F CFA/kg ($/kg 1.22)
Elasticity of transmission= 0.54
Absolute change (F CFA/kg)
Percent change
-45 ($/kg 0.1)
-8%
1

Percent change
-15%

Source: Author calculations
Note: 1The base price is the cotton fiber price in Mali in 2011. This price is obtained by dividing
the real farm gate cotton seed price by the seed/lint coefficient ratio of 0.42. The elasticity of
transmission is found by taking the average of the ratio between the percentage change in export
price to the percentage change in the farm gate fiber price from 2004 to 2011 (% PE %Pf )
(see Alston et al. 2007).

The second change in the government policy that will occur is the removal of the
fertilizer subsidy. The subsidy on fertilizer has been provided since 2008. The goal was to
increase agricultural productivity through moderate use of fertilizer, to improve soil
fertility and to help farmers overcome the liquidity constraint. Although important in
improving agricultural production, the fertilizer subsidy program will not be sustainable
in a medium or long term because of several factors.
First of all, criticisms of the fertilizer program view this program as high cost for
governments in developing countries (Harrigan 2008) and donors are unlikely to be
willing to help pay for this program as costs accelerate with more farmer participation.
Second, evidence from Malawi shows that a voucher fertilizer subsidy program is
often inefficient because of difficulties in the implementation of the program. In Malawi,
there was a lack of transparency in targeting the desired beneficiaries of the fertilizer
subsidy. Generally, producers with a significant number of assets or strong political
connections receive the subsidy as opposed to poor farmers with little endowment and
connections who are often claimed to be the main beneficiaries (Ricker-Gilbert et al.
2011).
Thirdly, the market prices for fertilizer in Mali are expected to stay on an upward
trend. In 2011, fertilizer prices were moving toward the record level of the 2008 year
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after a setback in 2010 (see figure 5.1). From 2011 to 2014, world demand for fertilizer is
expected to remain strong due to population growth, rising income in emerging countries
and biofuel development in USA, Brazil and European Union.
The growing population and incomes in emerging countries are expected to
increase the demand for vegetables, grains and other agricultural products as well as lead
to intensification in land use with increasing application of fertilizer. Rising income will
boost demand for meat which uses grains as animal feeds. The production of biofuels
using cereals such as corn, sugar cane and oilseed is forecasted to increase and compete
with the crude oil prices which are projected to remain strong (IFA 2011). All those
factors accelerate grain consumption and support a rise in fertilizer demand.
On the supply side, world fertilizer is forecasted to increase at modest rates due to
increased production capacity in many exporting countries (FAO 2010). This growth will
be mainly triggered by surpluses of nitrogen and phosphate while potash is likely to
remain more or less stable. Overall, even though the balance between supply and demand
shows some positive surpluses in the medium term, it is expected to be tight in the
coming years.
So, with the expansion of the fertilizer subsidy to more crops and more farmers
and with the probable increased fertilizer prices, the fertilizer subsidy program will
become more expensive for the Malian government and ultimately will not be fiscally
sustainable for the government. Moreover, in the medium to long run if there are crises
again international agencies will push the government to reduce or eliminate the fertilizer
subsidies. Thus we will consider the case of eliminating the 24 percent difference
between world and Malian fertilizer prices.

7.2 Effect of a Reduction in the Farm Gate Cotton Price
The 8 percent decrease in the farm gate price leads to a small decrease in the area
in cotton and a marginal increase in maize area (table 7.2). Production of the new
sorghum stays at its maximum 4 ha with the credit constraint.
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The income effect resulting from the 8 percent reduction in the cotton price is a
decrease of the household wealth by 5 percent (table 7.2). This is primarily due to the
reduction in the expected return from cotton following a decline in cotton area. A larger
reduction in household wealth has been offset by the higher returns to sorghum driven by
the increased sorghum sales. This is an important result as marketing strategies to
improve sorghum prices or in general grain prices can soften the negative impact on the
household wealth following a decline in the farm gate cotton price. The reduction in
cotton price introduces more risk in the distribution of the expected ending wealth
through the larger standard deviation of wealth and increases substantially the marginal
value of cash across periods (table 7.2).
The higher marginal value of the sorghum credit constraint of 1.48 (table 7.2)
indicates farmers’ willingness to invest more in the improved sorghum. Sorghum
provides the largest expected return among the crops due to a combination of factors
including the reduced cotton price, the fertilizer subsidy and the prospect to sell sorghum
at higher prices after storage.
Purchases of grains particularly sorghum and maize are very limited during the
post-harvest season (table 7.3). Rather farmers increase their sales of sorghum by selling
a larger part of their sorghum production in the price recovery period while no harvest
sales occur (table 7.3). Consumption of sorghum is kept at a minimal level due to the
higher return on marketing. Maize and to a lesser extent millet, substitute for sorghum in
consumption (table 7.2). Millet contributes to the financing of household expenditures at
harvest. There is a higher percentage of millet sold at harvest time relatively to the other
grains to compensate for the decreased cotton sold then (see table 7.3).
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Table 7.2: Farmers’ Response to a Reduction in Cotton Price and Removal of
Fertilizer Subsidy
Traditional Crop
Technologies

Cotton Price
Cotton Area (ha)
Percentage change
Maize Area (ha)
Percentage change
Traditional Sorghum Area (ha)
Percentage change
Millet Area (ha)
New Sorghum
Percentage change
Total Area (ha)
Expected End Wealth (F CFA)
Percentage change
Marginal Value of the IST
Credit Constraint
Minimum Wealth (CFA)
Maximum Wealth (CFA)
Standard Deviation of Wealth
Marginal Value of Grain Balance
Constraint (CFA/kg)
Maize
Millet
Sorghum
Max Marginal Value of Cash Period
2
Max Marginal Value of Cash Period
3

Base Case
Improved
Sorghum
Marketing
Strategy
for all
Grains
2011
Economy
231
3.49

Scenario 1
Improved
Sorghum
MS for all
Grains
Reduction in
Cotton Price

Scenario 2
Improved Sorghum

only
212
3.31
-5%
4.7
4%
0

MS for all Grains
Reduction in Cotton
Price
and Removal of
Fertilizer Subsidy
212
1.35
-61%
1.17
-74%
6.47

15
1,457,230

3
4
0%
15
1,388,355

3
3.01
-25%
15
1,154,091

1.28

-5%
1.48

-21%
0.80

72,088
4,271,996
816,187

19,952
4,261,232
826,410

0.000
4,489,907
888,311

21,728
27,096
26,117

21,775
27,142
26,120

24,823
27,994
26,222

1.69

1.70

2.36

1.36

1.39

12.82

4.51
0
3
4

Source: Model Results
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com
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Table 7.3: Expected Grain Consumption, Sales and Purchases across Policy Scenarios

Sorghum
Maize
Millet
Total
Sorghum
Maize
Millet
Total
Sorghum
Maize
Millet
Total

Expected Consumption
(kg)
Expected Sales (kg)
Expected Purchases (kg)
Harvest Price Recovery
Harvest Price Recovery Harvest Price Recovery
Season Season
Season Season
Season Season
Improved Sorghum and Marketing Strategies
205
280
0
2962
167
13
3435
2261
0
1419
396
1
5
375
287
907
0
22
3645
2916
287
5289
562
36
Reduction in Cotton Price only
105
285
0
3081
71
6
3536
2269
1
1557
169
1
4
362
378
925
0
12
3645
2916
378
5562
241
19
Reduction in Cotton Prices and Removal of Fertilizer Subsidy
2203
1601
0
4634
0
0
1442
781
0
147
330
180
0
533
738
836
0
7
3645
2916
738
5617
330
187

Model Results

7.3. Effect of a Reduction in Cotton Price and Removal of Fertilizer Subsidy
With the reduction in cotton seed price combined with the increased fertilizer
costs, there is a double constraint on the cotton and maize production. First, the lower
cotton price reduces the cotton expected returns and the area planted to cotton (table 7.2).
Secondly, the higher fertilizer costs further reduce cotton profitability and the acreage
response. Maize area decreases also substantially (table 7.2) because the input tied credit
available for maize as well is linked to the cotton price and the cost of fertilizer. Maize
input credits from the CMDT must be repaid in cotton.
The improved sorghum area declines by 25 percent but the declines in cotton and
maize area are at least twice that. The traditional sorghum area (without fertilizer)
increases by a sizable amount and is now cropped on 6 ha of land. The grain marketing
opportunity at higher prices improves the expected return of sorghum and reduces the
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effect of higher fertilizer costs on the improved sorghum profitability. Moreover, the
production costs of the improved sorghum cultivar are lower than those of cotton and
maize. Those two latter crops require higher level of fertilizer (200 kg/ha instead of 100
kg/ha for the improved sorghum) and other input expenses including a high level of
insecticides for cotton.19
Profitability of sorghum increases with farmers’ ability to take advantage of the
price seasonality. The share of sorghum planted on the best lands increases from 33
percent to 75 percent and the use of sorghum as a cash crop is enhanced with higher sales
at harvest and during the second price period (table 7.3). With the decrease in maize
production and larger supply of sorghum, this latter crop substitutes for maize in
consumption.
A change in the 2011 agricultural economy simulated through a decline in cotton
price and the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy leads to a sharp reduction in household
wealth, which falls by 21 percent (table 7.2). There is a higher exposure to risk in the
distribution of wealth and in the poor states of nature where farmers do not make any
profit, the marginal value of cash achieves a peak level (table 7.2). Clearly, the cost of
fertilizer is a central policy measure which impacts markedly household wealth.

7.4 Summary
The predicted policy change of 8 percent reduction in the cotton seed price has
only a small impact on the household wealth and cotton area. The yield effect of
improved sorghum and the ability of farmers to store and sell sorghum after harvest play
key roles in generating additional revenue if farmers continue to have access to bank
loans at favorable interest rates as they do presently. This combination of factors could
lead to major shifts in some regions such as the Koutiala region and the sorghum
19

The production function for cotton and maize includes farmers’ customary use of fertilizer as
recommended by CMDT and zero fertilization. The case is similar for sorghum but with lower fertilizer
recommendations. In the future more alternative fertilization data would be useful for defining other
alternatives as some of the reduction of maize and cotton may be due lack of alternative options, this linear
production function. We are grateful to Jerry Shively for this point.
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technology also should be a big benefit to Mali in feeding itself and in making shifts to
more processed food from sorghum and to the use of sorghum substituting for maize in
feed rations.
When the subsidy is removed on fertilizer, farmers’ incomes are severely
affected. But, there are still higher returns on cultivating the improved sorghum compared
to cotton and maize. Sorghum profitability was boosted here by the returns on marketing.
There were substantial impacts on marketing from the shifts to sorghum. This differs
from our earlier finding that marketing had little impact on incomes in comparison with
the sorghum technology introduction.
As the fertilizer subsidy will be fiscally unsustainable in the medium to long run,
it is important to find other non-subsidized methods to reduce the cost of fertilizer. These
could include higher nutrient fertilizers, better transportation, improved agronomy to
make better use of available fertilizer, and improved distribution networks for
fertilizer.After evaluating the importance of new technology, marketing and fertilizer in
driving household incomes, the next question is the benefits to women (and children)
from these different changes.
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CHAPTER 8: WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND
AGRICULTURAL POLICY ON WOMEN

This chapter raises the question of the benefits accruing to women and the welfare
impact on women resulting from new economic opportunities already studied for their
household income effects in the previous chapters. The specific economic opportunities
are the new sorghum technologies and associated marketing practices, the increased
cotton prices, and finally the fertilizer subsidy. In the previous chapter, we have observed
that these latter economic opportunities led to substantial income effects for the
household. In this chapter, we are emphasizing the sharing of the increased profit within
the household, particularly women’s gains from the improved technology and marketing.
Women are an important labor resource used on the household communal field
along with the male adult family members. When a new economic opportunity requiring
higher labor investments occurs, women have been observed reducing their participation
on their individual plots to respond to the higher demand for labor on the communal or
family land (Savadogo, Sanders and Mc Millan 1989). The resulting effect is an increase
in the household income generated on the family plot with men controlling this increased
income. The share of the additional income accruing to women or income compensation
for women’s increased labor is the outcome of negotiation between spouses and depends
on their relative bargaining power. Since the household head has greater control of the
household decision making and productive resources, women (and the other adult males
in the household) may not be fully compensated for their increased labor participation on
the communal field.
With many other demands on women’s time for child care, food preparation,
water and firewood delivery and the priority of work in the communal lands, greater
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labor demand on the communal lands means reduced time available and hence income
from the private plots of women. So, this chapter aims at investigating the benefits and
net welfare effects that women get from the adoption of new sorghum technologies and
the higher cotton prices and the other changes discussed in the previous chapters.
First, it describes the household decision making and women’s role in the farming
system. Second, the methodology and results of the estimation of the impact of adoption
of the new policies on women are discussed. Lastly, policy implications are derived from
the findings.

8.1. Household Decision Making
This section considers the intra-family labor allocation and the role of women in
the farm family system. It also defines the theories of resource allocation and income
distribution within the household.

8.1.1. Farm Family and Women’s Traditional Roles
In rural sub-Saharan African households, agricultural production generally takes
place on a communal land area and in private, individual plots. The historic role of the
communal land is to provide the subsistence consumption during the year. With the
addition of cash crops, the household head obligation remains to provide for the family
food requirements. However, there are often increased income streams beyond these
basic food requirements. These are still controlled by the household20 head with other
household members including women increasingly contesting for them.
The male household head has a dominant power in his relationship with other
household members. He controls the labor allocated to the communal field and the
income generated from this land (Gladwin and McMillan 1989, Hopkins, Levin and
20

The household in West Africa traditionally refers to large extended families composed of several nuclear
families, generally siblings living together with their wives and children. The size may exceed 30 but the
average is around 15. The household is under the authority of a single head, usually a man. Anthropologists
often define the household as those eating from the same pot.
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Haddad, 1994). All active household members can allocate their labor to their private plot
activities only after meeting the obligation of working on the communal land.
Social and religious customs prevailing in a given household, as well as women’s
age dictate the extent of women involvement on the communal land. This varies from no
work on the communal land to full employment. Indeed, even though some families
exempt women from participating in communal activities, many other households require
women to perform certain agricultural tasks during the farming season. Younger women
are generally involved in most cropping activities whereas older women have a privileged
status in the household. The participation of older women in the communal plot activities
is voluntary. They are also exempted from most domestic household chores particularly
when their daughters in law are included in the extended family and do these chores for
them. But we are studying in this research the average woman in the household with
obligation to work on the communal plot and who receives a private plot.
In return for labor participation on the communal plot, family subsistence grain
consumption and other necessary household expenditures are paid for by the household
head. Also, depending on the state of nature of the cropping year, women are
compensated for their work during the agricultural season by receiving some gifts
including clothes, cash payment or an additional share of the grain production above their
subsistence needs, which they can sell. Private plots are allocated by male household
heads to individual household members principally for the purpose of growing crops for
sale to supply their personal needs or to complement consumption in the family. The
rights to specific private plots are generally made on an annual basis based on the
household head discretion and land availability.
Women produce vegetables, legumes and spices on their private plots. Women
are the principal decision makers regarding production on their private plot or other
personal income generating activities. Women use their private plots to complement
home consumption and for their own financial needs and those of their children. They
make decisions based on the residual time left after meeting the requirement for
household chores and communal work. Then, depending on their time availability after
these main activities including their private plot, they can be involved in off farm work or
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self-employment activities such as craft work, beer brewing or food marketing. Given all
these multiple tasks performed by women, they have a very long work day and have to
give up their leisure time (Lado 1992). Some studies reported that women spend on
average 12-16 hours a day in agricultural and household work (Warner and Campbell
2000). While women contribute actively to farm production and family income
generation, women and non-household head men are confronted with unequal access to
productive resources including land, labor, technology, and credit (Warner and Campbell
2000).
The introduction of a new intensive agricultural technology on the communal plot
involves a readjustment of women’s labor allocation with increasing time spent on the
communal plot. This leads to less labor supplied to the private plot and thereby to
reduced earnings from the private plot. But women can still be made better off depending
upon how the household head spends the increased incomes resulting from the new
technologies and the decision making prevailing in the household.

8.1.2. Theories of Household Decision Making
Household decision making plays an important role in determining the
distribution of income within the family and the payment received by women for their
communal work. Three types of family decision making have been specified as
influencing the value of women’s labor. These are the exploitation theory, the neoclassical theory and bargaining theory.
In the exploitation theory the household head is portrayed as a dictator who
allocates resources in the family not necessarily for the best interest of household
members. Women are relegated to subordinate roles within the household. The division
of labor and distribution of resources within the family is shaped to be more profitable to
the male household head (Heath and Ciscel 1988). The household head reaps most of the
benefits of the labor efforts of family members and women’s share of household income
is determined by whatever the household head wants to pay them. In this condition, the
value of women’s labor in farm production is not determined by economic market forces
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but rather enforced by social factors, customs or expectations about women’s role in the
family and economy (Folbre 1986). Under the exploitation theory, we would not expect
women’s share of household income to increase with new income streams in the
household or to increase very much.
The other extreme representation of the decision making in the household is the
one attributed to the neo-classical economists who represent the household as a unitary
model with a joint utility function. The household head is described as being altruistic
and allocates resources within the family for the best interest of family members. So
incomes would be divided by the needs of the household and the household head only
embodies this decision making maximizing the welfare of the household. In the altruistic
decision making, increased income streams are perfectly divided satisfying everybody.
Empirically, the joint utility hypothesis has been challenged by empirical studies. Much
informal evidence in developing countries indicate that household members have diverse
preferences, particularly in the context of extended family and household demand for
goods and leisure depends on the identity of the individual controlling the income (see for
example Schlutz 1990, Thomas 1997, and Hopkins et al. 1994).
Generally, the exploitation and neo-classical views of women’s labor allocation
and family decision making have not been empirically confirmed. Rather, numerous
studies in developing countries point out some interactions in the process of household
resource allocation and income distribution within the household. The dynamic of intrahousehold resource allocation is captured through game theory tools. For this aim, Nash
Bargaining models of cooperation and non-cooperation in resource allocation and
distribution within the family have been developed by Bourguignon and Chiappori
(1992), Manser and Brown (1980) as well as Mc Elroy and Horney (1981).
The decision making process with the bargaining theory is analogous to the one of
a firm where conflicts are resolved through negotiation. All household members know
they need to collaborate to survive but there is conflict over the income streams
especially as new technologies increase income. For example both company officials and
the workers (or union) conflict over income shares but both know they are dependent
upon each other. Sen (1990) terms this as “cooperation-conflict”. Hence, bargaining
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theories have been developed based on the cooperation-conflict relationship in the
household. The outcome of negotiation is determined by the relative bargaining power
which is derived from the parties’ best alternative options or “threat point”. But, there is
also possibility for the party with less power to exit the contract if dissatisfied. The
relevance of the exit option between bargaining parties depends on how credible the
threat point is. So, in bargaining models, a key determinant of women’s share of
household income is their bargaining power. Women’s bargaining power is generally
influenced by better education, women’s opportunity costs, access to productive
resources and social norms (Jones 1983a, Agarwal 1997).

8.2. Method for the Estimation Procedure for the Welfare Impact
of Policies Changes on Women
The welfare effect on women of new policy initiatives will be measured through
the change in women’s total income in various scenarios with technology and policy
changes that were analyzed in previous chapters. The conceptual approach, empirical
estimation approach and the data required are laid out below.

8.2.1. Conceptual Approach
The conceptual approach of the welfare impact of new sorghum technologies and
agricultural policies focuses on the two most important farm productive activities for
women: the communal field and the private plot. Women’s additional work on the
communal plot resulting from the increased demand for their labor of new technologies
and policies enables them to receive additional compensation at harvest and to guarantee
their food consumption and that of their children. The private plot work is women’s best
alternative opportunity. The welfare impact of the introduction of a labor intensive new
technologies and/or policies on the communal plot can be summarized in the diagram
below:
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Figure 8.1: Diagram of the Welfare Impact on Women of a Labor Intensive Economic
Opportunity
Source: Author Own Design

Conceptually, the introduction of new economic opportunity on the communal
plot leads to a reallocation of labor to respond to the higher demand for labor on the
communal plot and will result in an increased profit controlled by the household head.
Then the change in women’s welfare following the new economic opportunity will
depend on women’s share from the increased incomes and the impact that her labor use
on the communal land will have on her private plot.21
The increased profit from the communal plot translates into increased payments
from the communal plot in the form of gifts principally clothes, cash or cereals. In the
1990s, the cotton economy was characterized by higher cotton seed price and higher
21

This increase labor could also come from other activities or leisure. We are treating here the case where
the labor increase in the communal plot reduces private plot activity. There is a literature arguing that
women have no leisure time as they have many pressing responsibilities.
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profits for farm households. So, during this period of cotton boom the harvest gifts to
women were substantial (Lilja and Sanders 1998). Cash and clothes were the principal
gifts received. With the decline of the cotton economy in the 21st century, the system
returned to a more traditional pattern. Women’s harvest gifts were reduced and included
mainly grains which women could sell. With the 2011 spike in the cotton price and
adoption of new technologies, sizable income surplus for households are expected and
women harvest gifts are therefore likely to increase.
The supply of labor time on the communal plot enables household members to
receive their subsistence allowance. The household head has the obligation to provide the
subsistence allowance to all his household members. The subsistence allowance is a
minimum amount of grains consumed by every household member and it is the outcome
of the production of cereals on the communal field. So, home consumption is part of the
household members’ compensation for their collective work on the family farm. In the
traditional system, the pressure of just providing subsistence consumption leads to
collaboration. When there is new technology, there will be increased demands for family
labor and new income streams will be generated. In this new system of the cotton zone,
farmers are already eating well. So little change in the subsistence grain production is
expected22.
With the increased returns on the communal plot, farmers have often been
observed making household investments for the collective good of their families. The
household investment expenditures benefiting women include housing improvement, new
farm equipment, children’s education, and health improvement. Even though such
investments undoubtedly improve women’s welfare, it is difficult to measure
quantitatively the effect of many household investments on women’s welfare. This is
illustrated by asking how much a motorcycle purchase, housing improvement or another
wife for the household head benefits women? An additional wife may reduce the labor
requirements of other family members. Clearly, improvement in housing would benefit
all household members but how much is the benefit to women? Given the limits to
22

Other food components were undoubtedly added to the grain consumption but we did not measure them.
So, we understate women’s welfare improvement by the value of diet improvement.
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measure the effect of such parameters on women’s total income, they will not be included
in the estimation of women’s welfare.
Under the traditional technology, women receive most of their disposable income
from the private plot although these are generally marginal lands in which few improved
inputs are used. Income from self-employment activities is minimal in many regions23
and the off-farm rural labor market has become more restricted with the downturn of the
cotton economy before the year 2010.24 With the increased labor time on the communal
land, women’s additional time will be principally coming from the private plot since
household duties require a fixed amount of labor time and little time is allocated to nonfarm activities during the agricultural season. Women are constrained to spend at least 4
hours/day in domestic work from field interviews. Self-employment opportunities are not
very common during the agricultural season so the amount of time that women devote to
these activities is minimal.
Thus the evaluation of the welfare impact on women of new policies will consider
the benefits received from the communal field and the changes in the returns from the
private plot.25

8.2.2. Empirical Estimation
The welfare impact on women of new economic incentives is evaluated by using
a partial budgeting approach which considers changes in the communal payment, the
subsistence allowance and the private plot earnings. The empirical estimation of the
welfare impact of new sorghum technologies and agricultural policies focuses on the two
most important productive activities for women: the communal field and the private plot.
Women’s additional work on the communal plot enables them to receive additional
23

Villages on the main highways with seasonal products to sell often benefit women but this was not
important in our evaluated village.
24

25

We are restating that the year 2011 was characterized by a spike in the farm gate cotton price

This approach underestimates surely women’s welfare but it is the best that can be done given the limits
in measuring quantitatively the benefits to women from increased family expenditures.
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compensation at harvest and to guarantee their food consumption and that of their
children. The private plot work is women’s best alternative opportunity.
The general form of women’s income earnings is defined as:
Y f  f ( ycf , y pf , y sf )

(8.1)

where Y f is the total private income earned by women, y cf is the communal plot
payment y sf is the value of the subsistence allowance and y pf is the private plot earnings.
The communal payment is represented by the value of gifts that women receive at harvest
from the household head for their labor effort supplied on the communal plot during the
agricultural season. These gifts are received in diverse forms that are in-kind (grains,
clothes) or in cash payment.
The welfare impact of technological change or new economic policy on women is
a function of first the income gains received by women for their increased labor supply
on the communal plot, second the expected increase in the subsistence allowance and
third the expected income losses from the private plot due to the reduction in time spent
on the private plot. It can be described as follows:
f
y cf y p y sf
Y f
 f(
,
,
)
T
T T T

(8.2)

where Y f T is the change in total income earned by women under the new policy
scenario, ( y cf T ) is the change in women’s compensations for their work on the
communal, and ( y sf T ) are the changes in subsistence consumption and private plot
earnings ( y pf T ), both relative to the household income changes.
The income gain from increased labor participation on the communal plot is
identified as the share of household wealth that women receive under the new economic
opportunity. During the field interviews, we estimated the proportion (  ) of household
income that women were receiving at harvest under historic technological change
(traditional technology and new agricultural technology or good crop year). This
proportion is the ratio of the value of the gifts received by women at harvest over the total
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household income26. The increase in the proportion of household income granted to
women when a new economic opportunity emerges reflects women’s bargaining power
within the household. We expect the proportion of increased household income that
women receive to be non-zero and positive if the household decision making is
characterized by bargaining or altruism, as opposed to an exploitative decision making.
The change in women’s share of the household wealth following the adoption of a
new policy ( y cf T ) is obtained by multiplying the change in women’s share of
household income relatively to their bargaining power ( ycf  ) by the change in
women’s proportion of household income from the traditional technologies to the new
policies (  T ) . The mathematical expression is:

y cf
y f 
 c *
T
 T

(8.3)

To estimate the income losses from the private plot, we assumed that the amount
of labor withdrawn from the private plot corresponds exactly to the same amount of
additional labor supplied to the communal land. Because of the lack of leisure time,
women have to reallocate their labor instead of reducing their leisure time. So, there is a
one to one relationship between the labor allocated to the communal and private plots.
 L p  Lc

(8.4)

The evaluation of women’s labor contribution for each technology or policy
scenario is derived directly from the farm programming results. Then, this estimate of
women’s time spent on the communal plot is equivalent to their reduced time on the
private plot.
The resulting income losses from the private plot is found by multiplying the
reduced labor time supplied to the private plot under each economic opportunity by the
average return to the private plot.
y pf
T
26



l pf
T

(

y pf
l pf

)

(8.5)

Given the difficulty that farmers have to reveal their income, we used the household expenditures as a
proxy for household income. Total household expenditures have been reported in table 2.6 of chapter 2.
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where l pf T is the variation in women’s labor allocated to the private plot from the
traditional technology to the new policy. y pf l pf is the total output on the private plot per
unit of women’s labor and corresponds to the average product of labor on the private plot
with the traditional technology. In this study, the relevant range of women’s production
function is assumed to be linear. This is because field evidence (Coulibaly et al. 2011)
revealed that women have access to very small areas of land (1/10 ha to 1 ha) and when
they get additional improved inputs their productivity increases substantially even at a
higher rate than those of men.27
The change in the subsistence allowance ( y sf T ) is the difference in women’s
grain consumption before and after the policy interventions.
Our methodological procedure was inspired by Lilja and Sanders (1998) but it
departs from this latter study in the way we estimated women’s communal payment
( y cf T ). The latter authors used an econometric model to find the coefficient estimate
of the change in women’s communal wage due to technological change. In our
procedure, we used directly the results of the farm programming model and household
survey to evaluate the changes in communal income led by technological innovation and
new economic policy. Women’s communal payment was the result of the product of the
proportion of household income women declared receiving during the field survey and
the value of the household wealth derived from the model results under each economic
opportunity.

8.2.3 Data
Data used for this analysis were obtained from a random sample of 30 women
from rural households that adopted sorghum new technologies respectively in the village
of Garasso of the study area Koutiala. These women were the wives of the household

27

We expect a sharply rising production function for women so these linear estimates would underestimate
the potential gains to increased labor supply of women if other inputs were also available.
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heads interviewed for the farm household model development in earlier chapters. One
woman was surveyed randomly per household.
Evaluation of the welfare impacts of the new policies on women is based on the
examination of women’s conditions without and with the economic opportunity from
sorghum technologies and the increased price for cotton. Respondents were interviewed
about their labor contribution on communal plots, private plots, off farm, gifts they
receive from the household head at harvest, private plot productions and sales, earnings
from self-employment activities, bargaining ability over increased profits from the
communal plot, livestock assets, and other social characteristics. Moreover, each
interviewee was given the opportunity to discuss the effects that the new policy had on
the time spent on the communal plot, private plot, self-employment activities, and leisure.
The data will be used to discuss women’s labor allocation across productive and
non-market activities, their income estimates and to analyze the net welfare impact of
policy change on women.

8.3. Results of the Empirical Estimation of Women’s Welfare
Women’s Welfare with Marketing Innovations and in the 2011 Economic Environment
Before delivering the results of the empirical estimation of the welfare impact on
women of the technology change and the new cotton policy, we will discuss women’s
labor allocation and personal earnings in the study area.

8.3.1. Women Labor Allocation
The descriptive data analysis revealed that women allocate their labor across
multiple simultaneous activities including farm work, non-farm activities and household
duties.
Farming labor allocation includes the work on the communal plot and on own
managed private plots. The activities on the communal plot take priority over the work on
the personal plots. Married women work during few labor periods and shorter hours than
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men on the communal plot. Their labor input is only compulsory during planting, harvest
labor periods including threshing and sometimes fertilizer application. Nonetheless, the
household head is free to request additional labor input at any time if there is need for
more labor supply such as during weeding activities. Data collected during the field
survey and confirmed in Coulibaly et al. (1998) reveal that women spend on average six
(6) hours per day working on the communal field whereas men usually work 8 hours.
Women have access to personal plots through their marital status and the head of
the household. These plots are specified on an annual basis by the household head and
their size and land quality depend on several factors with the most important being land
availability and the social status of women in the household. In the sample of women
interviewed, not all women had access to a private plot since land is a scarce resource. In
the sample 73 % of the women had access to a private plot. In families with limited land
resources to meet household food consumption, no private plots were granted to women.
Older women in the household, who are retired cooking wives,28 have priority in access
to private plots over younger active cooking wives. Hence, the data reveal that the
average age of women having access to a private plot is 47 whereas those who do not
have access to a private plot are on average 37 years old. The average area of land
cultivated by women with a private plot in the sample is 0.56 ha.
In Garasso, women with private plots usually grow crops that do not compete
with the communal land’s production. Women grow a variety of crops such as rice, okra,
peanuts, soybeans and spices that are complementary to the household communal crop
production. The yields of these crops are poor, less than 500 kg/ha for each crop because
women face many constraints in farming. These constraints include poor soil fertility, and
the lack of access to agricultural inputs such as organic and inorganic fertilizer, labor and
plowing equipment. Women’s fields are often depleted lands found on the edge of the

28

Retired cooking wives in the household are women who no longer participate in the household chores
and are not obligated to work on the communal plot during the agricultural season. A woman achieves this
social status when at least one of her sons get married and brings his wife to live with the extended family
in the compound. Her daughter in law represents an additional worker in the household. This latter then
substitutes for her mother’s in-law labor with respect to household duties and the labor obligation on the
communal plot.
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communal fields. Any attempt to increase women’s private plot especially in the south
might take into account land availability since in some southern villages land is
constrained by population growth.
Access to input for the private plot is very restricted. The private plot production
technology depends basically on women’s own labor input. Women can work on their
private plot after the communal work has been performed. Family labor specifically
children’s labor are made available to them once the activities on the communal fields are
completed. They recruit their children and use their labor and other female’s labor
primarily during the peak labor season of weeding and harvesting. Women lack access to
agricultural equipment and purchased inputs (fertilizer, herbicide). The limited access to
productive resources and the time constraint facing female farmers clearly translates into
many delays in their work and results in low productivity on their private fields. Also,
during the labor demanding seasons for women on the communal plot (planting, fertilizer
application and harvesting), activities on the private plots are often delayed or omitted.
On average, women spend 2.8 hours per day working on the private plot, and the number
of days that a woman will spend to work on one hectare of private land is 4 days for land
preparation, 11 days for seeding, 24 days for weeding and 22 days for harvesting (see
table 8.1).
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Table 8.1: Women’s Labor Allocation across Communal Plot and Private Plot
Communal Plot (days/ha)
4
12
2
46
19
133
108

Land Preparation
Seeding
Fertilizer Application
Thinning and weedings
Ridging
Harvest (& Threshing)
Total
Source: Household Survey
Note: Women have less than one hectare of land.

Private Plot (days/ha)
4
11
0
24
0
22
61

Women non-farm activities are small commerce performed locally during weekly
village market days or every day at home by children or older women, who are not
involved in domestic duties and farming activities. Women, who do not have access to a
private plot, have more time to engage in small retailing activities. Small commerce
consists of sales of processed food, spices and the sales of tree crop products such as shea
nuts, shea butter, bananas, mangoes and some other wild fruits. Women have less
opportunity to expand their non-farm work during the rainy season as opposed to the dry
season when there is less demand for agricultural activities. They do not generally engage
in the non-farm activities during the peak agricultural labor seasons. The prospect for
women to find off-farm employment is limited by the village remoteness of Garasso (55
km from the main town with poor roads most of the way), the lack of women’s education
and the inability to speak the language29 used for commercial transactions. Moreover,
domestic duties constrain women’s ability to participate in off-farm activities.
Women’s main family responsibility is to be in charge of the unpaid household
chores. The household duties include cooking meals, hauling water, processing grains for
domestic consumption, taking care of children, doing dishes, and fetching wood. These
29

In the village of Garasso, women speak only the local language Minianka from their ethnic tribe as
opposed to men who are able to speak at least two languages Minianka and Bambara, which is the national
language in Mali and is used prominently in commercial transactions.
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tasks involve a large amount of women’s labor because they are labor intensive. In the
data sample, active cooking wives spend at least 4 hours per day to perform their
household duties. Grain processing, cooking and hauling water are the most time
consuming household duties quoted by women during the informal interviews. For
example, field observations showed that women can spend 2 hours per day processing
grains which involves several steps including threshing the grains, blowing, cleaning and
pounding the grains with a mortar and a pestle. In extended families meal cooking
responsibilities rotate among married women. The wife in charge of cooking prepares
breakfast for household members and then cooks lunch to be carried into the field for the
workers. Once she is on the communal field, she might spend some time helping the
other workers, and afterwards heads for her private field to finally go back home at the
sun set (6:30 pm) to resume her work on the household chores. In the village surveyed,
no labor saving household technologies such as grain mills, fuel efficient stoves or
improved water pumps are available to enhance women’s productivity and efficiency in
accomplishing the household duties.

8.3.2 Women’s Earnings
Women have diversified sources of income distributed across private plot and
non-private plot owners (see table 8.2). These are sales of the private plot produce, nonfarm activities, communal field incentives and women’s work group activities. These
activities generate some small amount of money used by women to finance their own
needs, those of their children and consumption goods for the household.
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Table 8.2: Income Earning Activities and Labor Allocation across the Main
Activities

Activities

Return

Private Plot Owners
Number Total Income

F CFA/day

days/year

F CFA

Non Private Plot Owners
Return
Number
Total Income
F CFA/day days/year
F CFA
0
0
0

1,042
36,461
Private Plot
35
($81)
($2)
8,617
Off Farm
431
20
952
43
($19)
($1)
($2)
1,087
Work Group
275
4.0
419
3.3
($2)
(<$1)
($1)
22,977
Livestock
137
168
($51)
Fattening
(<$1)
2,667
Communal Plot
25
108
8
108
(<$1)
($6)
(<1$)
2,594
195
71,809
1,380
154
Total
($6)
($159)
($3)
Source: Household Survey Data
Sample: 30 women with 73 percent having a private plot.
Exchange rate: 1 $ US =452.61 F CFA on April 18, 2011 at www.oanda.com

40,813
($90)
1,363
($3)

900
($2)
43,075
($95)

From the survey results, income from the private plot producers is the most
important cash generating activity for women despite the low productivity of these plots.
Data reveal that the value of their production on the 0.56 ha of land cultivated area is on
average 36,461 F CFA ($US 80.56) which corresponds to 64,429 F CFA/ha ($US/ha
142.35). With the private plot savings, women generally invest in small ruminants (goats
and sheeps) fattening activity. Hence, the small ruminants represent live assets for
women and are important stock of wealth as revealed by the value reported in table 8.2.
The third source of income generating activity for the private plot owners is the non-farm
revenue with an average of 8,617 F CFA ($US 19) earned during the cropping season.
Despite the limited amount of time invested in this non-farm activity, for women without
access to a private plot, the returns are even higher than those earned from the communal
field. For the non-private plot producers, non-farm work (petty commerce) is their main
source of cash generating activities.
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Compensation from the communal plot is the fourth largest income source for
private plot producers and the second for the non-private plot owners. Under the
traditional technology, payments to women for the communal work are low. The average
payment for the communal work is estimated at 2,667 F CFA ($US 5.89) that is 178
FCFA/ha ($US/ha 0.39) for the private plot owners. The non-private plot owners receive
as communal payments 900 F CFA ($US 2) or 60 F CFA/ha ($US/ha 0.13). So, private
plot producers receive on average higher incomes than the non-private plot owners. This
probably results from the larger opportunity costs30 that private plot owners possess.
Indeed, the earnings from the private plot represent these women’s best alternative
opportunity and apparently give them higher bargaining power over the sharing of the
household wealth even though the household head entirely controls the allocation of the
private plot to women annually.
In terms of average return, compensation from the communal plot leads to the
lowest return on labor. It would not have been rational for a woman to allocate a
substantial amount of time to the communal plot if it were not for the need to provide for
the household subsistence allowance and living expenses. Economic rationality implies
that women allocate labor across activities until their returns are equalized. Women’s
compensation for the communal work is lower than the daily wage for hiring labor
estimated at 500 F CFA/day ($US/day 1.10). So, the household head will exploit this
comparative advantage by mobilizing family labor for the communal work.
The payments for communal labor or bonuses are variable across years and
depend upon the states of nature. For bad weather years there is little payment for the
communal labor. During good years of crop production, these payments can be up to 77
percent higher than the value for normal years (unpublished field interview data).
The last source of women’s income is the earnings from the gender workgroup.
Men and women participate in gender farm work teams. In Garasso, 63 percent of women
interviewed are members of a farm work team. The initial purpose of these work teams
30

Otherwise, we would expect women not having access to private plots to receive more compensation
from the communal plots because access to the private plots could be considered as a compensation for
working on the communal plots.
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was to assist the husbands of group members in performing agricultural tasks during peak
labor seasons. These work groups used to function under a form of labor exchange with
no or minimum income compensation for service rendered. The cash earned was spent in
organizing some social activities and village parties (purchase of uniformed clothes for
wedding, funerals, naming ceremonies, musical entertainment). But as already reported
by Lilja and Sanders (1996), there is now evidence of institutional change in the
functioning of women work teams. These groups are moving from mutual assistance and
community service to be more profit oriented. They are hired by farmers for some
agricultural tasks and with their collective bargaining power, the gender work groups
demand to be paid generally on a fixed cash rate upon completion of their work or at
harvest. Furthermore, these groups are evolving into associations and help members
getting small loans for private investments instead of using the returns on their labor for
community actions.
The total average income gains show a greater advantage to those with access to
the private plots.

8.3.3. The Welfare Impact of the New Technologies and Policy Changes for Women
Private Plot Producers
This section discusses the welfare impact on women private plot producers. The
outline that is used to estimate the welfare impact of the new sorghum-marketing
technology and the policy changes is detailed as follows.
First, we estimated women’s communal gains under the traditional system and
compare it with the new alternatives including the new sorghum-marketing package and
policy changes. This was obtained by multiplying the proportion of household income
received by women under each opportunity by the corresponding household wealth
derived from the model results. From the household surveys, a woman’s proportion of
household income is estimated on average at 0.4 percent of the household income under
the traditional technologies. This proportion is the value of the gifts (grains, clothes and
cash) women declared receiving at harvest divided by the total household expenditures in
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the traditional system (544,978 F CFA or $1,204) as reported in table 2.6 in chapter 2.
Under a new economic opportunity, this proportion increases to the average of 1.4
percent. This percentage is found by dividing the value of gifts women reported receiving
during a good crop year or under the adoption of the new sorghum technology by the
household expenditures defined in table 2.6.
Second, we estimated the resulting private plot earnings women receive under the
new sorghum-marketing technology and the policy changes. The private plot earnings is
the result of the average return to labor multiplied by the change in labor time from the
traditional system to the new technology or policy environment. For the change in labor
allocated to the private plot, we assumed that a unit of labor increased on the communal
land is equivalent to the same unit of labor reduced from the private plot. This is because
as already said earlier, the labor time allocated to the household chores is inelastic and
women have virtually no leisure time (Warner and Campbell 2000).
Finally, women’s total income across the traditional system and each of the new
economic opportunities is defined as the sum of the communal income and the private
plot earnings when obviously they could have benefit from other household expenditures.
The welfare impact on women of the new technologies and policy change is defined as
the percentage change in women’s total income from the traditional system to the
superior economic opportunity.
The evaluation of women’s welfare is performed under the various policy
initiatives analyzed in the preceding chapters. The base case consists in evaluating
women’s welfare with the traditional technologies and economic conditions prevailing
when the primary data were collected. The economic conditions were represented by the
announced cotton price of 200 F CFA/kg and no fertilizer subsidy. Then, the second
scenario estimates women’s welfare with the traditional technologies, adoption of
marketing strategy and the 2011 agricultural policy. This latter policy reflects the
substantial rise in cotton price of 31 percent and the 24 percent fertilizer subsidy. The
marketing strategy is the sales of grains at higher prices in the second price period. The
third scenario reflects the introduction of new sorghum technology accompanied by the
marketing strategy and the 2011 agricultural economy. In the last scenario, women’s
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welfare is estimated under the improved sorghum technology and marketing strategy but
with the reduction in the cotton price and the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy (table
8.3).

Women’s Welfare with Traditional Technologies
The use of traditional technologies yields a very low women’s share of household
wealth, estimated at 3,300 F CFA ($US 6.63). This is as expected since the use of
traditional technologies doesn’t generate much income surplus. Also, with the downturn
of the cotton economy, household decision making has shifted back to the one prevailing
in the subsistence system. During the time of cotton prosperity and the availability of
significant market surplus, women as well as other household members received higher
payments in gifts for their work on the communal plot. When they were not satisfied with
their payments, women engaged in bargaining with the household head (Lilja and
Sanders 1998). The share of the new income streams received was a function of their
bargaining power. However, with the declining cotton seed price up to the year 2011, the
returns to cotton have substantially declined and so did the communal payments to
women.
So, in this traditional system, the main benefit to women for working on the
communal land is the subsistence consumption and any household investment made for
the benefit of the entire family including women. The model results estimate the yearly
grain consumption per household member at 432 kg which is valued at 36,132 F CFA
(US$ 79.83) (table 8.3). Compared to the gifts received at harvest, the value of the
subsistence allowance is substantially larger and helps explain why in spite of the low
communal payments, women keep supplying their labor to the communal field. Their
goal is to guarantee enough food consumption for themselves and the other household
members including children.
As expected, the private plot earnings represent women’s main source of income
in the traditional system. The total return to labor and land (0.56 ha) is estimated at
36,461 F CFA (US$ 80.56) (table 8.3). Thus, women’s total income from farm work in
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the traditional system depends principally on the total return on land and labor of the
private plot. An increase in the private plot total return will be made possible either by an
increase in the time spent on it, a higher productivity or an increase in the amount of
private land cultivated.
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Table 8.3: Welfare Impact on Women of the Cotton Price Policy and Adoption of
Improved Sorghum Technology

Household Wealth (FCFA)

Traditional
Technologies

Traditional
Technology+ MS
and 2011
Economy

IST
MS
2011
Economy

IST+MS
Reduction in
Cotton Price,
Removal of
Fertilizer
Subsidy

808,386

1,247,780

1,457,000

1,154,091

($1,786)

($2,757)

($3,220)

($2,550)

A Woman' Portion of
Household Income

0.4%

1.4%

1.4%

1.4%

Women's Gains of
Household Income (FCFA)

3,257

17,976

20,994

16,627

($7.20)

($39.72)

($46.38)

($36.74)

38%

26%

-10%

432
36,132
($ 79.83)

432
36,132
($79.83)

432
36,132
($ 79.83)

432
36,132
($79.83)

1,042

1,042

1,042

1,042

($2.30)

($2.30)

($2.30)

($2.30)

35

22

26

39

36,461

22,606

26,981

40,107

($80.56)

($49.95)

($59.61)

($88.61)

-13,855

-9,480

3,646

(-$30.61)
40,582
($89.66)

(-$20.94)
47,975
($106)

(-$8.06)
56,733
($125.34)

2%

21%

43%

Change in Communal Labor
Grain Consumption (kg)
Value Consumption (FCFA)
Average Return to
Private Plot (0.56 ha)
(F CFA)

Number of days
in private plot
Women Income from
Private Plot (F CFA)

Private Plot Income Gain
or Loss (F CFA)

Total Income per year (F CFA)
Change in Total Income

39,717
($88)

Source: Author’s Calculations. Note: IST refers to improved sorghum technologies (high yielding sorghum
cultivar, fertilizer use, and improved agronomic practices). MS refers to marketing strategies for all grains.
We are not adding the value of grain consumption as it is constant across alternatives
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Women’s Welfare with Marketing Innovations and in the 2011 Economic Environment
With the implementation of the 2011 agricultural policies and farmers’ ability to
sell grains later in the year, the household wealth increases by 54 percent over the
traditional case. This is because of the higher use of inputs including family labor. The
model’s outcome reports that family labor demand increased by 38 percent. At higher
cotton prices and with access to fertilizer subsidy, cotton and maize productions increase
considerably.
The household income gives the women a share of 17,976 F CFA that is 1,198 F
C FA/ha ($US/ha 2.65). This is almost six times higher than the compensation paid to
women with the traditional technologies (table 8.3). Although women receive a higher
share of the communal income from the increased wealth, this share is still low compared
to the increased profit generated by the spike in the cotton price, the use of fertilizer
subsidy and the implementation of the marketing innovations. The remaining surplus not
paid to family members is kept by the household head who might use it for its own
preferences and/or to purchase some investment goods to enhance the well-being of the
household. In this latter case, women will have additional gains for their communal work
if the increased profit translates in an increased demand of the household goods for their
benefits. The literature reports higher men’s expenditures on cigarettes and alcohol
(Warner and Campbell 2000) but these still represent a very small income quantity. Even
if redirected, this income increase is minimal and would not affect the welfare of women
and children significantly.
The increased demand for women’s labor in the communal plot comes at the
expenses of women’s time on the private plot. Hence, women’s labor on the private plot
decreases by 38 percent and they spend 22 days instead of 35 days in their private plots
for the traditional system without sorghum marketing strategy. This reduction of labor
results in a loss of 13,855 F CFA ($US 30.61) in the returns from the private plot (table
8.3).
Since women’s gains from the increased household income are higher than the
decrease in their private plot earnings, women are still better off with a 2 percent increase
in their total income (table 8.3).
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Women’s Welfare with the Improved Sorghum Technology and New Marketing Strategy
in the 2011 Economic Conditions
Combining the adoption of improved sorghum along with the marketing strategy,
plus the substantial increase in cotton price and the fertilizer subsidy, the household
wealth increases by 80 percent relatively to the traditional system. There is an increase of
26 percent in women’s labor requirements for the communal land, but this rise in
women’s labor time is less than that obtained in the system without the new technology.
This is because of the decrease in labor requirements for the reduced area of cotton and
maize.
The labor supplied to the communal work boosts the household income and
translates into higher payments for women estimated at 20,994 F CFA (US$ 46.38) (table
8.3). With the proportion of woman’s share of income being maintained at 1.4 percent,
most of the increased income is controlled by the household head. The labor for the
communal plot comes from the effort on the private plot through a reduction of 9 days
spent on the private plot and a loss of 9,480 F CFA (US$ 20.94) in the total return of the
private plot.
Despite the reduced returns from the private plot, the overall gains to women
occur with an increase of 21 percent in their income (table 8.3). This positive income
gain for women is due to the increased share of the household gains that compensates for
the reduction in the private plot income.

Women’s Welfare with the Improved Sorghum Technology and Marketing Strategy but
removing the Fertilizer Subsidy and the Cotton Price Spike
The removal of the fertilizer subsidy and the reduction in cotton price increase the
production costs of all intensive crops. The household wealth increases by only 43
percent which is the lowest income effect compared to the preceding economic
opportunities (table 8.3).
Labor is pulled mainly out of cotton and maize production and allocated into
traditional sorghum which is less labor demanding. The resulting effect is a release of 10
percent of family labor compared to the 2008 case. Women reinvest this released labor
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time in their best alternative opportunity, the private plot. Therefore, the private plot
return increases by 3,646 F CFA ($US 8.06). The resulting effect in women’s welfare is
an increase of their income by 43 percent (table 8.3).
Notice that the change in the cotton pricing and fertilizer policies leads to the
lowest household income effect on the household but provides the largest benefit for
women because of the release of their labor and the consequent increase in the private
plot returns. This highlights the existence of conflicting interest over resource allocation
within the household and in response to the economic opportunities. The household head
needs higher labor time from women to increase production on the communal plot and
reaps higher profits. But women’s productive priority is on the private plot because more
labor time spent on the private plot leads to higher returns and increases her private
earnings.

8.4. Summary
In the household economy, household members are obligated to allocate
significant labor input on the communal plot for the family subsistence needs. The work
on the communal plot is the most time consuming women’s activities after the household
chores but women earn little income relative to their other principal opportunity, i.e. the
private plot. There was also potential from off-farm income for increasing women’s
income but again there were time constraints.
In terms of intra-household income distribution, women benefit relatively from
the new economic opportunities introduced on the communal plot. The most profitable
policy initiative for the household is the adoption of improved sorghum along with
marketing strategies and the government interventions to raise the cotton price as well as
to subsidize fertilizer. Nevertheless, these combined activities lead to lower welfare gains
for women as compared to the elimination of the fertilizer subsidy and the lower cotton
price.
The reason is that these economic opportunities from the higher cotton price and
lower fertilizer price increase significantly the demand for female labor on the communal
plot. On the other hand, the elimination of fertilizer subsidy and the lower cotton price
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release women’s time from the communal plot. Labor is reallocated on the private plot
and results in an increase of the total return on labor.
Thus, welfare enhancing policies for the household have a relatively low
distributional impact on women. Women gain significantly from the increasing time
allocated to the private plot. So, successful policies to increase women’s welfare might be
more concerned with releasing women’s time constraints and increasing the returns on
the private plot.
In regard to the household decision making process, the increase in the share of
household income received by women with the adoption of new sorghum technologies
and policy changes indicates some extent of cooperation in the household but it is a weak
evidence of bargaining. Probably over time with more agricultural innovations and the
increase in women’s opportunity costs through off-farm work and gender work groups,
women’s bargaining power will increase.

8.5. Policy Suggestions
This research has shown that the increase in women’s welfare will occur through
the release of their time from their most demanding labor activities and the investment of
their time in the opportunity that maximizes their private income. In this study, women’s
private plot is found to be their most rewarding economic activity. Therefore, welfare
enhancing policies for women could focus on releasing time from the less economic
profitable activities and increasing returns on the private plot as also recommended by
many gender related literatures.
A rise in the private plot returns will follow an increase in the private plot
productivity. This could be led by women’s access to good lands, adoption of yield
increasing technologies such as chemical fertilizer and high yielding cultivars on
women’s plots. But in the current socio-economic context, the productive resources are
under male control and there is very limited opportunity to increase women’s access to
those required agricultural inputs. Also, even if access to quality land and inputs become
effective, another bottleneck resides in women’s control of the improved private plot
outputs. Indeed, several projects have failed to achieve their expected results on women
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because the women did not control the output resulting from the introduction of the
agricultural technologies on the private plots (Dolan 2001).
Greater control of women’s output can be achieved from strengthening their
negotiation power, for example through the gender groups. In the Mopti region of Mali,
the IER-INTSORMIL program has been successful at helping women to benefit from the
new millet technologies by convincing their husbands to allow women to have access to a
portion of the lands. Women work individually but create marketing groups to share the
productivity gains.
An alternative to the concentration on the private plot is to raise the
compensations received from the family plot. The share of profit received from the
communal plot under traditional technologies and new economic opportunities are very
low relatively to the amount of time women spend for the communal work. The
remaining income is concentrated with the household head who uses it for his individual
preferences and family needs. Although women benefit from the household expenditures,
higher cash payments will develop greater incentive to increase labor productivity on the
communal plot and may result in larger profit for the household. In other regions this
concentration of income for the household head and poor compensation for other family
members is one of the factors leading to the breakup of the large households into nuclear
families (Lilja and Sanders 1998).
A second alternative to increase women’s income is the release of women’s time
from the labor intensive farm activities and unpaid household chores. The release of time
from the labor intensive farm activities will be made possible with diffusion of
agricultural technologies that require less investment in labor such as cereal technologies.
Concerning the unpaid domestic activities, the inelastic sizable amount of time
that women spend for the domestic work is a great obstacle to the development of
economic employment opportunities for women. The duty of fetching water, firewood,
and traditional processing of grains for meals all consume tremendous amount of time.
So, household labor saving technologies including motorized water pumps, improved
stoves and grain mills are expected to be effective in relieving women from the domestic
work burden and create opportunities for productive activities. Lawrence et al. (2001)
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have demonstrated that in Burkina Faso, the improved stoves were very efficient in
releasing women’s time from the household chores and increasing their welfare.
Additional free time will enable women to engage in non-farming activities where
they can have extra source of cash. Petty commerce has been identified as a profitable
earning activity for women although few opportunities exist currently to increase the
market share for this activity given the limited market size in the study area and the
distance from the paved highway. However, with further technology adoption and overall
regional economic growth there will be potential to increase market size and increase
demand for women’s retailing products.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Mali has experienced significant increases in area and productivity of the main
cereal crops over the past ten years. While the cereal sector has been gaining in yields,
the cotton sector, which has been the backbone of the Malian agricultural economy and
the main source of cash income for farmers has been through a period of drastic decline
for the last decade excluding the temporary upswing in price in 2010. There is now
evidence that an agricultural diversification strategy is needed to sustain farmers’ income
and help them to cope with the declining prices in the world cotton market.
Hence, questions are raised about the choice of investment strategies between
restoring the cotton sector and/or diversifying into the cereals that can be most successful
in enhancing farmers’ income. Though past policy initiatives have put a greater emphasis
on improving maize productivity, sorghum offers a stronger comparative advantage to
maize outside the high rainfall areas. Sorghum tolerates better flood, drought and soil
nutrient deficiencies than maize. So, sorghum can help farm households secure enough
food for consumption and can represent a source of cash income.
Various policy instruments have been introduced at the farm level to support the
development of the sorghum sector, promote food security and revamp the cotton
economy. These policy instruments include sorghum agricultural technologies, sorghum
marketing strategies, cotton pricing policy and a fertilizer subsidy extended to sorghum
and millet in 2011. The evaluation of the farm level impact and the distributional effects
within the household of those policy initiatives is essential to provide decision makers
with specific information with the potential to promote agricultural growth and enhance
farmers’ livelihoods. Hence, this research provides estimates of the income effects of
improved sorghum technology with and without marketing change. It also focuses on one
of the main innovations of the early 21st century in many developing countries, the
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fertilizer subsidies. This study also derives the welfare implications for women of the
above policy initiatives.
In Mali, recent agricultural policies to restore the cotton sector were based on a
sizable increase in the farm gate cotton price and a fertilizer subsidy. The model
estimation of the impact of the cotton pricing policy of a 31 percent increase in cotton
price and 24 percent fertilizer subsidy indicates a substantial impact of those policies on
the cotton sector as the cotton area and the farm household income increased
considerably. These findings indicate that the cotton pricing policy and fertilizer subsidy
program are important policies to be considered to increase farmers’ incomes and for a
recovery of the cotton industry. The Malian government has been dependent upon the
earnings of cotton and these have been decreased recently.31
In the objective of providing alternative source of income for farmers and raising
traditional sorghum productivity, we evaluated the effects of the introduction of sorghum
agricultural technologies with the present access to the fertilizer subsidy and marketing
strategies. The model results reveal that the improved sorghum technology is rapidly
adopted. Farm household income increases by 20 percent. Most of this income effect is
triggered by the yield effect led by the sorghum technology (improved cultivar, moderate
inorganic fertilizer and improved agronomy). There is only a small additional effect from
the improved marketing practices.
These results indicate that the improved sorghum technology is a viable source of
revenue diversification when farmers have access to improved cultivars, fertilizers, and
input credit. The farmers’ associations facilitate all these things. Storage and late selling
will ultimately lead to lower prices as more farmers embrace these strategies. Then other
marketing activities will need to progress to include new markets such as the use of
sorghum in poultry feed substituting for maize. Meanwhile, a focus on rapid technology
expansion appears to have higher returns than the storage investments for the improved
marketing.

31

In recent years, gold has been replacing cotton as the principal source of foreign exchange and Mali has
been promoting diversification in the cotton zone, especially increases in financing of inputs for maize.
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The cotton prices of 2011 were very high and were largely affected by climatic
events in China. With the continuing introduction of Bt cotton in the major cotton
producers of the world reducing the cost of production and with normal climatic
conditions in China we expect a cotton price decline to the level predominating in the 21st
century. With this moderate farm level price decline of 8 percent farmers shift from
cotton more into the cereals with new technology and are able to maintain their incomes
in this way.
The ultimate removal of the fertilizer subsidy pushed by the long term fiscal
unsustainability is significantly detrimental to the household income. With the higher
input costs, all the technology intensive activities decline including a 25 percent
reduction of the new sorghum area. However, the declines are even greater for cotton and
maize. Even with this fertilizer cost increase sorghum benefits from the improved
marketing with sorghum being held for later sales while maize sales are increased at
harvest for the harvest income requirement. The traditional sorghum activity expands
substantially here; however, this expansion of traditional sorghum will not be sustainable
without fertilization as it depletes the soil nutrients.
The bottom line here is that new sorghum technologies and marketing is
facilitating the diversification away from cotton and will be expected to continue but at a
slower rate even as the fertilizer subsidies are eliminated. Sorghum plays a very
important role in smoothing the household income over time when the cotton price is
reduced and the fertilizer subsidy is eliminated. So, there is a danger of not recognizing
the potential of sorghum by only providing the fertilizer subsidy to cotton and maize as
was the case before 2011.
Although we did not evaluate policies over an adjustment period, for food
security reasons a short run (next 3 to 5 years) policy of keeping the fertilizer subsidies is
recommended. There important learning by doing aspects of getting the moderate
fertilizer employed and the rest of the agronomic practices right to accompany the
improved cultivar. Moderate fertilizer needs to be side dressed not broadcast and a series
of agronomic practices need to be adopted. So these changes need to be mastered by
farmers to insure a high return to moderate fertilization (Coulibaly et al. 2011).
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The welfare estimation of the various agricultural policies adopted at the
household level shows that women are made better off from the increased household
income. However, less labor intensive technologies such as the agricultural sorghum and
marketing technologies provide a larger net income to women than policies to revamp the
cotton sector. Policy initiatives that are less labor intensive allow for greater gains for
women by enabling women to invest more labor time into the opportunity that maximizes
their private income, i.e. their personal plot.
Overall, the findings from this research have several policy implications.
First, the improvement in the cotton industry caused by the substantial rise in
cotton price and the allocation of fertilizer subsidy will be a short term effect given the
predicted decline in the world cotton price and ultimately the reduction and elimination
of the fertilizer subsidy. Cotton is expected to need more technological change to regain a
leading position in this system. With 64 percent of world production in Bt cotton (James
2010) it is difficult to see how Mali can compete with countries that are able to
substantially reduce costs with this cheaper and safer control of insect pests. So Mali will
need to follow Burkina Faso32 and rapidly incorporate this Bt gene into their improved
cotton cultivars.
Simultaneously, we have shown the potential for cereal diversification in the
cotton economy. This cereal technology is currently represented by the high yielding
sorghum technologies accompanied by marketing strategies. It has been demonstrated in
this dissertation and in the field (Coulibaly 2010, Coulibaly et al. forthcoming) that the
cereal technology-marketing package can transform sorghum from a subsistence to a
commercial crop. Bank credit is necessary and is increasingly made available in Mali.
Continued training of farmers’ associations in marketing strategy and business
management should enable them to further improve output prices and to prepare for the
real price declining effect expected from the widespread introduction of later selling of
sorghum. Higher sorghum prices are presently obtained through storage and late sales. In
32

INERA (Institute for the Agricultural and Environmental Research) officials in Burkina Faso reported
that 85 percent of the total cotton area in the 2010 crop year was grown with Bt cotton in Burkina Faso
(John Sanders, informal interview 2011).
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the future a demand expansion for sorghum stimulated by the development of the
emerging animal feed processing industry for poultry industry is expected to be effective
in moderating a price decline from widespread technology introduction. Also, large
product sales and volume input purchases by farmers’ associations will also benefit
farmers.
Further, fertilizer subsidies are deemed fundamental for Mali to increase crop
productivity, meet the food security challenges and contribute to fulfill the goal of
transforming Mali into the regional cereals granary for the sub-Saharan region of Africa
consistently with the Malian Agricultural Plans. Nonetheless, the large fiscal
expenditures implied by the subsidy program are likely to constrain the long-term
sustainability of this program. Strengthening the farmers’ association ability to access and
to modify fertilizer recommendations33 over time is one way of getting the costs of
fertilizer down. The farmers’ associations can buy fertilizer in large quantities thereby
reducing costs. Also as investments in infrastructure take place the cost of transport and
other transaction costs related to long distance between the farm production entity and
input and product markets will also be reduced. Continuing research and extension will
also be useful to support the diversification activities and develop site specific fertilizer
recommendations
Welfare evidence on women suggests that the most profitable economic
opportunity for the household is not the most beneficial for women. Women are better off
with the adoption of less labor intensive technologies on the communal plot. Therefore,
initiatives to improve women’s well-being must relax women’s time on the communal
plot to enable women to spend a higher amount of time on the private plot.
With the challenges facing women on access to land in terms of quantity and
quality and also access to agricultural inputs, policy interventions for the private plot may
need to target first access to better lands, compost and transportation to bring it to the

33

The present moderate dose is one sack of DAP and one sack of Urea. Ultimately the lack of potassium
will induce a deficiency in K and it will need to be applied. Sahelian soils tend to be deficient in P
(phosphorous) and in organic matter. So N (nitrogen) and P were concentrated on in the initial fertilizer
recommendations.
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fields. Secondly, a continuing effort to increase access to agricultural inputs especially
fertilizer and credit is necessary.
To increase women’s income, other alternatives to the non-farm activities and to
the private plot might be found in increasing the share of household income paid to
women. Even though small, women receive a share of the household profit. With the new
avenues for increasing household income and the bargaining type of decision making,
there will be increasing pressure on the household head to raise the share of the income
surplus from new technologies and marketing paid to women. Also, another strategy to
increase women’s welfare that was beyond the scope of analysis in this research is to
reduce women’s labor burden from the unpaid household chores. This could be made
possible through access to household labor saving technologies in order to generate
efficiency of women’s time and release time opportunities for self-employment or
income generating activities (Lawrence et al. 1999).

9.1 Directions for Future Research for the Farm Household
The discrete stochastic model used an average representative household to assess
the income effect of agricultural technologies, marketing strategy and public policies.
Using a representative average household does not take into account the impact of
differences in assets, resource endowments, farming systems, and cash flow across
households. There is a wide range of farmers with different resource endowments and
such factors are expected to influence the extent of technology adoption and marketing
patterns. A step further in this analysis would be to model those parameters and analyze
how sensitive farmers’ responses to some policy initiatives are to the household farming
and economic conditions. This will help researchers, policy makers and development
agencies to design technologies and policies that are best adapted to the household
agronomic conditions and socio-economic characteristics and could be better focused on
poverty alleviation.
The model was calibrated and the analysis performed with retail level grain
prices. Farmers also sell in local and regional markets and sorghum is produced all over
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the country. Our retail price probably need to be slightly discounted for farm prices
around harvest but the main difference then is transportation to specific agricultural areas
with isolated or distant regions. The margins increase seasonally and we focused on this
with the improved marketing option analyzed.
More information is always better than less but gathering good farm level data on
a crop sold all over the country in small quantities over time will not be easy.
Nevertheless, there should be some benchmark farm prices collected carefully for time of
sale and location relative to regional markets. Analyzing these margins will also be
interesting as improved transportation and communication over time is expected to
continue to reduce them. Our primary marketing focus in this research was on reducing
the large seasonal price spread between harvest and post-harvest price.
With increasing adoption of improved sorghum, there is potential for a structural
market change in the long run. In the long run, with the increased production resulting
from the adoption and the yield effect of the new sorghum will further reduce prices at
harvest. The price difference after storage will then reflect storage cost and a return to
entrepreneurs from taking the risk of holding the cereals. However, with the market
expansion coming from the development of the poultry and the food processing
industries, demand for sorghum will increase and moderate these real price declines. So,
a step forward in the investigation after these future changes when the technology has
been introduced on a widespread area will be to evaluate the price changes with the new
market effects.

9.2. Direction for Future Research on Women
The welfare impact of technological change and agricultural policy on women
was derived by using a partial budgeting approach with labor estimates from a farm
household model. The share of income from the communal field was found by
multiplying the household wealth derived from the model by a proportion of household
income received by women based on household surveys. This proportion represented
women’s bargaining power from historic technological change. This bargaining power
has been held constant across technologies and economic opportunities. In reality, we
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would expect women’s bargaining power to increase with higher income generating
opportunities. So, a model that will allow adjustment of bargaining power consistently
with the economic opportunities would provide more insights. An empirical application
of a Stackelberg oligopoly model (Warner and Campbell 2000) or Nash-cooperative
bargaining model with asymmetry power (Svejnar 1986) between spouses may be
appropriate for this purpose. Those models have been theoretically developed but there
are still large avenues for empirical research in development.
Assessing the impact of agricultural technologies and government policy on
women’s welfare is a multifaceted area of investigation with ample dimensions. We
focus on this research on the tangible measurable aspects of women’s welfare. But there
are untapped paths to evaluate welfare impact on women of policy initiatives and to
design pragmatic policy actions to increase women’s well-being. So, additional research
that will require innovative approaches might take into consideration more of the benefits
created by the increased household incomes that contribute to improve women’s welfare.
This could include improvements in housing, children education, household health, and
improved diets resulting from new economic opportunity. This will require new intensive
household surveys but would be a more complete response to the welfare impact on
women from new technologies.
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Appendix A: Yield Variability

Real aggregate yield observations and monthly prices were only available for a 10
years period going from 1998 to 2007. However, to be able to fit any appropriate
distribution to the data, a larger number of observations are required. Given that
traditional crop yields in the study area are mainly influenced by rainfall, observations on
rainfall from 1980 to 2009 were used to simulate crop yields for the missing years of
observations that means from 1980 to 1997 and from 2007 to 2009. In the study region,
the likelihood of excess rainfall in the months of August and September makes flooding
sometimes a constraint to adequate plant maturation and good crop yields. Thus, a
quadratic term in rainfall was added in the regressions to characterize the decreasing crop
yield with excess of rainfall. So, the grain yield regression equations are described as
follows:

yit   0i  1i X t   2i X t   it
2

Where y it is the yield of the grain i (millet, sorghum and maize) in year t , X t and X t2 are
respectively the rainfall observation and the quadratic term for rainfall in year t,  it is the
random term associated with the grain i in year t.  0i ,  1i and  2i are the slope
coefficients associated to the different variables. The results of the regressions are plotted
in figures A.1 through A.3.
For cotton, in addition to rainfall, exogenous cotton prices set by the parastatal
company at the beginning of the agricultural season are expected to impact the allocation
of land to cotton and influence significantly cotton yield. Therefore, cotton prices from
1980 to 2009 were added in the cotton yield regression equation as shown below:

yct   0c  1c X t   2c X t2   3c Pct   ct
Where y ct is the cotton yield in year t, Pct is the cotton price in year t,  ct is the random
term for the cotton yield regression,  0c , 1c ,  2c and  3c are the slope coefficients
associated to the different variables. The result of the regression of cotton yield as a
function of rainfall and price is reported in table A.1.
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In total, instead of 10 years of observations, the expanded sample for crop yields contains
29 observations including both real yield data and simulated yields. One year of
observation (1984) was dropped because of inconsistency in the data. The first order
moment and second order moments represented by the mean and the covariance matrix
for the original sample (10 observations) and the expanded one (29 observations) were
calculated. The results reported in tables A.2 through A.4 show a good match between
these two samples which means that the expanded sample is a good representation of the
sample of real yield observations and can thereby be used to construct a suitable yield
distribution.
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Figure A.1 Yield of Sorghum versus Mean Rainfall for the time series 1980 to 2009

Figure A.2 Yield of Millet versus Mean Rainfall for the time series 1980 to 2009
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Figure A.3 Yield of Maize versus Mean Rainfall for the time series 1980 to 2009

In the graphs, circles are the yields of observed data from 1998 to 2007. Dark lozenges
are the yields of the predicted data in 1994 that have been replaced by the discounted
observed data for this year. For cotton, we were able to have real yield data for that year
1994. The squares are the predicted yields. Observations for the year 1984 have been
dropped. Cotton yields are also function of cotton prices.

Table A.1. Cotton Yields versus Rainfall and Cotton Prices
Yield

Cotton

Intercept

--3050.75**
(1166.40)

Price
Coefficient

Rainfall

3.15**
(0.89)

53.59**
(18.47)

Rainfall^2 Adjusted
R2

-0.21**
(0.07)

0.63

F

6.13**

N=10 and standard error of the coefficients are reported in parentheses
***= significance at 1 % level of confidence, **= significance at 5 % level of confidence and
*=significance at 10% level of confidence

Standard
deviation
of the
residuals
68.91
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Statistics for the Real Data Set (1998 to 2007)

Table A.2. Crop Average Yields for the Real data Set (1998 to 2007)
Millet Yield
Average Yield
(kg/ha)

961

Sorghum Yield
1002

Maize Yield
1765

Cotton Yield
966

Table A.3. Variance/Covariance Matrix for the Real Data Set

Millet
Sorghum
Maize
Cotton

Millet
5,117.06
5,309.67
14,970.20
3,357.93

Sorghum

Maize

Cotton

7,339.57
17,883.7
6,615.84

54,611.7
11,774.7

19,309.4

Statistics for the Expanded Data Set (1980 to 2009) *

Table A.4 Crop Average Yields for the Expanded data Set (1980 to 2009)

Average Yield
(kg/ha)

Millet Yield

Sorghum Yield

Maize Yield

Cotton Yield

953

996

1745

968

*: Observation in 1984 has been dropped

Table A.5 Variance/ Covariance matrix for the Expanded data Set
Millet
Sorghum
Maize
Millet
5,453.92
Sorghum
6,271.76
7,934.58
Maize
13,210.3
15,649.9
37,934.6
Cotton
2,761.89
4,258.32
9,196.34
*: Observation in 1984 has been dropped

Cotton

12,350.5
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Appendix B: Distribution of Yields and Prices

Joint Multivariate Distribution of Yields using Gaussian Quadrature
A multivariate joint distribution was used to derive yield states of nature because
of the high correlation between crop yields. The multivariate normal distribution is the
most commonly employed multivariate parametric distribution for empirical work. Direct
representation of joint multivariate is computationally cumbersome and might lead to the
issue of the “curse of dimensionality”. As the number of variables grows, the size of the
matrix required to obtain good estimates of the joint probability distribution grows
exponentially (Fass 2005). Therefore, to avoid the difficulties inherent to direct
estimation of joint multivariate distribution, a discrete approximation of the joint
multivariate distribution is required.
The Gaussian Quadrature is the approach selected to generate discrete
approximations of the joint multivariate distribution. The Gaussian quadrature method
has two main advantages over some alternative approximation methods. First, the
Gaussian quadrature is simple to implement and avoids the complexity of evaluating
numerically the integral function. Second, the number of points necessary to get a good
approximation are lesser and more accurate than those obtained with some other
approaches such as the Direct Expected Utility Maximizing Program using Quadrature.
Therefore, it reduces the likelihood of occurrence of the curse of dimensionality limiting
often the implementation of Discrete Stochastic Program and other dynamic models.
The Gaussian Quadrature is a technique that uses moments to construct
distributions. It is based on selecting points among random variables and their
corresponding weights in such a way that the moments of the discrete approximation
match the moments of the true distribution (De Vyust and Preckel 2007). The points can
be interpreted as states of nature and the weights as the probabilities associated to the
states of nature.
The Gaussian Quadrature approach to numerical integration approximates the integral of
the product of two functions g(x) and f(x).

133
n

 g ( x, y) f ( x)d ( x)   p

j

g ( x j , y)

j 1

Where g ( x, y) is the level of profit realized when state of nature x is realized and the
decision y is selected. y is a vector of decision variables.

x  xi i 1,...,m is a vector of m independent random variables. In the case of yield, we have
four yields random variables for the traditional technologies and 5 yields random
variables including the improved sorghum cultivar. f (x) is the joint probability density
function for the random variables. p j is the weight or the probability associated with the
vector of points x j . The sum of the probabilities must be equal to 1.
With the Gaussian Quadrature, the probabilities of realization of a set of vectors
of random variables are found by solving a programming problem. There is no objective
in this programming problem but the constraints specify that the mean and the second
order moment about zero must match the same moments of the original distribution. In
addition, the sum of the probabilities of occurrence of the set of vectors must be equal to
1. The application of the Gaussian Quadrature approach to approximate the original
distribution of yield random variables leads to 17 points or set of random variables
vectors with positive probability (see table B.1).
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Table B.1 States of nature of Yields (kg/ha) and their Corresponding Probabilities
Points
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Cotton
939
781
909
962
1028
1143
1031
953
1009
1111
777
1145
1063
767
1005
824
875

Maize
1715
1383
1841
1621
1364
1727
1823
1903
1538
1868
1207
1800
1804
1896
2040
1578
1941

Sorghum
1005
846
976
962
713
1005
971
1090
978
1056
798
1059
994
991
1095
939
1088

Millet
951
830
968
918
716
954
1007
1039
931
1006
785
958
921
979
1000
901
1026

New
Sorghum
1642
1483
1613
1599
1350
1642
1608
1727
1615
1693
1435
1696
1631
1628
1732
1500
1800

Probability
0.171
0.069
0.128
0.025
0.026
0.089
0.023
0.14
0.015
0.072
0.034
0.047
0.037
0.007
0.049
0.034
0.034

Distribution of Prices
In regards to the distribution of prices at the different decision periods, the
residuals of the prices regression equations were used to construct distributions and to
derive the probabilities associated to the states of nature. A Gaussian Quadrature
approximation can be used also in this case to identify the probabilities of the price states
of nature but given the 10 price observations an empirical distribution will produce
exactly the same results as the Gaussian Quadrature approximation. Thus, the empirical
distribution identifies each year of the 10 years period as a single state of nature, with the
probability 1/10 attached to each outcome. Thus, 10 states of nature with a probability of
1/10 for each event have been identified for prices at harvest, in the recovery and the lean
seasons (see tables B.2, B.3 and B.4).
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Table B.2 Probability Distribution of the Residuals for the Grain Harvest Prices regressed
on Yields
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Maize
17.15
-10.49
-27.381
21.602
17.58
-31.104
4.114
5.425
-12.872
15.975

Millet
52.062
-0.439
-34.372
26.859
23.978
-27.889
-9.403
9.188
-24.624
-15.359

Sorghum
18.629
8.598
-33.667
34.321
14.514
-22.948
-4.772
0.011
-26.502
11.816

Probability
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

Table B.3 Probability Distribution of the Residuals of Grain Recovery Prices regressed
on Harvest Prices
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Maize
-6.869
-23.026
23.895
35.079
-24.764
-11.631
41.447
-14.632
-13.973
-5.526

Millet
-31.622
-41.915
39.602
44.288
-2.52
-27.275
39.939
-3.319
-15.398
-1.78

Sorghum
-6.994
-30.45
28.375
47.948
-22.55
-14.73
44.667
-11.263
-19.578
-15.426

Probability
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
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Table B.4 Probability Distribution of the Residuals of prices in the Hungry Season
regressed on prices in the Harvest and Price Recovery Periods
States
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Maize
-0.831
-6.547
-10.977
11.474
-9.898
-6.321
-11.152
-10.885
7.445
37.693

Millet
7.423
1.539
-11.945
-3.798
-8.277
-4.041
17.561
-5.631
-7.498
14.668

Sorghum
-0.651
-7.764
-2.708
-3.889
-1.952
-14.567
5.125
-5.557
8.349
23.614

Probability
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
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Appendix C: Yield, Rainfall and Price Data

Table C.1: Yield, Rainfall and Cotton Price Data from 1980 to 2009

Years

Millet

Traditional
Sorghum

Improved
Sorghum

Maize

Cotton

Rainfall

1980
1981
1982
1983
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Mean

951
994
1005
951
988
1001
913
1022
830
968
1001
882
918
716
996
954
995
1007
1039
931
1006
785
958
921
983
979.4
1000
901
1026
953

1005
1051
1070
1005
1048
1056
958
1082
846
976
1061
914
962
713
1059
1005
1026
971
1090
978
1056
798
1059
994
989
991
1095
939
1088
996

1642
1688
1707
1642
1685
1693
1595
1719
1483
1613
1698
1551
1599
1350
1696
1642
1663
1608
1727
1615
1693
1435
1696
1631
1626
1628
1732
1500
1800
1633

1715
1846
1870
1715
1824
1871
1606
1931
1383
1841
1866
1523
1621
1364
1843
1727
1893
1823
1903
1538
1868
1207
1800
1804
1773
1896
2040
1578
1941
1745

939
1043
1058
958
970
987
893
1028
778
906
1070
826
957
1028
1046
1145
1053
1031
953
1009
1111
777
1145
1063
798
767
1005
825
875
967

108
121
119
108
117
125
101
129
93
151
122
99
103
190
117
111
143
148
123
105
112
91
136
98
113
152
138
102
129
121

Nominal
Cotton
Price
55.00
65.00
65.00
75.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
93.00
95.00
85.00
97.50
130.00
155.00
185.00
170.00
185.00
150.00
170.00
200.00
180.00
200.00
210.00
160.00
165.00
160.00
200
170.00
133

Real
Cotton
Price
212
230
227
218
207
211
214
215
219
221
235
209
233
219
227
278
247
262
214
224
252
235
255
255
188
184
174
200
164
222

Note: data in bold are real data from the region of Sikasso in 1994 discounted by a percentage to
reflect the yields in Koutiala. The discount rates are bias observed between yields of Koutiala and
Sikasso from 1998 to 2007. Over this time period, yields of millet in Sikasso are on average 7
percent higher than millet yields in Koutiala. Sorghum and maize yields are respectively 5
percent and 1 percent lower in Sikasso than yields in Koutiala. Those discount rates were applied
to find the estimated yields in 1994 in Koutiala for millet, sorghum and maize.
Data in italic are the observed yields in Koutiala from 1998 to 2007
Data in regular font are the predicted yields obtained with the regression equations
For the improved sorghum, we had only three years of field observations (2007 to 2009), so we
computed first the difference in the average yield between the traditional cultivar and the
improved one during those years. Then we found the yields of the improved sorghum for the 26

138
years with missing observations by adding this average value to the yields of the traditional
sorghum variety.
Rainfall data are average monthly observations in mm.
Cotton real prices have been obtained by deflating the nominal prices using the GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) deflator index in Mali with 2008 as the base year. The resulting predicted
cotton yields appear to be more consistent with the observed trend in yields when the GDP
deflator is used to correct for inflation than the CPI (Consumer Price Index).

Table C.2: Sorghum Real Prices from 1998 to 2008
Years
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Mean

Harvest Season
Prices
119
80
65
114
157
56
90
96
69
82
80
92

Recovery Season
Prices
135
73
117
185
157
65
158
108
73
90
109
115

Note: Prices have been deflated with GDP deflator by using 2008 as the base year.

Hungry Season
Prices
124
65
153
202
115
72
196
103
93
120
138
126

139
Appendix D: GAMS Model

*%%%%% Jeanne DSP model%%%%%%%
*1. Finding the probabilities of the different states of nature
Option
limrow=0
limcol=0 ;
Sets
inp input for crops /npkc, ureac, herb, insect,seedc,npkm,uream, seedma, seedmi,seedsor, urea2,
dap,seedntso/
lper labor period /L1*L10 /
crop all crops in the model /cot,maiz,mil,sorg/
grain(crop) grain consumed in the household hold / mil, sorg, maiz/
cropact all crop activities used in the model / trdct, trdma, trds, trdmi,ntso/
*trdct=traditonal cotton, trdma=traditonal maize, trds=traditional sorghum, trdmi= traditional
millet, Ntso=new technology for sorghum
trad(cropact) traditional activities /trdct, trdma, trds, trdmi/
gtrad(trad) traditional activities except cotton / trdma, trds, trdmi/
t time period /t1*t29/
*time from 1980 to 2009 with 1984 dropped
ty(t) subset time period when we have real yield data /t18*t27/
*time from 1998 to 2007
sy(t) subset time period when yield probabilities is not equal to
zero/t1,t9,t10,t13,t14,t16,t18,t19,t20,t21,t22,t23,t24,t26,t27,t28,t29/
labor family labor /male, female, child/
alias (cropact,j),(trad,trd),(grain,gr) ;
alias (ty,ty1,ty2,ty3);

Table outmap(cropact,crop) Which crop activities produce which crops
cot maiz mil sorg
trdct 1
trdma
1
trds
1
trdmi
1
ntso
1;
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Parameter
table yield(t,*) predicted and real yield data in kg per ha
trdmi
trds
trdma
trdct
ntso
t1
951
1005
1715
939
1642
t2
994
1051
1846
1042
1688
t3
1005
1070
1870
1058
1707
t4
951
1005
1715
963
1642
t5
988
1048
1824
969
1685
t6
1001
1056
1871
990
1693
t7
913
958
1606
895
1595
t8
1022
1082
1931
1026
1719
t9
830
846
1383
781
1483
t10
968
976
1841
909
1613
t11
1001
1061
1866
1068
1698
t12
882
914
1523
828
1551
t13
918
962
1621
962
1599
t14
716
713
1364
1028
1350
t15
996
1059
1843
1046
1696
t16
954
1005
1727
1143
1642
t17
995
1026
1893
1053
1663
t18
1007
971
1823
1031
1608
t19
1039
1090
1903
953
1727
t20
931
978
1538
1009
1615
t21
1006
1056
1868
1111
1693
t22
785
798
1207
777
1435
t23
958
1059 1800
1145
1696
t24
921
994
1804
1063
1631
t25
983
989
1773
798
1626
t26
979
991
1896
767
1628
t27
1000
1095
2040
1005
1732
t28
901
939
1578
824
1500
t29
1026
1088
1941
875
1800 ;
Positive Variables
pry(t)
Probability on the t-th yield ;
Variables
z
Dummy objective ;
Equation
obj
Dummy objective definition
prysum
Probabilities add to 1
mu(cropact)
Means of crop yields
sig(cropact,cropact) Covariances of crop yields ;
obj .. z =e= 0 ;
prysum .. sum(t,pry(t)) =e= 1 ;
mu(cropact) .. sum(t,pry(t)*yield(t,cropact)) =e= sum(t,yield(t,cropact))/card(t) ;
sig(cropact,j) .. sum(t,pry(t)*yield(t,cropact)*yield(t,j))
=e= sum(t,yield(t,cropact)*yield(t,j))/card(t) ;
Model GQYields / obj,prysum,mu,sig / ;
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Option limrow=1,limcol=1 ;
Solve GQYields using lp minimizing z ;
scalar nstate Number of states ;
nstate = sum(t$pry.l(t),1) ;
display nstate ;
yield(t,'prob') = pry.l(t) ;
display yield ;

Table map(cropact,crop) Mapping from crops to grains
mil sorg maiz cot
trdmi 1
trds
1
trdma
1
trdct
1
*ntso
1
;
Parameter
rainfall(t) average monthly rainfall across time periods
/t1 108, t2 121, t3 119, t4 108, t5 117, t6 125, t7 101, t8 129, t9 93, t10 151,
t11 122, t12 99, t13 103, t14 190, t15 117, t16 111, t17 143, t18 148, t19 123,
t20 105, t21 112, t22 91, t23 136, t24 98, t25 113, t26 152, t27 138, t28 102, t29 129/
pcot(t) real cotton prices across time periods in F CFA per kg
/t1 212, t2 230, t3 227, t4 218, t5 207, t6 211, t7 214, t8 215, t9 219, t10 221,
t11 235, t12 209, t13 233, t14 219, t15 227 , t16 278, t17 247, t18 262, t19 214,
t20 224, t21 252, t22 235, t23 255, t24 255, t25 188, t26 184, t27 174, t28 200, t29 164/;
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Table hvprice(t,grain) Harvest time price for grain
mil sorg
maiz
t18 153 119
96
t19
94
80
64
t20
82
65
67
t21 128 114
98
t22 170 157
130
t23
83
56
49
t24 109
90
84
t25 115
96
87
t26
82
69
62
t27
87
82
83
t28 104
80
86
;
Table rcprice(t,grain) Recovery time price for grain
mil sorg maiz
t18 131 135 113
t19
69
73
64
t20 140 117 114
t21 185 185 157
t22 175 157 130
t23
74
65
60
t24 164 158 149
t25 126 108
96
t26
85
73
71
t27 103
90 101
t28 123 109 113
;
Table hnprice(t,grain) Hungry time price for grain
mil sorg maiz
t18 119 124 100
t19 70
65
63
t20 167 153 120
t21 204 202 167
t22 153 115
79
t23
80
72
73
t24 210 196 148
t25 128 103
77
t26
93
93
88
t27 137 120 136
t28 156 138 120
;
Variables
calpha
Intercept for cotton yield
cbetar
Rainfall slope for cotton yield
cbetarr
Rainfall^2 slope for cotton yield
cbetap
Price slope for cotton yield
alpha(grain) Intercept for harvest price of grain
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beta(grain) Yield slope for price of grain
rpalpha(grain) Intercept for regression of recovery price
rpbeta(grain) Slope for regression of recovery price
hpalpha(grain) Intercept for regression of hungry price
hphbeta(grain) Slope for regression of hungry price for harvest price
hprbeta(grain) Slope for regression of hungry price for recovery price
ssq
Regression sum of squares ;
Equation
lsqobj
Least squares objective ;
lsqobj .. sum(grain,sum(ty,sqr(hvprice(ty,grain)
-alpha(grain)-beta(grain)*sum(cropact,map(cropact,grain)*yield(ty,cropact)))))
+ sum(ty,sqr(yield(ty,'trdct')-calpha-cbetar*rainfall(ty)
-cbetarr*sqr(rainfall(ty))-cbetap*pcot(ty)))
+ sum(grain,sum(ty,sqr(rcprice(ty,grain)-rpalpha(grain)
-rpbeta(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain))))
+ sum(grain,sum(ty,sqr(hnprice(ty,grain)-hpalpha(grain)
-hphbeta(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain)
-hprbeta(grain)*rcprice(ty,grain))))
=e= ssq ;
Model HPReg / lsqobj / ;
Solve HPReg using nlp minimizing ssq ;
Parameters
rhvp(ty,*) Residuals for grain harvest prices regressed on yield
rrcp(ty,*) Residuals for grain recovery prices regressed on harvest price
rhnp(ty,*) Residuals for grain hungry prices regressed on harvest and recovery prices ;
rhvp(ty,grain) = hvprice(ty,grain)
-alpha.l(grain)-beta.l(grain)*sum(cropact,map(cropact,grain)*yield(ty,cropact)) ;
rrcp(ty,grain) = rcprice(ty,grain)-rpalpha.l(grain)
-rpbeta.l(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain) ;
rhnp(ty,grain) = hnprice(ty,grain)-hpalpha.l(grain)
-hphbeta.l(grain)*hvprice(ty,grain)
-hprbeta.l(grain)*rcprice(ty,grain) ;
rhvp(ty,'prb') = 1/card(ty) ;
rrcp(ty,'prb') = 1/card(ty) ;
rhnp(ty,'prb') = 1/card(ty) ;
yield(t,cropact)$(not yield(t,'prob')) = 0 ;
display yield,rhvp,rrcp,rhnp ;
**Deterministic prices and residuals
Parameter
hprice(t,ty,*);
hprice(t,ty,grain)=
alpha.l(grain)+beta.l(grain)*sum(cropact,map(cropact,grain)*yield(ty,cropact))+ rhvp(ty,grain);
hprice(t,ty,'prob')= pry.l(t)*1/card(ty);
hprice(t,ty,grain)$(not hprice(t,ty,'prob'))=0;
Parameter
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,*);
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rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)= rpalpha.l(grain)+rpbeta.l(grain)*hprice(t,ty1,grain)+ rrcp(ty2,grain);
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'prob')= pry.l(t)*1/card(ty)**2 ;
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)$(not rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'prob'))=0;
Parameter
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,*);
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,grain)=
hpalpha.l(grain)+hphbeta.l(grain)*hprice(t,ty1,grain)+hprbeta.l(grain)*rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)+rhn
p(ty1,grain);
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,'prob')= pry.l(t)*1/card(ty)**3 ;
huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,grain)$(not huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,'prob'))=0;
display hprice,rprice,huprice;
Parameters
Table inpuse (cropact,inp) quantity of inputs used per activity
*seed= kg/ha; npk=kg/ha; urea=kg/ha; herb=lt/ha; insect=lt/ha manure=kg/ha
seedc seedma seedsor seedntso seedmi npkc ureac urea2 herb insect dap npkm
uream
trdct
trdma
trds
trdmi
ntso

30
0
0
0
0

0
20
0
0
0

0

0
0

9
0
0

0
0

0

0 0
0 5
10 0

150 50 0 3
5 0 0 0
0
0 0 2 0 0 100 100
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 50 0 0 50 0 0 ;

Table labusec (cropact,lper) qty of labor used on crop activity
*unit of labuse: pde=person day equivalent, 1pde=8 hours of work by an adult
* Human labor period definition see Coulibaly (1995)
*for the definition of the labor period, see Appendix IV in Coulibaly (1995)
*the definition of the labor periods vary per crop
*cot: L1=manure spray, L2= ridging, L3= seeding1 , L4=insecticide spray, L5= weeding and
fertil appl,
*L6= herbicide spray, L7= weed2 (is zero because no 2nd manual weeding but with animal
traction), L7= mounting, L8= harvest L9= harvest
*maize: L1=manure spray, L2=ridging and seeding1, L4=fert&weeding1, L5=weeding2,
L6=mounting, L7=harvest, L8=harvest
*sorg and mil : L1=manure spray, L2=ridging, L3=seeding1, L4=seeding2&thining,
L5=weeding, L6=weeding, L7=weeding, L8=mounting, L9=harvest, L10=harvest
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trdct
trdma
trds
trdmi
ntso

L1
24
30
0
0
24

L2 L3 L4
51 6
8
51 0 58
36 10 14
36 10 14
36 10 14

L5
72
50
17
17
17

L6
5
51
4
4
4

L7
0
20
10
10
10

L8 L9
L10
26 280 149
210 0
0
58 20
105
58 20
105
58 20
105;

Table labavail (labor,lper) family labor availability
*Adult members are composed of adult males, females and child labor
*labor are expressed in person day equivalent, 1 pde=8 hours
*Male adult works an average of 8 hours per day
*Female adult works an average of 6 hours a day, women are only available for planting, thinning
and harvesting
*Child works an average of 4 hours per day

L1 L2 L3
Male 208 104 104
Female 156 78 78
Child 104 52 54

L4 L5 L6
96 96 72
72 72 54
48 48 32

L7
120
90
60

L8 L9 L10
208 208 208
156 156 156
104 104 104 ;

Parameter
hirew(lper) wage (F CFA per day) hired labor
/L1 500, L2 500, L3 500, L4 500, L5 500, L6 500, L7 500, L8 500, L9 500, L10 500/
*incost(inp) /npk 268, urea1 268, herb 2888, insect 4510, seedc 34.5, seedma 400, seedmi 400,
seedsor 400,urea2 300, dap 340,seedntso 120/
*Inputs Prices 2008
*incost(inp) /npkc 369, ureac 380, npkm 351,uream 380, herb 4500, insect 4510, seedc 34.5,
seedma 400, seedmi 400, seedsor 400,urea2 350, dap 720,seedntso 120/
*Subsidized fert for sorgh=518, noS=615
*scenario P=231, all else constant
*incost(inp) /npkc 334, ureac 344, npkm 318,uream 344, herb 4078, insect 4088, seedc 31,
seedma 363, seedmi 363, seedsor 363, urea2 317, dap 653,seedntso 109/
*scenario P=231,and fertilizer cost changed
incost(inp) /npkc 243, ureac 243, npkm 243,uream 243, herb 4078, insect 4088, seedc 31,
seedma 363, seedmi 363, seedsor 363, urea2 243, dap 486,seedntso 109/
*scenario removal of fertilizer subsidy fertilizer cost at the 2011 market prices
*incost(inp) /npkc 342, ureac 303, npkm 335, uream 303, herb 4078, insect 4088, seedc 31,
seedma 363, seedmi 363, seedsor 363, urea2 303, dap 671,seedntso 109/
*Inputs Prices 2008 and subsidized fertilizer price for all crops
*incost(inp) /npkc 243, ureac 243, npkm 243,uream 243, herb 4500, insect 4510, seedc 34.5,
seedma 400, seedmi 400, seedsor 400,urea2 243, dap 486,seedntso 120/
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Qstock1(crop) initial stock of grain at the begining of the planting season
/ cot 0, mil 1200, sorg 1500, maiz 1000/
farmlab(labor) number of active family member /male 4, female 3, child 3/
exrcprice(crop)/ cot 222, mil 125, sorg 115, maiz 106/
mincons1 minimum household requirement in stage 1 /5103/
mincons2 minimum household requirement in stage 2 /3645/
mincons3 minimum household requirement in stage 3 /2916/ ;
Parameter Joint(t,ty,ty,ty) ;
Joint(t,ty1,ty2,ty3)=pry.l(t)* 1/card(ty1)*1/card(ty2)*1/card(ty3);
Scalar
*Scalar for the first stage
Icap1 initial capital /365000/
hhexp1 Household expenditures in the first stage /136240/
hhexp2 Household expenditures in the second stage /110000/
hhexp3 Household expenditures in the third stage /136240/
Harvreq harvest income requirement /163000/
pricecot announced cotton price /231/
Land1 constraint /12/
*Land constraint for millet
Land2 constraint /3/
socred /150000/
intrest/0.30/
land /15/
taum/0.20/
taus/0.32/
taumi/0.23/;
Positive Variables
cons1(crop)
Quantity of grain consumed during the agricultural season (kg)
Qsale1(crop)
Quantity of grain sold at the beginning of the planting season (kg)
Qpurch1(crop)
Quantity of grain purchased at the beginning of the planting season (kg)
Qtrans1(crop)
Quantity of grain transferred from planting to the end of harvest (kg)
Cashtrans1
Amount of cash transferred from the first period to the second one (F CFA)
Xha(cropact)
Area of land allocated to the different crops (ha)
totinp(inp)
Total quantity of purchased inputs used for the traditional technologies (kg)
Hlab(lper)
Agricultural labor hired on farm (man hours)
agprod(t,crop)
Harvest crop production (kg)
cons2 (crop,t,ty) Quantity of grain consumed during the second period by yield and harvest
price state of nature (kg)
Qsale2(crop,t,ty) Quantity of crop sold at harvest by yield and harvest price state of nature (kg)
Qpurch2 (crop,t,ty) Quantity of grain purchased at harvest by yield and price state of nature
(kg)
Qtrans2(crop,t,ty) Quantity of grain transferred from harvest to the recovering period by yield
and harvest price state of nature
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Cashtrans2(t,ty)
Amount of cash transferred from harvest to the recovering period by yield
and harvest price state of nature
Cons3(grain,t,ty,ty) Quantity of grain consumed during the third period (kg)
Qsale3 (grain,t,ty,ty) Quantity of grain sold at the end of the recovering period by yield harvest
price and recovering price state of nature (kg)
Qtrans3(grain,t,ty,ty) Quantity of grain transferred from the recovering period to the hungry
season by yield harvest price and recovering price state of nature (kg)
Cashtrans3(t,ty,ty) Amount of cash transferred from the recovering period to the hungry season
by yield harvest price and recovering price state of nature (kg)
Variable
Eprofit

Expected profit

;
Equations
GRAINBAL1
GRAINCONS1
CASHBAL1
LANDCROP1
LANDCROP2
INUSE(inp)
FARMLABAV(lper)
GRAINBAL2
APROD(crop,t)
GRAINCONS2(t,ty)
CASHBAL2(t,ty)
GRAINBAL3(grain,t,ty,ty)
GRAINCONS3(t,ty,ty)
CASHBAL3(t,ty,ty)
OBJECTIVE
HARVINC(t,ty)
GRAINCONSS(crop,t,ty)
COTONCRED(t)
NTSOCRED(t,ty,ty)
GRINK
LIMPURCH2(crop,t,ty)

Grain balance for the first period
Grain consumption first period
Cash balance for the first period
Land constraint for cotton, sorghum and maize
Land constraint for millet
Input used constraint
Farm labor availability
Grain balance for the second period
Agricultural production
Grain consumption second period
Cash balance second period
Grain balance third period
Grain consumption third period
Cash balance third period
Linear objective
Harvest income constraint
Grain consumption constraint related to agricultural production
Cotton credit
Improved sorghum credit
Improved sorghum credit constraint
Limit on grain purchase second period

;
GRAINBAL1 (crop)$(ord(crop) gt 1).. cons1(crop)+ Qsale1(crop)+ Qtrans1(crop)=l=
Qstock1(crop)+ Qpurch1(crop);
GRAINCONS1..sum((crop)$(ord(crop)gt 1), cons1(crop))=G= mincons1 ;
variable icap ;
positive variable borrow(t,ty);
CASHBAL1.. hhexp1 + sum((cropact)$((ord(cropact)gt 2)and(ord(cropact)lt
5)),sum((inp)$((ord(inp)gt 7)and (ord(inp)lt 11)), Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)))
+ exrcprice('sorg')*1.24*Qpurch1('sorg') +
exrcprice('mil')*1.23*Qpurch1('mil')+exrcprice('maiz')*1.37*Qpurch1('maiz')+Cashtrans1 =l=
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*Icap+ sum(crop $(ord(crop)gt 1),exrcprice(crop)*Qsale1(crop)) ;
Icap1+ sum(crop $(ord(crop)gt 1),exrcprice(crop)*Qsale1(crop)) ;
LANDCROP1.. sum(cropact$(not(ord(cropact)eq 4)),Xha(cropact))=L= Land1;
*Land constraint for millet
LANDCROP2..Xha('trdmi')=L= Land2;
INUSE(inp)..sum(cropact, inpuse(cropact,inp)*Xha(cropact))=E= totinp(inp);
FARMLABAV(lper)..sum(cropact,labusec(cropact,lper)*Xha(cropact)) =l=
sum(labor,labavail(labor,lper)*farmlab(labor))+ Hlab(lper);
positive variable borrow(t,ty);
*Constraints for the second period (End of December-May)
GRAINBAL2(crop,t,ty)$((ord(crop)gt 1)and(sy(t)))..cons2(crop,t,ty)+ Qsale2(crop,t,ty)+
Qtrans2(crop,t,ty) =l=
Qtrans1(crop)+agprod(t,crop)+ Qpurch2(crop,t,ty);
APROD(crop,t)$sy(t).. agprod(t,crop)=E=
sum(cropact,outmap(cropact,crop)*yield(t,cropact)*Xha(cropact));

GRAINCONS2(t,ty)$sy(t)..sum((crop)$(ord(crop)gt 1),cons2(crop,t,ty))=G=mincons2;
CASHBAL2(t,ty)$sy(t).. hhexp2 + hprice(t,ty,'mil')*1.38*Qpurch2('mil',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'sorg')
*1.39*Qpurch2('sorg',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'maiz')*1.40*Qpurch2('maiz',t,ty)+Cashtrans2(t,ty)
+ sum(lper,Hlab(lper)*hirew(lper))+sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)lt 3),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)lt 8),
Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)))=l=
hprice(t,ty,'mil')*Qsale2('mil',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'sorg')*Qsale2('sorg',t,ty)+
hprice(t,ty,'maiz')*Qsale2('maiz',t,ty)+ Cashtrans1+pricecot*agprod(t,'cot') ;
*Harvest income requirement
HARVINC(t,ty)$sy(t)..hprice(t,ty,'mil')*Qsale2('mil',t,ty)+ hprice(t,ty,'sorg')*Qsale2('sorg',t,ty)+
hprice(t,ty,'maiz')*Qsale2('maiz',t,ty)+ pricecot*agprod(t,'cot') =G= harvreq;
COTONCRED(t)$sy(t)..pricecot*agprod(t,'cot') =G= sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)lt
3),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)lt 8), Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)));
LIMPURCH2(crop,t,ty)$((ord(crop)gt 1)and(sy(t)))..Qpurch2(crop,t,ty) =L= cons2(crop,t,ty)Qtrans1(crop);
*Constraints of the third period (End of May-September)
GRAINBAL3(grain,t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t).. cons3(grain,t,ty1,ty2)+ Qsale3(grain,t,ty1,ty2)
+ Qtrans3(grain,t,ty1,ty2) =l= Qtrans2(grain,t,ty1)+ Qpurch3(grain,t,ty1,ty2);
GRAINCONS3(t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t)..sum(grain,cons3(grain,t,ty1,ty2)) =G= mincons3;
CASHBAL3(t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t).. hhexp3 + Cashtrans3(t,ty1,ty2)+ rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'mil')
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*1.22*Qpurch3('mil',t,ty1,ty2)+ rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'sorg')*1.23*Qpurch3('sorg',t,ty1,ty2)+
rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'maiz')
*1.27*Qpurch3('maiz',t,ty1,ty2)+ 1.12*(sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)eq 5),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)gt
10), Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp))))
=l= sum(grain,rprice(t,ty1,ty2,grain)*Qsale3(grain,t,ty1,ty2))+ Cashtrans2(t,ty1) ;

NTSOCRED(t,ty1,ty2)$sy(t)..rprice(t,ty1,ty2,'sorg')*agprod(t,'sorg') =G=
sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)eq 5),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)gt 10),
Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)));

GRINK.. sum((cropact)$(ord(cropact)eq 5),sum((inp)$(ord(inp)gt
10),Xha(cropact)*inpuse(cropact,inp)*incost(inp)))=L=socred;
*Expected profit

OBJECTIVE.. Eprofit =E= sum(t$sy(t),sum(ty1,sum(ty2,sum(ty3, huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,'prob')
*(sum(grain,huprice(t,ty1,ty2,ty3,grain)*Qtrans3(grain,t,ty1,ty2))+Cashtrans3(t,ty1,ty2))))));
Model Expprofit
/GRAINBAL1, CASHBAL1, LANDCROP1, LANDCROP2,INUSE, FARMLABAV,
GRAINBAL2, APROD, CASHBAL2, GRAINBAL3,
HARVINC,
COTONCRED,
GRINK ,
LIMPURCH2,
NTSOCRED,
CASHBAL3, OBJECTIVE,
GRAINCONS1, GRAINCONS2, GRAINCONS3/ ;
cashtrans3.up(sy,ty1,ty2) = 10000000 ;
qtrans3.up(grain,sy,ty1,ty2) = 1000000 ;
*Qsale3.fx(grain,sy,ty1,ty2)=0;
Qsale3.fx('maiz',sy,ty1,ty2)=0;
Qsale3.fx('mil',sy,ty1,ty2)=0;
xha.fx('ntso') = 0 ;
*Solve Expprofit using lp minimizing icap ;
*Qsale3.fx('sorg',t,ty1,ty2)=0;
Solve Expprofit using lp maximizing Eprofit ;
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